Author(s)
Introduction
Unprecedented in modern history, the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the globe in early 2020 leaving much of the world in a state of paralysis for several years. It led to dramatic reconfigurations of societies, polities, and economies. Even nations with a capable administrative apparatus — usually the prime insurer against misfortune and market failure — were brought low by this novel pathogen. The wealthiest countries in the world were unable to obtain the medical equipment needed to cope with the threat, and found themselves reduced to asking citizens to lock themselves up in their homes, much as medieval authorities did during prior plagues. While these dramatic, brute-force measures did curb the loss of life, they also brought on an economic catastrophe every bit as harrowing as the medical one they helped to avert. The interplay of these dynamics was felt acutely in the Muslim-majority world because of pervasive problems of underdevelopment, chronic state weakness, and limited trust in government.
Through a series of online surveys in key Muslim-majority countries, this report evaluates the pandemic’s effect on the religious lives of Muslims, as well as its impact on their mental health and views of their government’s handling of the crisis. Amid the multifaceted disruption caused by the pandemic, our study found that religion took on new and outsized importance for Muslims across Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Context: The Pandemic and Religion
Modern social science has long held that religion functions as a balm in the face of adversity. Scholars as diverse as Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud all viewed religious faith as an antidote to the alienating effects of modernity, or as a means of coping with insecurity and uncertainty. More recently, Kenneth Scheve and Davis Stasavage argued that religion limits “the psychic costs of adverse life events” such as losing employment or sickness.[1] Similarly, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart argue that “the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks,” suggesting that “feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal, and personal risks are a key factor driving religiosity.”[2] In an experimental study in Tunisia, Sharan Grewal and his co-authors found that experimental subjects who were assigned to feel a sense of economic scarcity appeared to place greater value on the compensations of the hereafter.[3]
Given the extent of COVID-19’s damage to human lives and its economic and social effects, the pandemic proved to be a major global catastrophe, and might therefore be expected to have led to increases in religiosity worldwide. Jeanet Bentzen found evidence for this proposition: More people around the world were using Google to search for prayers, which suggested that they were “turn[ing] to religion for comfort and explanation.”[4] In contrast, Brian Hollar speculated that the pandemic might instead cause a religious recession, as the pandemic-induced elimination of many communal faith practices (such as prayer in congregation) could lead to the long-term dissociation of individuals from their faith communities.[5] A recent German study, based on an online survey of almost 2,000 respondents, seemed to provide evidence in favor of the former proposition, finding that almost a third of those surveyed reported an increase in religious faith since the beginning of the pandemic, with only 11% reporting a decrease in faith.[6]
Likewise, religious beliefs and institutions have been recognized for their vital roles in enabling the faithful to cope with disruption and tragedy. Scriptural assurances of a heavenly afterlife and divine justice provide individuals with psychological comfort in the face of adverse life events. As the coronavirus ravaged communities, ordinary citizens seemed to attach greater value to religious ritual and practice. Some governments mobilized religion, religious institutions, and authorities to encourage citizens to comply with efforts to mitigate the spread of the pandemic.[7]
The COVID-19 pandemic also required changes in social behavior that have had distinctive and wide-ranging implications for faith practices in Muslim communities — e.g., with respect to the religious permissibility of suspending congregational prayers or regarding Sufi devotional rites that incorporate various forms of interpersonal proximity and contact. As with any sudden shift in social norms and behavior, coronavirus measures in some Muslim settings have generated heated discussions about the extent to which these measures are consistent with Islamic norms and whether they have a basis in prophetic tradition (sunna).
Study Overview
To explore Muslim responses to the pandemic, we conducted a series of online surveys in several key Muslim-majority countries that allow for cross-regional comparisons. While our primary interest lies in identifying individual religious responses to the pandemic in the Muslim world, these responses materialize in a complex web of factors inherent in each country — this required us to carefully consider case selection. Given the vast diversity in the Muslim world, we aimed to select countries that would best represent this diversity — i.e., ethnicity and socioeconomic development — and simultaneously provide us with variation on key parameters such as state capacity, state regulation of religion, and democratic governance. Using these criteria, we selected Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Our study allowed us to explore some key questions related to the pandemic and religion in the Muslim world. Such questions include:
- How did the pandemic affect mental health among Muslims?
- How do Muslims view their government’s handling of the pandemic?
- How do Muslims evaluate government policies to contain the spread of coronavirus?
- How did the pandemic affect religiosity among Muslims?
Relationship to Existing Work in the Field
The pandemic has generated significant discussion over whether religion could experience a revival, as people seek strength and security in their faith, or whether the reverse is more likely to occur. Filip Mazurczak points to the popularity of live-streamed virtual religious services in Catholic Poland and the fact that religious leaders have been receiving more positive media coverage than usual as evidence of surging interest in religion.[8] He notes, however, that trauma-induced spikes in religiosity can be short-lived, a point taken up by Brian Hollar who argues that there is just as likely to be a “religious recession” as the social capital accruing from communal religious gatherings begins to dissipate and church coffers start to run dry without regular passings of the offering plate.[9]
Other analyses explore some of the ways in which COVID-19 revealed divisions within religious traditions.[10] For example, while longstanding Christian structures such as the Roman Catholic Church and various Orthodox denominations moved relatively quickly to suspend religious services and endorse social distancing, newer Christian formations — such as evangelical groups in the United States and Latin America — were more likely to resist lockdown orders. Further, divisions between states and religious groups emerged as a result of pandemic-related policies. While the main point of contention seemed to center around governments trying to enforce social distancing measures on religious institutions reluctant to shut down communal services, there were also cases in countries such as Brazil and Tanzania of political leaders urging a popular embrace of religion as a response to the virus.[11] This latter point is relevant to another common theme present in much of the analysis of religion and COVID-19, namely the possibility that the pandemic is driving an increase in tensions between religious groups.[12] For example, numerous analysts have been tracking new spikes in anti-Muslim sentiment in India as Hindu nationalist groups — some with ties to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party — engage in disinformation campaigns blaming the coronavirus outbreak on Muslims.[13]
More specifically in the Muslim world, analysts have examined the many ways in which the COVID-19 pandemic has had an impact on various aspects of religious observation and devotional practice. There has been considerable focus on how the closure of religious facilities, mainly mosques, has affected the social and congregational dimensions of religious practice. Mehmet Ozalp, as well as other observers, noted that the decision to cancel Friday prayers — regarded by many Muslims as the one obligatory congregational worship each week — proved controversial in Pakistan, South Africa, and elsewhere.[14] Others have noted that mosque closures and the cancellation of congregational prayers had a corollary impact on seemingly unchanging aspects of Islam, such as the call to prayer (adhan), with the formulaic summoning of believers to “come to pray” being replaced in the adhan of many countries in the Middle East with the phrase “pray at home.”[15] Travel in connection with pilgrimage is also an important dimension of Islam; after Saudi Arabia cancelled pilgrimage visas for umra (a lesser form of discretionary pilgrimage to the Kingdom’s holy sites), observers began to look at the question of how the main annual hajj pilgrimage season could be affected.
Turning to the intersection of COVID-19, religion, and politics, a recent analysis from the Wilson Center explores the comparative roles and responses of Islamist groups to the pandemic in various settings around the world.[16] This work reveals that, in many respects, the pandemic appears to reaffirm aspects of the standard literature on competition between Islamists and the state. For example, Hezbollah demonstrated greater capacity than the Lebanese public health authorities to initiate large-scale coronavirus testing. In Egypt, state agencies have been complicit in misinformation campaigns tying the banned Muslim Brotherhood to the spread of the virus. Consistent with the idea that armed Islamist groups — which simultaneously engage in conventional political activism and the provision of social services — are able to flexibly assign capacity and resources between these different functions at will, Hamas recently deployed its Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades to sanitize streets and buildings in Gaza.
A recent report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on “Islamic Authority and Arab States in a Time of Pandemic”[17] focused on emerging dynamics between states and religious actors in the Middle East. The report highlights various forms of tension that emerged between governments seeking to associate themselves with religious leaders while responding to COVID-19. Likewise, religious actors perceived the pandemic as an opportunity to enhance their reputation and to improve their standing or consolidate autonomy vis-à-vis the state.
While much of the available analysis on the intersection of COVID-19 and Muslim communities is necessarily anecdotal, context specific, and at times rather speculative in nature, the best of this emerging work identifies very real and significant questions that merit further investigation. This study seeks to contribute to the discussion on this topic with comparative, cross-national data on the coronavirus and Muslim religious practices, and their views of the relationship between states, religious actors, and institutions around questions of public health, trust, and religious authority.
The Survey
We commissioned an online survey in November and December of 2020 of more than 9,000 adults in Egypt (2,018), Saudi Arabia (2,041), Turkey (2,043), Pakistan (1,213), and Indonesia (2,011) with support from the Henry R. Luce Foundation. The survey was conducted by YouGov, using its survey panels across countries in our study. The sample was 50% female, and the average age of our respondents was 31.2 years (females 29.9; males 32.6). Of the respondents, 30% were between the ages of 18 and 24, 20% between 25 and 29, 18% between 20 and 34, 14% between 35 and 39, and 18% were above 40 years old.
As an online survey, the survey sample is not representative at the national level: The respondents are disproportionately educated and urban. However, the survey is representative in regard to various indicators of religiosity — a key variable of interest in our study — as well as employment and marital status.
An online survey presents certain advantages over conventional methods of conducting surveys. At a time of pandemic-induced closures and restrictions, approaching prospective survey respondents for face-to-face surveys proved to be nearly impossible — whether because of government-imposed restrictions or the individuals’ choice to avoid personal interaction. An online survey allowed us to circumvent such challenges and provided a unique opportunity to gauge the relationship, if any, between the effects of the pandemic and religious beliefs and practices. (See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the demographics of the survey sample, and the advantages and disadvantages associated with our sample and questionnaire and Appendix 2 for an explanation of the variables used in the graphs.)
Mental Health Effects of the Pandemic
The uncertainty surrounding the course of the pandemic has been a key source of concern for many around the world. Similarly, policies aimed at limiting the spread of COVID-19 and managing the pandemic have fundamentally changed the social and economic environments in many countries. Therefore, whether caused by being confined to their homes for extended periods of time, the fear of the virus itself, or the uncertainty surrounding the pandemic, COVID-19 hit people hard. We asked questions about the mental health effects of loss of employment income, unemployment, and gender. The results demonstrate that the pandemic led to notable mental health issues for survey respondents.
Loss of Employment Income
Our data shows that economic concerns about the pandemic were a main source of anxiety among survey respondents. Respondents who experienced or expected to experience employment income loss after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic were nearly twice as likely to experience various mental health issues compared to those who did not experience such loss of employment. Of the respondents who faced employment income loss, 45% felt nervous or anxious, 40% could not stop worrying, 47% had little interest or pleasure in doing things, and 43% felt down or depressed more than half the days or nearly every day (Figures 1a-d).
Figure 1 — Mental Health Effects of Loss of Employment Income
Unemployment Attributed to Coronavirus
Likewise, respondents who experienced unemployment due to the coronavirus were more likely to indicate feelings of anxiety and nervousness compared to those who did not. Of those who lost employment, 44% felt nervous or anxious, 42% could not stop worrying, 46% had little interest or pleasure in doing things, and 45% felt depressed more than half the days or nearly every day (Figures 2a-d).
Figure 2 — Mental Health Effects of Unemployment Attributed to Coronavirus
Variation According to Gender
We observed some variation across gender lines as well (Figures 3a-d). Women tended to express feelings of nervousness and anxiety, the inability to stop worrying, little interest in doing things, and depression slightly more than men did. However, it is important to take this finding with caution because such differences might be due to the stigma attached to men discussing mental health issues.
Figure 3 — Mental Health Effects of the Pandemic: Variation by Gender
Difference by Country
There are notable differences between countries in how survey respondents expressed their views on their mental health (Figures 4a-d). Some of these differences are, in fact, extremely stark. In Indonesia, on average nearly 75% of the respondents expressed no or limited feelings of anxiety, worrying, little interest in doing things, or depression. By contrast, approximately one quarter of Indonesian respondents had similar feelings more than half of the time or nearly every day.
Our survey also revealed that the COVID-19 pandemic challenged the mental well-being of respondents in Egypt and Turkey more than respondents in any other countries. On average 40% to 43% of respondents in both Egypt and Turkey indicated that they suffered from various forms of mental health issues; in some cases, as high as one half of the respondents indicated so. Survey results showed that respondents in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had moderate levels of anxiety, depression, or nervousness. On average, 30% to 35% of the respondents in both countries said that they suffer from a form of mental health issue more than half the time or nearly every day, while 60%-65% of the respondents expressed little to no concern with these mental health issues.
Figure 4 — Mental Health Effects of the Pandemic: Variation by Country
Views on Government Performance in Dealing with the Pandemic
Overall Performance of Government
We observed significant variation in how the performance of each country’s government is evaluated (Figure 5a). In Saudi Arabia, 78% of the respondents rated the government’s overall performance as good, very good, or excellent.[18] The same figure stands at 51% in Egypt, 50% in Turkey, 39% in Pakistan, and 37% in Indonesia. Personal challenges caused by the pandemic seemed to have had a limited effect on respondents’ views on government performance. Individuals who lost employment income were slightly more likely to have a poor view of the government’s performance than those who did not (Figure 5b).
Figure 5 — Overall Government Performance in Dealing with the Pandemic
Trust in Government Response to COVID-19
We also asked about government responses to COVID-19. Survey respondents across the board trusted their government to respond to the coronavirus pandemic effectively. Approximately 80% of the respondents trust their government regardless of their employment, income status, education, or gender. The only exception was the country of citizenship, where we observe some variation. In Saudi Arabia, 91% of the respondents trust their government to effectively respond to the pandemic somewhat or completely, whereas the comparable figure stands at 72% for Egypt, 76% for Pakistan, 75% in Indonesia, and 76% in Turkey (Figure 6a).
Trust in Accuracy of COVID-19 Information From Government
When we asked respondents about their trust in their government to give them accurate information about COVID-19, the responses were similarly high across the board (Figure 6b). Approximately 80% of respondents indicated that they trusted their governments somewhat or completely to relay accurate information about the virus. Similar to the previous question about respondents’ trust in their government’s ability to respond to the coronavirus, 89% of Saudis, 69% of Egyptians, 71% of Turks, 78% of Indonesians, and 85% of Pakistanis trusted the information flow from their government on coronavirus.
Figure 6 — Trust in Government Response and Accuracy of COVID-19 Information
Views on Government Policies to Deal with the Pandemic
We also gauged public support for various policies governments have proposed or implemented to contain the coronavirus pandemic or lessen its impact in countries across the Muslim world.
Restrictions On Cross-Border Travel
We observed strong support for one of the most commonly implemented policies of the pandemic era: restrictions on cross-border travel. We asked whether respondents supported closing the country’s borders (including air travel to/from). On average, more than 70% of the respondents somewhat or strongly supported the policy. Less than 15% of the respondents somewhat or strongly opposed this proposed policy. The strongest support for the travel restrictions came from Indonesia (81%), Turkey (78%), and Saudi Arabia (75%); Egyptian (66%) and Pakistani (64%) support for this policy was also robust but somewhat weaker. Interestingly, support for this policy appears to be stronger among the less educated; as the level of education increases, the support for this policy appears to grow weaker (Figures 7a-b).
Figure 7 — Restrictions on Cross-Border Travel
Release of Prisoners to Reduce Coronavirus Spread
The release of prisoners was one of the policy items discussed as a solution to mitigate the spread of coronavirus among this vulnerable population (Figure 8). Overall, the opposition to this proposal appears to be slightly over 50% regardless of economic status, education, or gender. In particular, respondents in Turkey and Indonesia were overwhelmingly opposed to this idea with 72% and 68% against it, respectively. One important reason for Turkish respondents’ high rates of opposition was, without a doubt, the existence of a large number of inmates affiliated with Fethullah Gulen.
Figure 8 — Release of Prisoners to Reduce Coronavirus Spread
Lockdowns and Closures of All Non-Essential Businesses
Early in the pandemic, lockdowns and closures of all non-essential businesses were widely implemented around the world. We asked survey respondents their views on these policies (Figures 9a-c). On average, 65% of our respondents either somewhat or strongly supported these policies. Among those who either lost employment or employment income during the pandemic, support for these measures appeared to be slightly higher. There is some variation by country on this measure as well. Turkey is the outlier, as 83% of the respondents either somewhat or strongly supported these measures. By comparison, only 47% of Indonesian respondents and 59% of Pakistani respondents expressed support.
Figure 9 — Lockdowns and Closures of Non-Essential Businesses
Increase Food Subsidies So People Can Stay Home from Work
The survey data shows that the respondents who faced loss of employment income following the onset of the pandemic supported policies to increase food subsidies for people to stay home (88%) more than those respondents who did not face employment income loss (80%). Similarly, respondents who attributed employment loss to the pandemic were more strongly in favor of the measure to increase food subsidies than those respondents who did not. We also observed a notable variation by country. The proposed increase in food subsidies to contain the spread of the coronavirus was met with great enthusiasm among respondents in Pakistan (90% overall support), Indonesia (88%), Turkey (86%), and Egypt (84%), while support among Saudi respondents remained moderate by comparison (31% somewhat support, 45% strong support) (Figures 10a-c).
Figure 10 — Support for Increased Food Subsidies
Effects of the Pandemic on Religiosity and Religious Practice
Importance of Religion in Their Lives
Our survey reveals notable variation by country in the importance of religion (Figure 11a). Our findings generally correspond to findings in other surveys conducted in the Muslim world.[19] Between 92% and 95% of respondents in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia indicated that religion is somewhat or very important in their lives. In Turkey, 80% of respondents view religion’s place in their lives in the same way, but only 61% view religion as very important in their lives — a significantly lower figure in comparison to the other countries in the study.
One of the important revelations from our data is that, while religion remains an important part of survey respondents’ lives in the five countries studied, this importance weakened in relative terms when faced with the direct effects of the pandemic (Figure 11b). Of the respondents who did not lose employment income due to the pandemic, 93% viewed religion as somewhat or very important in their lives whereas the same figure stands at 86% for those who lost or expected to lose employment income.
Figure 11 — Importance of Religion in Their Lives
Daily Prayer
Loss of employment income during the pandemic resulted in a 16% lower rate of daily prayers among survey respondents, down from 79% among those who did not experience employment income loss to 63% among those who did (Figure 12a). Likewise, unemployment attributed to the pandemic similarly resulted in lower daily prayer rates; among those who attributed their unemployment to coronavirus, 66% of the respondents indicated that they prayed daily, whereas the comparable figure for those who did not was 72% (Figure 12b). Women were more likely to pray on a daily basis (75%) than men (67%) in our sample (Figure 12c). There is significant variation from one country to another in daily prayers (Figure 12d). An overwhelming majority of respondents in Egypt (76%), Saudi Arabia (84%), Indonesia (85%), and Pakistan (63%) indicated that they prayed daily in the first couple of months of the pandemic. In Turkey, however, only 35% of our respondents indicated that they prayed on a daily basis.
Figure 12 — Daily Prayer
Mosque Attendance
We observed similar responses in other forms of religious practice. Individuals who faced no loss of employment income since the onset of the pandemic were more likely to attend the mosque for Friday prayers or multiple times a week (60%) than those who experienced or expected to experience employment income loss (53% to 56%) (Figure 13a). In Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, nearly two-thirds of the respondents attended the mosque at least once a week in the first few months of the pandemic, 67% and 63% respectively. By comparison, only 34% of the Turkish respondents attended the mosque at least once a week in the same time period (Figure 13b).
Figure 13 — Mosque Attendance
Reading or Listening to the Qur’an
More than half of the survey respondents read or listened to the Qur’an at least four times a week (Figures 14a-b). Loss of employment income led to a slight decrease in Qur’an reading or listening (from 54% to 48%). While respondents in Egypt (66%), Saudi Arabia (60%), Pakistan (54%), and Indonesia (55%) read or listened to the Qur’an frequently, 61% of Turkish respondents indicated that they read or listened to the Qur’an twice a month or less.
Figure 14 — Reading or Listening to the Qur'an
Comparison to Pre-Pandemic Times: Prayer
Yet, compared to pre-pandemic times, religiosity figures illustrate a slightly different picture. While more than half of the survey respondents indicated their prayer behavior did not change compared to the period before the pandemic, those who experienced or expected to experience employment income loss were more likely to indicate that they were praying more at the time of the survey than the pandemic period compared to those who did not lose employment income, 41% and 30% respectively. On average, 40% of the respondents in each country indicated that they prayed more now than prior to the pandemic; in Turkey, the same figure stands at 23% (Figures 15a-b).
Figure 15 — Compared to Pre-Pandemic: Praying/Performing Salah
Comparison to Pre-Pandemic Times: Qur’an Reading or Listening
The pandemic led to some changes in Qur’an reading or listening behavior among survey respondents (Figures 16a-d). Those who experienced income loss (38%), unemployment loss (38%), or food insecurity (40%) due to the pandemic were slightly more likely to have read or listened to the Qur’an compared to those who did not, 32%, 35%, and 33% respectively. We observed notable variation in Qur’an reading/listening behavior. In Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia, substantial shares of respondents indicated that they read or listened to the Quran more in the past two months than they did prior to the pandemic, while the figures were considerably lower in Turkey.
Figure 16 — Compared to Pre-Pandemic: Qur'an Reading or Listening
Implications: What Our Findings Mean for Policymakers
As countries around the globe make their way into a post-pandemic world, it is important to take stock of how the devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic impacted various facets of the societies we live in. Religious life is one element of daily life that the pandemic deeply impacted.
Muslim societies present a particularly interesting case. The prominence of religion in Muslims’ lives and comparatively higher levels of religiosity — as attested by Muslims themselves — offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the pandemic’s effect on their religious lives.
Our study was based on an online survey distributed to individuals in key Muslim-majority countries. While there are some limitations on the inferences that we can draw from the survey, the online format was the best tool to use during a pandemic that hampered many in-person interactions around the world. Our study reveals compelling insights on the pandemic’s effect on religion in Muslim societies.
In conjunction with the study’s findings published elsewhere,[20] we find notable support for the argument that individuals tend to turn to faith during times of disaster and seek comfort from the stress and uncertainty associated with the calamity they face.
The results show that individuals who suffered the pandemic’s effects at a personal level through unemployment or employment income losses sought solace in their faith. We find that those who were materially affected by the pandemic indicated, on average, higher levels of religiosity during the pandemic compared to the pre-pandemic period with respect to daily prayers and Qur’an reading or listening. This is an important finding that sheds light on a critical and longstanding question about the role of religion during times of crisis.
However, our study represents a snapshot taken at one point in time during the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, our findings highlight short-term shifts in religiosity and religious behavior among Muslims. Without a subsequent study on the same subject, it is difficult to conjecture on whether the effects we found in our study have any staying power in the long-term.
If religion can, indeed, offer comfort from the material and immaterial distresses of major crises that affect society en masse, this suggests that governments should reconsider some of their pandemic policies concerning religious practice. While pandemic measures were predominantly related to the communal elements of religious practice, it is important to strike a balance between the physical and mental health of individuals. The efficacy of these measures for extended periods of time hinges, in part, on managing collective mental health and ensuring buy-in for these policies. Minimizing impact on religious practice should constitute a major consideration in this process.
Appendix 1: Detailed Information About the Survey
This appendix provides detailed information about the public opinion survey conducted as part of the study “The Umma in the Time of Corona: Exploring Muslim Responses to the 2020 Global Pandemic.” The study was undertaken by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and supported by the Henry Luce Foundation.
We conducted a comprehensive public opinion survey of more than 9,000 Muslims in five Muslim-majority countries around the world: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia. By using the services of the online panel-based polling company YouGov, we deployed surveys in our target countries and captured attitudes toward issues at the intersection of the COVID-19 pandemic and Muslim religiosity, such as the pandemic’s effect on religiosity, religious practice, the public role of religious institutions, states’ use of religious institutions, and the social and political implications of pandemic-induced shifts in religiosity.
The pilot study was conducted in November 2020 for all countries in the study. After revisions, the full survey was launched in all countries in December 2020 and completed in January 2021. The surveys were administered by YouGov. With an extensive reach since 2005, YouGov offers the most effective means of conducting public opinion surveys. The surveys were conducted online via YouGov’s panels in each country. YouGov assisted in designing the final questionnaire, translating the survey questions into local languages, and testing the questionnaire prior to the full launch.
We chose to work with YouGov in this study for the key advantages that the company offers. First, YouGov is a survey company that has access to a large respondent pool in parts of the world we were interested in for this study. In a region beset with challenges in accessing the local populations for research purposes, particularly during the pandemic, YouGov offers the most effective means of doing so. YouGov has a reasonably strong track record of results and a good degree of reliability.
YouGov takes several quality control measures in administering surveys. The YouGov system monitors any anomalies in individual responses and picks up “speedsters” (people who finish a survey in a significantly less time than the survey length), single line responses (if someone answers responses in a similar way for all questions), and IP addresses that are not from the target country. At the data processing stage, all data is validated and cleaned prior to proceeding with the tabulations.
While our survey has many advantages and contributes to the discussion on the religion-politics relationship in the Muslim world in important ways, it also has its limitations. One concern is sample representativeness: The survey sample is not representative at the national level, as it is disproportionately educated and urban. Hence, we want to be careful in the conclusions we draw from this unrepresentative sample. The results are not always generalizable to the broader population. Even so, we want to underscore its potential value.
Appendix 2: Variables Used in Graphs and Survey Questions
We include below an explanation for each of the three variables used in the graphs and the survey questions they are based on.
Loss of Employment Income:
Yes / No | None / Actual or Expected / Actual and Expected
This variable is based on the combination of two separate survey questions (Q8_1 and Q8_2):
- Have you, or has anyone in your household experienced a loss of employment income since March 13, 2020?, and
- Do you expect that you or anyone in your household will experience a loss of employment income in the next 4 weeks because of the coronavirus pandemic?
Both questions have two answer options: “Yes” or “No”.
If a respondent answered both questions “No”, this variable is coded as “None.”
If a respondent answered either of the two questions “Yes,” this variable is coded as “Actual or Expected.”
Lastly, if a respondent answered both questions “Yes”, it is coded as “Actual and Expected.”
Unemployment Attributed to Coronavirus: Yes / No
This variable is based on the survey question (Q11) “What is your main reason for not working for pay or profit? Select only one answer. I did not work because …”
If respondents answered this question with any of the following three answers, we coded it as “Yes”, otherwise “No”: “I am/was sick with coronavirus”, “I am/was caring for someone with coronavirus”, and “I am/was concerned about getting or spreading coronavirus.”
Change in Food Security: Better / Same / Worse
This variable is based on two separate survey questions (Q13 and Q14):
- Getting enough food can also be a problem for some people. Which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household **before March 13, 2020**?, and
- In the **last 7 days**, which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household?
If the respondent indicated having access to more food in the last seven days than before the pandemic, it was coded as “Better.”
If the respondent indicated an equal level of access to food in both questions, it was coded as “Same.”
Lastly, if the respondent indicated having less access to food in the last seven days compared to the pre-pandemic period, it was coded as “Worse.”
Other Questions
[Q8_1] Have you, or has anyone in your household experienced a loss of employment income since March 13, 2020?
1. Yes
2. No
[Q8_2] Do you expect that you or anyone in your household will experience a loss of employment income in the next 4 weeks because of the coronavirus pandemic?
1. Yes
2. No
[Q11] What is your main reason for not working for pay or profit? Select only one answer. I did not work because:
1. I did not want to be employed at this time
2. I am/was sick with coronavirus symptoms
3. I am/was caring for someone with coronavirus symptoms
4. I am/was caring for children not in school or daycare
5. I am/was caring for an elderly person
6. I was concerned about getting or spreading the coronavirus
7. I am/was sick (not coronavirus related) or disabled
8. I am retired
9. My employer experienced a reduction in business (including furlough) due to coronavirus pandemic
10. I am/was laid off due to coronavirus pandemic
11. My employer closed temporarily due to the coronavirus pandemic
12. My employer went out of business due to the coronavirus pandemic
13. Other reason, please specify
[Q13] Getting enough food can also be a problem for some people. Which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household **before March 13, 2020**?
1. Enough of the kinds of food (I/we) wanted to eat
2. Enough, but not always the kinds of food (I/we) wanted to eat
3. Sometimes not enough to eat
4. Often not enough to eat
[Q14] In the **last 7 days**, which of these statements best describes the food eaten in your household?
1. Enough of the kinds of food (I/we) wanted to eat
2. Enough, but not always the kinds of food (I/we) wanted to eat
3. Sometimes not enough to eat
4. Often not enough to eat
Endnotes
This study was undertaken by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and funded by a grant from the Henry Luce Foundation. Peter Mandaville and Tarek Masoud made important contributions to the study.
All graphs in this report were created by the author.
[1] Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage, “Religion and Social Insurance Evidence from the United States, 1970–2002,” in Divide and Deal: The Politics of Distribution in Democracies, ed. Ian Shapiro, Peter A. Swenson, and Daniela Donno Panayides (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 149–185.
[2] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[3] Sharan Grewal, Amaney A. Jamal, Tarek Masoud, and Elizabeth R. Nugent, “Poverty and divine rewards: The Electoral Advantage of Islamist Political Parties,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 4 (2019): 859–874.
[4] Jeanet Sinding Bentzen, “In Crisis, We Pray: Religiosity and the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization vol. 192 (2021): 541–583.
[5] Brian Hollar, “Will COVID-19 Cause a Religious Recession?” Religion & Diplomacy, April 8, 2020, https://religionanddiplomacy.org/2020/04/08/will-covid-19-cause-a-religious-recession/.
[6] WWU Münster, “Corona Pandemic is Obviously Influencing Religiosity,” WWU Münster, November 23, 2020, https://www.uni-muenster.de/Religion-und-Politik/en/aktuelles/2020/aktuell/News_Corona_und_Religiositaet.html.
[7] Samuel L Perry, Andrew L. Whitehead, and Joshua B. Grubbs, “Culture Wars and COVID-19 Conduct: Christian Nationalism, Religiosity, and Americans’ Behavior During the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 2020, 59(3): 405–416; Francesco Rigoli, “The Link Between COVID-19, Anxiety, and Religious Beliefs in the United States and the United Kingdom,” Journal of Religion and Health 60 (2021): 2196–2208; Ates Altinordu, “Divine Warning or Prelude to Secularization? Religion, Politics, and the COVID-19 Pandemic in Turkey,” Sociology of Religion 82(4) (2021): 447–470; Rafal Boguszewski, Marta Makowska, Marta Bozewicz, and Monika Podkowinska, “The COVID-19 Pandemic’s Impact on Religiosity in Poland,” Religions 11(12) (2020).
[8] Filip Mazurczak, “The Pandemic and Religious Revival,” First Things, April 20, 2020, https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2020/04/the-pandemic-and-religious-revival.
[9] Brian Hollar, “Will COVID-19 Cause a Religious Recession?” Religion & Diplomacy, April 8, 2020, https://religionanddiplomacy.org/2020/04/08/will-covid-19-cause-a-religious-recession/.
[10] Economist, “The Coronavirus Pandemic Has Exposed Fissures Within Religions,” Economist, April 11, 2020, https://www.economist.com/international/2020/04/11/the-coronavirus-pandemic-has-exposed-fissures-within-religions.
[11] Nichols Bariyo and Joe Parkinson, “Tanzania’s Leader Urges People to Worship in Throngs Against Coronavirus,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/tanzanias-leader-urges-people-to-worship-in-throngs-against-coronavirus-11586347200.
[12] Geneive Abdo and Anna L. Jacobs, “Are COVID-19 Restrictions Inflaming Religious Tensions?” Brookings Institution, April 13, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/13/are-covid-19-restrictions-inflaming-religious-tensions/.
[13] Joanna Slater and Niha Masih, “As the World Looks for Coronavirus Scapegoats, Muslims Are Blamed in India,” Washington Post, April 23, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-world-looks-for-coronavirus-scapegoats-india-pins-blame-on-muslims/2020/04/22/3cb43430-7f3f-11ea-84c2-0792d8591911_story.html.
[14] Mehmet Ozalp, “How Coronavirus Challenges Muslims’ Faith and Changes Their Lives,” The Conversation, April 1, 2020, https://theconversation.com/how-coronavirus-challenges-muslims-faith-and-changes-their-lives-133925.
[15] Martin Chulov, “Covid-19 Pandemic Casts Long Shadow As Ramadan Starts,” Guardian, April 23, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/covid-19-pandemic-casts-long-shadow-as-ramadan-starts.
[16] Andrew Hanna, “What Islamists Are Doing and Saying on COVID-19 Crisis,” Wilson Center, May 14, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/what-islamists-are-doing-and-saying-covid-19-crisis.
[17] Frederic Wehrey, Nathan J. Brown, Bader Al-Saif, Intissar Fakir, Anouar Boukhars, and Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, “Islamic Authority and Arab States in a Time of Pandemic,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 16, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/16/islamic-authority-and-arab-states-in-time-of-pandemic-pub-81563.
[18] Because criticism of the government is an extremely sensitive issue in Saudi Arabia, the wording on this question for Saudi Arabia differs from the wording in other countries in our study. In Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey, we asked: “Generally speaking, how would you rate the overall performance of the government in [COUNTRY]?” In Saudi Arabia, we asked more broadly about the economy as an imperfect substitute: “Generally speaking, how would you rate the overall performance of the economy in Saudi Arabia?”
[19] For example, see the Arab Barometer surveys, https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/and Pew Research’s Report, “The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society,” April 30, 2013, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-overview/.
[20] Yildirim, A.Kadir, Tarek Masoud, and Peter Mandaville, “Will the Pandemic Spark a Religious Revival in the Muslim World?” Washington Post, April 2, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/02/will-pandemic-spark-religious-revival-muslim-world/.
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