Introduction
Climate change and environmental changes are increasingly prominent drivers of migration. The great majority of individuals displaced find refuge within their own country, while some are forced to cross international borders.[1] By 2050, according to the World Bank’s Groundswell report, up to 216 million people across six world regions could be forced to move internally within their countries due to slow-onset effects of climate change such as water scarcity, lower crop productivity and rising sea levels.[2] By region, approximately 86 million individuals could be displaced within sub-Saharan Africa, 49 million in East Asia and the Pacific, 40 million in South Asia, 19 million in North Africa, 17 million in Latin America, and 5 million in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. These estimates paint a startling picture for displacement over the next several decades if government inaction on the intersection between climate, development, human rights and migration policies continues. Perhaps most importantly, migrants who leave their homes due to climate change are currently unprotected by international law or the domestic policies of most receiving countries.
The United Nations has defined a disaster as a “serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts.” It also defines the adverse effects of climate change as “changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.”[3] These changes contribute to the complexity of internal and cross-border migration, displacement and other forms of human mobility. Global warming is expected to worsen extreme weather events — including heavy rainfall, droughts, heatwaves and tropical storms.[4] Since mid-June 2022, for example, Pakistan has experienced heavy monsoon rains and the worst flooding the nation has seen in over a decade.[5] Currently, one third of the country is under water, and extremely heavy rains have impacted over 33 million people.[6] According to Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority, there have been over 1,700 deaths, more than 12,000 people injured, 1.1 million livestock lost, over 2.1 million houses damaged, and over 500,000 people forced to seek shelter in relief camps.[7] Extreme weather events can hinder swift humanitarian responses, exacerbating issues such as food insecurity and threatening the health and livelihoods of vulnerable populations.[8] In this case, Pakistan hosts around 1.3 million Afghan refugees, 420,000 of whom live in the most heavily affected provinces.[9] There is a dire need for greater international cooperation, along with adaptive policies and action for future preparedness. If not, climate-related challenges, losses and damages — ecological, human and economic — will continue.
The international community must prepare for individuals displaced internally or across borders in the context of climate change. This report investigates the possible pathways forward to ensure that individuals displaced by climate change have adequate legal protection. We begin by examining the forecasted implications of climate change as well as the complexity of quantifying and defining “climate refugees.” Second, we assess possible pathways for protection at the international, regional and individual country levels to determine how various systems of refugee protection could be extended to include individuals fleeing climate change. Finally, we discuss best ways forward for policy approaches and practices that are climate-resilient and inclusive.
Forecasted Implications of Climate Change
It is important to distinguish between climate processes and climate events. Climate processes happen at a slow pace and cumulatively, bringing serious implications for food and human security. Examples include sea level rise, the salinization of crop lands and desertification. In contrast, climate events are sudden environmental disasters that reap geophysical havoc, affecting a vast number of people in a short period of time. Examples include flooding, hurricanes, typhoons and other storm-like occurrences.[10] Different countries and regions have varying adaptation capacities and abilities to respond to climate processes and climate events, ultimately determined by the quality of their economic, human development and governance practices.
According to the 2022 United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people are living in countries with high human vulnerability to climate change.[11] Weather change patterns are making certain parts of the world uninhabitable as their populations are constantly in a battle against time and water accessibility to grow crops. In many cases, affected communities must endure long drought spells or severe flooding, making food and water supplies undependable. Climate change disasters in physical forms manifest through the following categories, bringing devastating human, economic, material and environmental losses: 1) floods, heavy rains and strong winds; 2) coastal storms and sea level rise; 3) impacts of increased carbon dioxide concentrations; 4) droughts; and 5) extreme heat. The adverse effects of climate change also create a series of human rights impacts through the intersection of gender, race, class, indigenous identity, age, disability, income, migratory status and geographical location, potentially creating further vulnerability.[12] As depicted in Figure 1, disasters continue to trigger most displacements worldwide, with 23.7 million recorded in 2021.[13]
Figure 1: Internal Displacements Worldwide 2012-2021
For example, climate projections report that by 2050, the number of people at risk of floods will increase from the current level of 1.2 billion to 1.6 billion, and 3.2 billion people will live in water-scarce areas.[14] Frequent clustering of cities on coastlines and unregulated urban growth will also increase individuals’ vulnerability when natural disasters strike.[15] Small island states such as Samoa, Niue and Vanuatu, Kiribati, Palau and the Solomon Islands are more at risk than others, facing higher annual average loss and damage from cyclone impact, warming oceans and rising sea levels.[16] The Pacific region reports that in the last three decades, disaster-related losses amounted to approximately US$3.3 billion, affecting at least 6.3 million people.[17] For agriculture and fishing-based communities, these disasters create a human security risk that threatens basic livelihoods by reducing arable land and decreasing fishing stocks, in addition to the effects of coral bleaching and the loss of ecosystem services. There are also non-economic losses and damages related to cultural sites that are being eroded by storm surges and rising sea levels, as well as the loss of life, human health, biodiversity and territory.[18] Food crises linked to repeated weather extremes, such as prolonged droughts are also issues of grave concern, with many children at great risk of food insecurity, malnutrition and starvation, particularly in East Africa, South and Central America, and Central Asia.[19] Finally, heat waves in southern Asia and the Middle East have disproportionately impacted individuals already living in poverty, particularly women and those in low-income employment. By 2030, the unavoidable economic losses due to climate change are projected to reach between $290 billion and $580 billion.[20]
The Difficulty of Defining “Climate Refugees”
At present, individuals who migrate due to climate change impacting their livelihood or safety are not entitled to protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which form the backbone of most asylum systems worldwide. Many argue that opening the UN Refugee Convention and revising the definition of who classifies as a refugee could result in an even narrower definition given today’s highly politicized climate.[21]
Despite a lack of agreement over its definition, the term “climate refugee” has gained popularity in recent years and is now used by politicians, international organizations, NGOs, academics and media outlets. Along with the broad category of “refugee,” the terms “climate refugee” and “climate migrant” have been racialized and stigmatized over the last decade.[22] Some argue for a broader, more encompassing concept. For example, the International Organization for Migration uses the term “environmentally displaced persons,” which it defines as “persons who are displaced within their country of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration, or destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one.”[23] Others are skeptical of the extent to which climate-induced migration poses a threat, arguing that in the cases of floods and other environmental havoc, the vast majority of people move short distances internally and at times temporarily –– such as to the next neighborhood, village or town –– and that most people living in developing countries do not have the resources to move longer distances or across borders.[24] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has thus been hesitant to extend the term “refugee” to people displaced externally and internally due to climate disruption, arguing that those displaced as a result of environmental change can still rely on the protection of their national governments, whereas traditional refugees cannot.[25] In the absence of an agreed upon definition, we discuss the different options available to provide protection to individuals displaced by climate change.
Scales of Protection: The Use of New and Existing Legal Pathways for Individuals Displaced by Climate Change
The processes and frameworks currently available to address individuals displaced by climate change include an extensive list of partnerships, commissions, conventions, standards and cross-cutting agendas. However, international law still has no clear mechanism or legally binding solutions for these individuals. The following sections address the different scales of protection currently available, including at the international, regional and individual country levels.
International Responses
A clear international framework that regulates the protection of individuals displaced by climate change is yet to be developed. However, the international community has taken several steps in recognizing the importance of climate-induced displacement in the last decade.
The Nansen Initiative, launched by the Norwegian and Swiss governments in 2012, was one of the first initiatives that focused on recognizing and protecting individuals displaced by climate change at the international level. The initiative involved regional consultations with governments and civil society actors, including in the Pacific, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia and South Asia. Their efforts resulted in a non-binding agenda endorsed by 109 states in 2015 to fill the legal protection gap for individuals displaced by climate change.[26]
The Task Force on Displacement (TFD), created in 2015 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), currently represents the most advanced example of a broad global policy framework integrating human mobility and climate change dimensions.[27] In its first phase, the TFD developed a set of comprehensive recommendations “to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.”[28] Currently in its second phase, the TFD’s objective is to implement such recommendations, including developing national and subnational legislation, policies and strategies to reduce climate-induced displacement and enhancing research, data collection, risk analysis and information sharing to understand and manage human mobility driven by climate change.[29]
The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, endorsed in 2018, acknowledged the urgent situation of migrants being displaced because of climate change, and included a call to “develop coherent approaches to address the challenges of migration movements in the context of sudden-onset and slow-onset natural disasters.”[30] More recently, in May 2022, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants announced that his forthcoming report to the 77th session of the General Assembly, which opened on September 13, is dedicated to the issue of the impact of climate change and the protection of the human rights of migrants.[31]
The UNHCR also took a stand on the issue of climate migration when it released a statement titled, “Legal considerations regarding claims for international protection made in the context of the adverse effects of climate change and disasters,” in October 2020. The document states that people fleeing in the context of the adverse effects of climate change and disasters may have valid claims for refugee status under the 1951 Convention.[32] This paper constituted an important step by the UNHCR in acknowledging the diverse consequences of climate change and disasters — including the growing prevalence, spread and severity of new and reemerging diseases, food insecurity, famine, water scarcity and exposure to exploitation and trafficking. It also highlighted that the adverse effects of climate change and disasters are often worsened by other factors such as poor governance, public disorder, fragile ecosystems, socio-economic inequalities, xenophobia, and political and religious tensions, which in some cases can lead to violence. These compounding factors may compel individuals to leave their country and seek international protection. However, this guidance and current international refugee law may only be applicable in limited situations where the adverse effects of climate change collide with other factors, such as violence and conflict, and does not provide a solution for displacement due to slow-onset climate change or climate processes.
As noted earlier, none of these instruments or reports are legally binding for states, which are ultimately the arbiters of protection for individuals displaced across borders. As such, international actors have emphasized that states must be the entities to extend legal status to those displaced by climate change. Until further coherence on global instruments can be achieved, the domestic implementation of regional agreements and actions taken by individual countries provide the most relevant levels of protection, as detailed in the following two sections.[33]
Regional Responses
The UNHCR handbook suggests that since it is the role of states to widen the definition of refugee status, the push to address climate-induced migration must come from individual states or regional coalitions.[34] The UNHCR handbook clearly articulates, “primary responsibility lies with States for preventing displacement when possible and, when it cannot be avoided, for protecting displaced people as well as finding durable solutions for their displacement.”[35]
Several regional mechanisms and frameworks provide broader definitions of refugees and migrants who have the right to seek protection compared to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. As a result, they provide a higher chance of recognition for individuals displaced by climate change — but they also come with their own subset of challenges.
One of the oldest regional protection instruments is the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. It has been ratified by 46 African countries, making its provisions legally binding domestically.[36] This convention broadens the UN definition of a refugee to include every person who has to seek refuge in a different country due to “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality.”[37] Although there is no specific mention of climate change or environmental disasters, it could be argued that these phenomena constitute a serious disturbance to the public order of a country. Nonetheless, the OAU Convention does not guarantee safeguard for individuals fleeing due to climate change, as climate change and environmental disasters are not listed as qualifying conditions to obtain refugee status. This means refugee claims from these individuals are assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Another regional instrument is the Cartagena Declaration, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama in 1984. Its definition of refugees is similar to that of the OAU Convention, considering refugees those who “have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”[38] Once again, the definition does not explicitly mention fleeing due to climate change or environmental disasters as a valid claim to obtain refugee status, but it could be framed within the “other circumstances” category. Although the Cartagena Declaration is not legally binding, 15 Latin American countries have incorporated its broader refugee definition into their national law or practice, making it one of the most relevant instruments in regard to climate-related displacement in the region.[39] The Cartagena definition is used prominently; for example, as of 2020 Mexico and Brazil have granted refugee status to more than 12,000 and 46,000 Venezuelan refugees, respectively, using the Cartagena Declaration’s broad definition.[40] If this definition can be used to provide protection to those who normally would not qualify for refugee status under the Refugee Convention, it is reasonable to believe that individuals displaced by climate change could also be included under this category.
The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa (2009), known as the Kampala Convention, is also worth mentioning as it is the only binding agreement on IDPs.[41] The Kampala Convention has been ratified by over 30 African countries and is the only binding agreement that explicitly mentions “natural or human-made disasters, including climate change” as one of the reasons why IDPs should be entitled to protection.[42] The inclusion of climate change as a qualifying reason for obtaining protection is a great step forward, especially since, according to predictions, most individuals displaced by climate change will end up being internally displaced and never cross international borders. However, 13 years after the adoption of the convention, states have fallen short at implementing its provisions at the national level. Only Niger has adopted a law on the protection of IDPs, and four additional countries have drafted laws for the implementation of the convention.[43]
More recently, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa, composed of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, adopted the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD Region. The protocol was endorsed by the committee of ambassadors, ministers of interior and ministers of labor of the IGAD states, and it recognizes “the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation as important drivers of displacement and migration.” It therefore provides protection to citizens of IGAD states who are “moving in anticipation of, during or in the aftermath of disaster.”[44] Although challenges remain regarding the national ratification process and the implementation of the protocol, it could offer solutions to countries that are severely affected by drought and environmental degradation, making them more prone to outward migration.[45]
Another regional framework is the Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, adopted by the League of Arab States in 1994. Although this convention was never ratified by the League of Arab States, and therefore is not legally binding, it includes natural disasters as a qualifying reason to apply for refugee status. It defines a refugee as “any person who unwillingly takes refuge in a country other than his country of origin or his habitual place of residence because of sustained aggression against, occupation and foreign domination of such country or because of the occurrence of natural disasters or grave events resulting in major disruption of public order in the whole country or any part thereof.”[46] Several countries of the League of Arab States, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have also not yet recognized the 1951 Refugee Convention, which is especially concerning since these countries are major migrant and refugee-hosting states.[47]
Other regional frameworks are being discussed, such as the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, developed over the last two years through consultations and research.[48] Over 100 state and non-state actors from the Pacific met this summer to discuss the draft documents and consider how the framework will be reflected in national policies.[49] If this framework is finalized and its provisions are adopted as national policies, it will be an important step toward finding solutions to climate-induced displacement — particularly because Pacific island countries are among the most affected by climate change due to sea level rise. In fact, eight islands in the Pacific have already been submerged, and two more are rapidly disappearing.[50]
In theory, these frameworks have the potential to offer broader opportunities to protect individuals displaced by climate change — but in practice, it is difficult to assess their effectiveness. First, climate change intersects with other drivers of migration — including economic factors — making climate-induced migration difficult to quantify. Second, data on displacement across borders due to disasters or climate events are available to a small extent, but data on displacement due to slow-onset climate change, or climate processes, are almost non-existent from a quantitative perspective.[51] An exception is the availability of quantitative data on internal displacement due to disasters, as the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center has been monitoring displacement linked to disasters for over 20 years.[52] Lastly, there is little, if any, global data available regarding how many individuals are able to obtain protection through the regional frameworks described — with very few exceptions such as data on the number of humanitarian visas granted in Argentina and the number of individuals granted temporary protected status (TPS) in the United States.[53]
Individual Responses
As highlighted above, several Latin American countries have incorporated the broader refugee definition of the Cartagena Declaration into their national law or practice. In 2011, Mexico passed the Law on Refugees, Complementary Protection and Political Asylum, which includes the Cartagena refugee definition. Furthermore, Mexico’s “Regulations of the Migration Law” provide protection for humanitarian reasons to individuals fleeing disasters in their country of origin.[54] It is unclear how often individuals displaced by climate change are able to obtain protection in Mexico, but between 2006 and 2017, Haitians affected by the 2010 earthquake and 2016 hurricane were able to obtain refugee status on the ground of “other circumstances” that have seriously perturbed public order.[55]
Argentina, which also uses the broader definition of refugee in the Cartagena Declaration, took a significant step in 2022 toward the protection of individuals displaced by environmental disasters. The country recently announced a special humanitarian visa to facilitate regular admission of individuals from Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean who are fleeing socio-natural disasters, for a period of three years.[56] This step is significant, as these regions have been gravely affected by climate change. Extreme weather events such as torrential rain and flooding followed by long droughts have already affected 2.2 million people in the region known as the “Dry Corridor” — comprising Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.[57]
New Zealand operates a labor migration scheme with the island nations of Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu and Kiribati through an agreement known as the Pacific Access Category. The agreements are small in scale — only 250 people each from Fiji and Tonga and 75 each from Tuvalu and Kiribati are accepted each year — but they still represent an avenue through which individuals might migrate regularly.[58] In 2017, New Zealand considered developing experimental humanitarian visas for Pacific Islanders affected by climate change. However, they were never implemented, as Pacific Islanders wanted to avoid the stigma of refugee status and asked the New Zealand government to reduce emissions, provide other legal migration pathways and support adaptation efforts.[59]
Lastly, the United States does not have a federal framework that addresses climate-induced displacement, though there are some provisions that offer protection to migrants fleeing disasters, such as temporary protected status (TPS) and deferred enforced departure (DED), which allow individuals who are already present in the U.S. to stay in the country because of ongoing conflict or environmental disasters, among other factors, in their countries of origin.[60] Yet these two instruments are only temporary and apply exclusively to individuals who are already in the United States. As such, they do not provide a regular pathway for individuals displaced by climate change to be admitted into the United States. The Biden administration has expressed increased interest in finding solutions for climate-induced displacement. In February 2022, President Biden signed the executive order “Rebuilding and Enhancing Programs to Resettle Refugees and Planning for the Impact of Climate Change on Migration,” directing the national security advisor to draft a report on climate change and its impact on migration.[61] This report provides a helpful overview of the current protection landscape for individuals displaced by climate change, as well as policy recommendations for the U.S. government, but it has not yet resulted in any policy changes.
Conclusion
The idea of protecting the rights of individuals displaced by climate change is not yet fully accepted within international law. As a result, the available options for protection are haphazard and uneven, varying according to geography, region and even temporality. This report assessed the different levels of protection currently available, ultimately arguing that the domestic implementation of regional agreements and the pathways offered by individual countries offer the best ways forward at present.
Broadening protection beyond existing pathways will entail a rethinking of migration as a climate change adaptation strategy and not simply as a “crisis.”[62] Historically, migration has been a mechanism of societies to respond to climate stress. While migration is not usually the first adaptive response to climate change, it can become a necessity when other means of adaptation — such as selling crop yields or livestock — become insufficient, and individuals can no longer rely on their governments for assistance or are unable to support themselves or their families.[63] Not without reason, the UN Human Rights Council declared in 2021 that a healthy, sustainable and livable environment is a human right, acknowledging that the air we breathe, the food we eat, the water we drink, our health, well-being and survival all depend on a clean, healthy and sustainable environment.[64]
It is also important to note the general trend of wealthy countries in the Global North looking to countries in the Global South to host refugees. Countries in the Global South will be most impacted by climate change and disasters, and yet they have fewer economic and technological resources to implement mitigation techniques. While countries in the Global South have generally been those to adopt more expansive refugee definitions — including regional definitions like the Cartagena Declaration or the OAU Convention — it should not be solely up to these countries to “solve” the issue of individuals displaced by climate change, especially considering that the Global South already hosts more than 80% of the world’s current refugees. Moving forward, whether at the international, regional or individual country level, it is important that collective efforts include climate-resilient policies and responses that are inclusive and provide targeted investments and developmental assistance for the countries and regions most impacted by climate change.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Alizay Azeem, Emelia Gauch and Sophia Lima for their research assistance.
Endnotes
[1] M. McAuliffe and A. Triandafyllidou, eds., World Migration Report 2022. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva, 2021, https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022.
[2] Viviane Clement et al., “Groundswell Part II: Acting on Internal Climate Migration,” World Bank, 2021, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36248.
[3] United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “Disaster Terminology,” n.d., https://www.undrr.org/terminology/disaster; United Nations, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” 1992, https://bit.ly/3es3rQb.
[4] Tim Gaynor, “‘Climate change is the defining crisis of our time and it particularly impacts the displaced,’” UNHCR, November 30, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2020/11/5fbf73384/climate-change-defining-crisis-time-particularly-impacts-displaced.html.
[5] Sara E. Pratt, “Devastating Floods in Pakistan,” NASA Earth Observatory, August 31, 2022, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/150279/devastating-floods-in-pakistan.
[6] Imran Mukhtar, “‘Start my life from zero’: Poor Pakistanis face heavy cost of floods,” Reuters, September 5, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/pakistan-floods-climate-aid-idAFL8N3093XX.
[7] NDMA (Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority), “Daily SITREP No 116 Dated 7th October, 2022,” https://cms.ndma.gov.pk//storage/app/public/situation-reports/October2022/OpjiVyHZ4mHMKLiCS5do.pdf; NDMA, “Monsoon 2022 Daily Situation Report No 93,” September 14, 2022, http://cms.ndma.gov.pk/storage/app/public/situation-reports/September2022/lBHvZcghKHlBWMyx7qIM.pdf.
[8] Clement et al., “Groundswell Part II.”
[9] UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), “UNHCR rushes aid by air and road after Pakistan floods; steps up Afghanistan relief,” September 6, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/9/6317099f4/unhcr-rushes-aid-air-road-pakistan-floods-steps-afghanistan-relief.html.
[10] Ian Fry, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change,” United Nations General Assembly, July 26, 2022.
[11] IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), “2022: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability,” Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, In Press.
[12] S. Nazrul Islam and John Winkel, “Climate Change and Social Inequality,” Working Paper 152, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, October 2017, https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2017/wp152_2017.pdf.
[13] Disasters included in this report are geophysical (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides) and weather-related (storms, floods, wildfires, droughts, landslides, extreme temperatures, cyclones and other storms) events. See IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre), Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID) 2022, May 2022, https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/2022-global-report-on-internal-displacement.
[14] United Nations, “Water and Climate Change,” n.d. https://www.unwater.org/water-facts/water-and-climate-change.
[15] National Intelligence Council, “Structural Drivers of the Future Demographic Trends: The Future of Migration,” April 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/GT2040/NIC-2021-02486--Future-of-Migration--Unsourced--14May21.pdf.
[16] Leila Mead, “Small Islands, Large Oceans: Voices on the Frontlines of Climate Change,” March 2021, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Brief #15, https://www.iisd.org/system/files/2021-03/still-one-earth-SIDS.pdf.
[17] Sabira Coelho, “Background paper for the Pacific Regional Policy Dialogue on Climate Mobility,” September-December 2020, International Organization for Migration, https://bit.ly/3ROENa5; Debarati Guha-Sapir, Pascaline Wallemacq, Philippe Hoyois, and Regina Below, “Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2016: The Numbers and Trends,” CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters), October 2017, https://emdat.be/sites/default/files/adsr_2016.pdf.
[18] Coelho, “Background paper for the Pacific Regional Policy Dialogue on Climate Mobility.”
[19] United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, “Drought in numbers,” May 11, 2022, https://www.unccd.int/resources/publications/drought-numbers.
[20] Tracy Carty and Lyndsay Walsh, “Footing the bill: Fair finance for loss and damage in an era of escalating climate impacts,” Oxfam International, June 7, 2022, https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/footing-bill-fair-finance-loss-and-damage-era-escalating-climate-impacts.
[21] Elizabeth Ferris and Jonas Bergmann, “Soft law, migration and climate change governance,” Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 8, no. 1 (2017): 6-29, https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2017.01.01.
[22] Lydia Ayame Hiraide, “Climate Refugees: A Useful Concept? Towards an Alternative Vocabulary of Ecological Displacement,” Politics (February 2022), https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957221077257.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Hein de Haas, “Climate refugees. The fabrication of a migration threat,” Hein de Haas (personal blog), January 31, 2020, http://heindehaas.blogspot.com/2020/01/climate-refugees-fabrication-of.html.
[25] Joanna Apap, “The concept of ‘climate refugee’: Towards a possible definition,” EPRS: European Parliamentary Research Service, Belgium, 2019, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/1335316/the-concept-of-climate-refugee/1941760/.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Mariam Traore Chazalnoel and Dina Ionesco, “IOM Perspectives on Climate Change and Migration,” International Organization for Migration (blog), January 12, 2019, https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/blogs/iom-perspectives-climate-change-and-migration.
[28] International Organization for Migration, “Task Force on Displacement,” n.d. https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/task-force-displacement.
[29] UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), “Report of the Task Force on Displacement,” September 17, 2018, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/2018_TFD_report_17_Sep.pdf.
[30] Apap, “The concept of 'climate refugee'”; “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” July 13, 2018, 9, https://bit.ly/3epdxkQ.
[31] United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, “Report on the impact of climate change and the protection of the human rights of migrants,” last updated May 24, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2022/report-impact-climate-change-and-protection-human-rights-migrants.
[32] The paper notes that, like any other claim, it must show the claimant meets the criteria in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, or be compelled to seek protection outside their own country due to events seriously disturbing the public order under Article I(2) of the 1969 OAU Convention and Conclusion III(3) of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration. See UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), “Legal considerations regarding claims for international protection made in the context of the adverse effects of climate change and disasters,” October 1, 2020, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5f75f2734.html.
[33] International Organization for Migration, “Mapping Human Mobility (Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation) and Climate Change in International Processes, Policies and Legal Frameworks,” August 2018, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM%20TFD%20II.2%20Output.pdf; Chazalnoel and Ionesco, “IOM Perspectives on Climate Change and Migration.”
[34] Frances Nicholson and Judith Kumin, “A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum systems,” Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook for Parliamentarians no. 27, 2017, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5a9d57554.pdf.
[35] Ibid.
[36] African Union, “List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,” May 16, 2019, https://bit.ly/3yyn4x7.
[37] OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, Addis-Ababa, 10 September 1969, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/45dc1a682/oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html.
[38] Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama November 22, 1984, 36, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html.
[39] Valentina Canepa and Daniela Gutierrez Escobedo, “Can Regional Refugee Definitions Help Protect People Displaced by Climate Change in Latin America?” Refugees International (blog), February 16, 2021, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/2/16/can-regional-refugee-definitions-help-protect-people-displaced-by-climate-change-in-latin-america; Luisa Feline Freier, Isabel Berganza, and Cécile Blouin, “The Cartagena Refugee Definition and Venezuelan Displacement in Latin America,” International Migration 60, no. 1 (2022): 18-36, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imig.12791.
[40] Canepa and Gutierrez Escobedo, “Can Regional Refugee Definitions Help Protect People Displaced by Climate Change in Latin America?”; Feline Freier, Berganza, and Blouin, “The Cartagena Refugee Definition and Venezuelan Displacement in Latin America.”
[41] Megan Bradley, “A Landmark for Human Rights: The Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement Comes into Effect,” Brookings Institution (blog), December 6, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2012/12/06/a-landmark-for-human-rights-the-kampala-convention-on-internal-displacement-comes-into-effect/.
[42] UNHCR,“UNHCR welcomes Ethiopia’s ratification of Kampala Convention,” February 14, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2020/2/5e468f7d4/unhcr-welcomes-ethiopias-ratification-kampala-convention.html; African Union, African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), adopted by the Special Summit of the Union Kampala, Uganda 23rd October 2009, 13, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-treaty-kampala_convention.pdf.
[43] Eve Massingham, Angela Cotroneo, Livia Hadorn, and Alexandra Ortiz, “The Kampala Convention: key recommendations 10 years on,” Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, December 2019, https://bit.ly/3TagJja.
[44] IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), “Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD Region,” February 26, 2020, Khartoum, Sudan, 2, 11, https://bit.ly/3rLtOnd.
[45] European Commission, “EUTF supports the Protocol on the Free movement of Persons in the IGAD region,” December 13, 2021, https://bit.ly/3EAJ3XU.
[46] League of Arab States, Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, 1994, https://www.refworld.org/docid/4dd5123f2.html.
[47] Maja Janmyr, “The 1951 Refugee Convention and Non-Signatory States: Charting a Research Agenda,” International Journal of Refugee Law 33, no. 2 (June 2021): 188–213, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeab043.
[48] ICAAD (International Center for Advocates Against Discrimination), “ICAAD Joins CSO Partners at the First-Ever Regional Climate Mobility Dialogue,” June 2022, https://icaad.ngo/2022/07/15/icaad-joins-cso-partners-at-the-first-ever-regional-climate-mobility-dialogue/.
[49] ILO (International Labour Organization), “High-level Dialogue on the New Regional Framework on Climate Mobility concludes,” June 24, 2022, https://www.ilo.org/suva/public-information/WCMS_850454/lang--en/index.htm.
[50] John Podesta, “The climate crisis, migration, and refugees,” Brookings Institution, July 25, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/.
[51] International Organization for Migration's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, “Types of Migration: Environmental Migration,” last updated June 21, 2022, https://bit.ly/3EHy4Ma.
[52] IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre), “Displacement, disasters and climate change,” n.d, https://www.internal-displacement.org/research-areas/Displacement-disasters-and-climate-change.
[53] Ibid; International Organization for Migration's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, “Types of Migration: Environmental Migration.”
[54] Simon Behrman and Avidan Kent, eds. Climate Refugees: Global, Local and Critical Approaches, (Cambridge University Press, 2022). See Reglamento de la Ley de Migración, Diario Oficial de la Federación, September 28, 2012, https://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/regley/Reg_LMigra.pdf
[55] Behrman and Kent, eds. Climate Refugees: Global, Local and Critical Approaches.
[56] Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina, “Dirección Nacional de Migraciones,” May 16, 2022, https://www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/262784/20220519; Argentine Republic, “Migraciones anunció ante la ONU un visado para desplazados por desastres socio-naturales de México,” Centroamérica y el Caribe, May 19, 2022, https://www.argentina.gob.ar/noticias/migraciones-anuncio-ante-la-onu-un-visado-para-desplazados-por-desastres-socio-naturales-0.
[57] World Food Program, “The Dry Corridor,” n.d, https://www.wfpusa.org/emergencies/dry-corridor.
[58] Suong Vong, “Protecting Climate Refugees is Crucial for the Future,” Humanity in Action, May 2017, https://humanityinaction.org/knowledge_detail/protecting-climate-refugees-is-crucial-for-the-future/.
[59] Helen Dempsten and Kayly Ober, “New Zealand's ‘Climate Refugee’ Visas: Lessons for the Rest of the World,” Center for Global Development (blog), January 10, 2020, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-zealands-climate-refugee-visas-lessons-rest-world.
[60] Erol Yayboke, Trevor Houser, Janina Staguhn, and Tani Salma, “A New Framework for U.S. Leadership on Climate Migration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 23, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-framework-us-leadership-climate-migration.
[61] The White House, “Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration,” October 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Migration.pdf.
[62] Clement, et al., “Groundswell Part II.”
[63] Oli Brown, “Migration and Climate change, 2008,” International Organization for Migration, Migration Research Series No. 31, https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-no-31-migration-and-climate-change.
[64] UNCHR, “Right to healthy environment,” April 12, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2022/04/right-healthy-environment.
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