Inside COP28: A Participant’s Take on Climate Diplomacy Efforts in Dubai

Introduction

The 28th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) occurred at Expo City in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), from November 30 to December 12, 2023. Around 85,000 people attended the event, doubling the number of participants at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2022. Participants — including delegates from member states of the UNFCCC, business leaders, climate scientists, Indigenous people, and a variety of other stakeholders — convened to discuss strategies for limiting the global impact of climate change with a focus on assessing progress toward meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement. 

This report offers key insights from my experience at COP28. I compare my participation at this summit with that of two previous summits, assess the UAE’s climate diplomacy efforts, and analyze the significant outcomes of COP28.

Setting the Scene: Expo City

COP28 was held at Expo City, a manicured space originally built for the Dubai World Expo 2020 (an event that took place between October 1, 2021, and March 31, 2022, after being delayed by a year due to the COVID-19 pandemic).[1] For COP28, the pedestrian-friendly yet massive 438-hectare area was divided into two parts: the “Green Zone” and the “Blue Zone.”

The Green Zone, open to the public, included exhibition spaces dedicated to specific areas of interest, such as the energy transition, climate finance, and technology and innovation. It also showcased new projects from renewable energy and clean technology organizations such as the UAE’s Masdar and Saudi Arabia’s Green Initiative. The fashion company Stella McCartney also had a popular booth exhibiting its investments in sustainable textiles near the entrance to the Green Zone. McCartney herself even provided tours to climate summit leaders. 

The more exclusive Blue Zone, where access was restricted to badge-holders, housed the larger forums for COP28 policy negotiations. It included about 300 pavilions for nation-states and associated supranational organizations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the European Union, as well as nongovernmental organizations, such as the Global Cement and Concrete Association and The Nature Conservancy.

Even though COP conferences have had dedicated exhibition spaces since 2021, this was the first time these pavilions were segregated into separate areas. Many members of country delegations, including the Turkish delegation I represented, spent time inside these pavilions networking with other representatives, organizing side events, and hosting visitors. 

A record number of delegates attended COP28 with the UAE, China, Brazil, and Nigeria sending the largest delegations, suggesting significant financial spending on their part.[2] However, the UAE, as the host country, likely expended the most capital in preparation for the event.

Continuities and Ruptures: Comparing COP28 to Previous Summits

As a previous participant of COP17 in Durban (2011) and COP18 in Doha (2012), my main goal was to follow discussions on the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) policy.[3] In comparison to the two previous summits I attended, COP28 was much larger and more multifaceted with higher participation from corporate actors — including about 2,500 fossil fuel company lobbyists. Unlike my experiences at COP17 and COP18, it was easy to be overwhelmed by side events at COP28 and lose sight of the official raison d'être of the summit: establishing formal mechanisms for global cooperation on climate change. 

Given their location in the Gulf and the 11-year gap, it is helpful to compare COP18 and COP28. One of the most remarkable events at COP18 was a climate march, the first public demonstration in modern Qatari history. During the march, activists called upon Arab officials to lead the climate debates. A Dubai-based journalist told me, “It’s just the environment, it’s not politics, so they can allow this to happen here.” 

Such overt political gestures were more limited in Dubai in 2023. Instead, COP28 often had the feel of a tradeshow, serving as a platform to demonstrate various corporate investments in sustainability. 

Despite their differences, there were a number of continuities between the summits. Some of the most crowded events at COP18 were focused on new market mechanisms to reduce harmful greenhouse gas emissions, an area that has transformed climate finance as it exists today. Additionally, although COP18 was unable to generate models for financing adaptation or mitigation efforts in developing countries, COP28 had more success in this area through the approval of the “loss and damage fund” that will help developing nations cope with the damage caused by climate change. 

Lastly, a key difference between COP18 and COP28 was that participants at COP28 spent much of their time quietly discussing the elephant in the room: the fact that the climate summit was being held in a country that relies heavily on oil exports and was chaired by Sultan Al Jaber, the CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). These contradictions — and the UAE’s evolving role in climate diplomacy — are further discussed below.

The UAE’s Role in Climate Diplomacy

During an online event in the run-up to COP28, the chair of the summit, Al Jaber, remarked that there was “no science” behind demands for phasing out fossil fuels and that a phaseout would cause the world to revert “back into caves.”[4] Although it is difficult for participants to monitor how the summit is covered in the media and develop a comprehensive perspective of the meeting in real time, these remarks, which became public during the early days of the summit, did not go unnoticed. 

I met Al Jaber in 2010, when I started conducting ethnographic research on renewable energy and clean technology development in the UAE. At the time, I marveled at the fact that the former CEO of Abu Dhabi’s flagship renewable energy and clean technology company, Masdar, now acted as the global leader for climate policy as well as the UAE’s Special Envoy for Climate Change. Friends and acquaintances who had worked at Masdar with Al Jaber shared my fascination with his ascent, especially given how so many of Masdar’s projects — including the development of Masdar City, intended to be a sustainable urban community and technology hub — had failed to deliver the promised results. 

During my research in 2010–14, many employees at Masdar emphasized that they did not identify as environmentalists and explained that they perceived climate change as a business opportunity. They did not aspire to challenge capitalist consumerism, which many observers blame for dwindling resources and climate vulnerability. Instead, they saw Masdar as a strategic company attempting to sustain the status quo or, at best, improve life for certain segments of society. 

Based on my research, I found that decision-makers at Masdar typically prioritized market-oriented technical fixes. The ideological scaffolding of Masdar, which highlights the significance of technological innovation, design solutions, and new business models, has become globalized and, like oil itself, has emerged as a significant export from the UAE. 

Within this context, there are two ways to assess COP 28: first, by situating it nationally within the political economy of the UAE, and second, by considering its impacts on global climate change policy. 

At a national level, hosting COP28 in Dubai was a major success for the UAE’s efforts in climate diplomacy. However, it is important to highlight that this was not the country’s first victory. Since the early 2000s, the UAE has been building a foreign policy agenda centered on climate change adaptation and mitigation projects. For example, in 2015, Abu Dhabi began hosting the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency. And, even though it was mostly known for its eco-city project, Masdar began planting the seeds for the UAE’s engagement with the UNFCCC between 2010 and 2012. 

At a time when oil-producing countries were striving to lead the conversation on climate change, international consultants working with Masdar’s climate change policy wing drafted a CCS policy for the UNFCCC in collaboration with geologists and reservoir engineers from ADNOC, the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO), and the Directorate of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) at the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As demonstrated in my book “Spaceship in the Desert” (2019), while geologists and reservoir engineers from ADNOC and ADCO generated most of the technical depth on CCS, consultants from DECC and Masdar refined the floating language that allowed them to communicate with UN institutions, foregrounding constructive ambiguity in climate policy.[5] 

Back in 2010, consultants at Masdar believed that drafting a CCS policy would allow the UAE to demonstrate and publicize its commitment to climate change mitigation goals, improving its image in the international policy sphere. At COP18 in Doha in November 2012, an alliance between the UAE, Norway, and Saudi Arabia ensured the approval of CCS as a climate change mitigation strategy, despite complaints by members of the Association of Small Island States. Masdar consultants had predicted that the eventual inclusion of CCS as a climate change mitigation strategy could lead to a major diplomatic success, contributing to the UAE’s transformation into an international leader in the field. About a decade later, COP28 validated their perspectives.

Moving forward, decision-makers in the UAE plan to diversify their economy beyond fossil fuels and have invested in producing a knowledge-based economy that includes renewable energy and clean technology. These efforts have not only allowed the UAE to enhance its geopolitical and geoeconomic power, but have also generated additional capacity for oil-exporting countries to claim a central role in policy debates.

The global impact of COP28 on climate policy, in large part, remains to be seen, but the UAE has certainly had an impact by imprinting its ideological scaffolding — including its emphasis on market thinking — onto global climate debates. 

COP28 Outcomes 

COP28 received attention not only in advance of the meeting, but also after its conclusion. Below I assess three key outcomes that emerged from the summit.

1. Taking stock of climate progress since 2015: COP28 prioritized the “global stocktake,” an aggregate evaluation of the world’s progress on climate action that extends beyond the nation-state as a unit of assessment and provides future direction for decision-makers worldwide. The UN published the stocktake prior to the meeting so that world leaders could absorb its findings, which have been compiled since the 2015 climate summit in Paris. This comprehensive assessment underscored that the world is not on track to meet its goal of restricting global warming to an increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius (C).
2. Contributing to the loss and damage fund: COP28 leadership ensured commitments from wealthy countries, including the UAE, U.S., Japan, Germany, and Italy, to a loss and damage fund that will help developing countries “avert, minimize and address loss and damage” from the impacts of climate change.[6] Collectively, these nations pledged approximately $800 million to the loss and damage fund, rendering climate finance one of the most important points of discussion during the summit. Despite many participants commenting that $800 million is a relatively small amount, the loss and damage fund will remain a key outcome of COP28. 
3. Committing to shift away from fossil fuels: Another key milestone of the summit was a deal committing all signatory countries to move away from carbon energy sources. The global pact, referred to as the UAE Consensus, was the first in 28 years to explicitly mention the need to shift away from every type of fossil fuel. Despite this victory, many critics were frustrated with the lack of clear commitments to phase out or phase down fossil fuels. Some observers wished they could replace the term “energy transition” with “fossil fuel phaseout” instead.  

Climate Challenges Will Persist in the UAE and Beyond

As debates regarding climate diplomacy continue, significant material transformations are happening both in the UAE and worldwide. 

For one, the UAE can no longer shield its population from the negative impacts of its oil production. A 2016 report in Nature Climate Change states that by the end of the 21st century, population centers in the Arabian Peninsula could experience temperature levels unfit for human habitation.[7] Additionally, given their coastal locations and their heavy reliance on reclaimed land for urban and infrastructure projects, the UAE and its Gulf neighbors are especially vulnerable to sea level rise. 

During COP28, many participants commented on the high levels of air pollution in Dubai. The UAE government maintains that its air pollution is not due to anthropogenic causes but instead is a result of sandstorms. However, academic research on the topic consistently demonstrates that fossil fuel production in the region releases harmful chemicals into the atmosphere, creating health risks for residents. Moving forward, decision-makers in the UAE will be forced to recognize the impact of fossil fuels on the nation’s air pollution levels and implement effective climate change mitigation and adaptation projects. 

Globally, the future of climate change also appears bleak. In a 2018 report, the International Panel on Climate Change pointed to increased risks associated with long-term warming above 1.5 degrees C, such as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, crop loss, and coral reef die-offs.[8] Decision-makers attending COP28 insisted that the 1.5 C target remains their “north star” but announced that the world only has six years before it crosses this threshold in 2030. 

In order to achieve the 1.5 C goal, global cooperation among both oil-exporting and -importing nations is critical. An environmental journalist who has been following climate change negotiations for the past 30 years suggested that it has been easy to blame oil-exporting countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE for climate change, but by focusing only on these countries, we ignore the fact that they produced oil for an eager global population that could not quit fossil fuels. Understanding both the supply and demand side of things will therefore be crucial as the world attempts to bring global warming under control. 

Will Things be Different at COP29?

So much of the criticism regarding COP28 has focused on the fact that the conference was organized in an oil-producing country. But holding the summit in the UAE has made it clear that many people view climate change as a business opportunity, precluding critical observers from singling out oil-producing countries as the prime instigators of climate change. 

The decision that COP29 will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan, reveals that climate debates are further shifting in favor of fossil-fuel producers. This shift minimizes the urgency of climate change, prioritizes our consumerist habits, and glosses over the material transformations in our environments worldwide. Moving forward, future climate debates, including the upcoming COP29 summit, should garner stronger commitments to phasing out fossil fuels — from both the nations that produce them and the nations that consume them. It is also critical for world leaders to develop and commit to a roadmap that details exactly how the phaseout will occur. 

Notes

[1] Dubai consists of many such spatially segregated neighborhoods organized along the spine of Sheikh Zayed Road. These neighborhoods have been developed since the late 1970s, with each one dedicated to specialized services. For example, such neighborhoods include Media City, Humanitarian City, Education City, and so on. Expo City constitutes an extension of this urban logic and was designed with the World Expo 2020 in mind. 

[2] Robert McSweeney, “Analysis: Which countries have sent the most delegates to COP28?” Carbon Brief, December 1, 2023, https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-have-sent-the-most-delegates-to-cop28/. 

[3] Controversial outside fossil fuel circles, carbon capture and storage is a climate change mitigation technology that operates by obtaining carbon dioxide from industrial compounds, carrying it to storage sites, and injecting it into the ground. By injecting carbon dioxide into fields and forcing oil out, oil producers can extend the lifespan of their oilfields. While this technology has gained global appeal over the past decade, some policymakers and scientists argue that CCS could cause concentrated amounts of carbon dioxide to leak out into the atmosphere. They also point out that liability protocols related to such incidents are ambiguous. Furthermore, CCS has received additional criticism because it can cause a crowding-out effect, whereby funds are pulled away from developing renewable energy and instead put toward a project that prolongs the use of fossil fuels.

[4] Damian Carrington and Ben Stockton, “Cop28 President Says There is ‘No Science’ behind Demands for Phase-Out of Fossil Fuels,” The Guardian, December 3, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/03/back-into-caves-cop28-president-dismisses-phase-out-of-fossil-fuels.

[5] Constructive ambiguity in this context refers to the use of intentionally ambiguous language in policy documents with the purpose of promoting and advancing a particular political goal. Gökçe Günel, Spaceship in the Desert: Energy, Climate Change, and Urban Design in Abu Dhabi (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019): 157–82. 

[6] The language of “averting, minimizing and addressing” stems from Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, signed in 2015. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, “Adoption of the Paris Agreement,” distributed December 12, 2015, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.

[7] Jeremy S. Pal and Elfatih A. B. Eltahir, “Future Temperature in Southwest Asia Projected to Exceed a Threshold for Human Adaptability,” Nature Climate Change 6 (2016): 197–200, https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2833.

[8] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “Global Warming of 1.5 ºC,” 2018, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 

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