Dilma’s Nightmare: Venezuelan Crisis Spills Into Brazil

By Víctor M. Mijares, 2011 Americas Project Fellow; Research Fellow, German Institute of Global and Area Studies; and Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universidad Simón Bolívar; and Christopher Bahia Mendonça, Research Fellow, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, and PhD Candidate in Political Science at Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Although the hemisphere is keen to insulate itself from Venezuela’s political and economic problems, the country constantly challenges regional capabilities in crisis management. The latest victim of the turmoil in Venezuela is the Brazilian government. The failed attempt by an opposition group of Brazilian federal senators — led by Aécio Neves — to visit Venezuela’s imprisoned opposition leader, Leopoldo López, is confronting the administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff with the democratic regional power dilemma of whether or not to intervene in Venezuela.

The region is fully aware of Venezuela’s current situation. President Hugo Chávez’s death has forced an ongoing process of constant re-accommodation within chavismo, making President Nicolás Maduro a far less confident president who has blocked urgent economic reforms and compensates for the lack of democratic governance with repression. In addition, volatility in international oil markets in the last two years has further exposed Venezuela’s deepening economic troubles. As tensions mount, regional institutions have yet to take concrete actions against Venezuela. Intervention by the Organization of American States is constantly impeded its South American members —  Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador — as well as by Venezuela and Brazil, and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is tangled in the troublesome domestic politics of its member countries.

The multilateral quagmire has brought new opportunities for diplomatic involvement by  the U.S., which in March imposed sanctions on seven  top officials for alleged human rights violations and corruption. This development was a major setback for South America’s autonomy. For the past decade, regional crises among member countries, as well as domestic turmoil, had been managed by UNASUR — often under Brazilian leadership. However, as former Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso warned in early 2014, Brazil’s shortcomings in crisis management are undermining the country’s international image and leaving behind its once cherished role as the unquestionable South American leader.         

Historically, from Brazil’s diplomatic standpoint, it is quite unusual for the country’s Congress to be active in foreign affairs. The executive branch, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is traditionally responsible for the direction and tone of the country's external actions. Congress, in turn, is a ratification and control agent. However, seizing the moment of Dilma’s low popularity, the opposition is about to call the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Congress to explain Brazil’s acquiescence to Venezuela’s human rights violations in recent years, and to request the disaffiliation of Venezuela from MERCOSUR, South America’s leading trade bloc.

The timing is unfortunate for Dilma. As the Maduro administration is trapped in its own practices, inner-party conflicts and populist rhetoric, the Brazilian government is facing a major geopolitical dilemma amid the worst domestic conditions in 20 years. Brazil is struggling between assuming regional leadership by taking a bold stand in its approach to the crisis in Venezuela — e.g., coordinating actions with the Brazilian opposition to pressure Maduro to make political and/or economic concessions, such as releasing political prisoners or easing controls, and restraining public spending while trying to convince the different factions within Venezuelan opposition to work together — or keeping a safe distance and focusing on its own domestic troubles. Both are difficult choices.

On one hand, a crisis management approach would automatically point out that there is an irregular situation in Venezuela that should be attended by the international community. Despite the efforts of many former Ibero-American presidents to bring Venezuela's troubles to the world’s attention, no single leader in the region has  directly intervened. By being the first, Dilma's Brazil could gain diplomatic advantage by keeping Washington away from the region. However, it could also be the first step for Brazil to distance itself from an important ideological and business partner in the region. In addition, it could give the Brazilian opposition new arguments for questioning the Partido dos Trabalhadores’ (PT) historic relation with chavista-Venezuela. On the other hand, staying away from the crisis may result in giving up the idea of regaining its image of a rising power — since it would not be fulfilling its role of the region’s provider of stability. Moreover, the Venezuelan crisis has already spilled over into Brazil and any attempt to keep it contained is futile.

Venezuela is now an issue in Brazilian politics. If the Brazilian opposition is able to find foreign support and evidence of the government’s close cooperation with arguably the most corrupt and repressive regime in the region, PT’s era could come to an end under the worst of circumstances. This scenario might be coupled, for instance, with the Odebrecht case — the Brazilian construction giant involved in major corruption scandals in which bribes were allegedly paid in exchange for construction contracts with Petrobras and companies, such as those involved with building São Paulo’s stadium for the opening of the FIFA World Cup. This scandal could play a significant role if investigators trace links between the public sector and private interest in Odebrecht’s branch in Caracas, where the company allegedly got the contracts for Caracas’ subway extension with a waiver from public bidding, for instance.

The spillover of the Venezuelan crisis could also have serious implications for the rest of the region. Given the prominent role of Brazil as South America’s core power, its domestic instability hurts regional institutions like MERCOSUR and UNASUR. These organizations were created to fulfill development goals and, above all, to establish political autonomy as a bloc; this crisis could foster the tendency to weaken the commitment to regional and collective autonomy. This is not the first time that the region has been tested by a Venezuelan crisis, but its potential impact on Brazilian politics has never been stronger. This could be the first glimpse of a game-changing response in South America.

Voices of the Americas is a space for Americas Project fellows to share their insights into events unfolding in their home countries and in the region as a whole. The fellows' essays will also focus on economic development, institution building, democracy and the rule of law.

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