Thousands of column inches and reams of (virtual) paper have been devoted to analyzing the merits or otherwise of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed on July 14 between Iran and the P5+1. Debate, both in the United States and in Iran, has raged over the terms of the agreement and whether the implementation mechanisms are verifiable and enforceable. The legacy of 36 years of mutual tension and recrimination since the troubled events of 1979 mean that domestic political opposition may yet undermine the deal, in Teheran just as much as in Washington, D.C.
Away from the media spotlight, regional reaction to the agreement has been mixed. The range of responses in the six Gulf states illustrates both the diversity of regional approaches to Iran and the absence of any monolithic “Gulf position” on the issue. The Sultanate of Oman, for example, was pivotal in facilitating the five secret rounds of direct discussions between lower-level U.S. and Iranian officials in 2013 that paved the way for the launch of the multilateral negotiations in Geneva. Oman and Iran have had relatively good relations for decades. During the 1970s the Shah sent Iranian forces to assist Oman’s long-serving Sultan Qaboos to quell a Marxist-inspired rebellion in the Omani province of Dhofar.
Qatar also has enjoyed relatively warmer relations with Iran, borne in large part out of the largest non-associated gas field in the world, which straddles the offshore boundary of the two countries. Policymakers in Doha have an interest in constructive ties with Teheran to ensure the stability of the North Field, the engine of Qatar’s growth into an economic powerhouse since the 1990s. Pragmatic acknowledgment of the need to maintain at least a workable relationship also merged with Qatar’s advocacy of diplomatic mediation in the 2000s. As early as February 2012, Qatar’s current foreign minister, Khalid Mohammed al-Attiyah, told the Munich Security Conference that “with our allies and friends in the west we should open a serious dialogue with the Iranians.”[1]
Broadly similar sentiments were expressed in January 2014, two months after the announcement of the interim nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, by the UAE Prime Minister (and ruler of Dubai), Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. In a BBC interview, Sheikh Mohammed stated that “we need to give Iran space, Iran is our neighbor and we don’t want any problem.”[2] The UAE and Iran also exchanged foreign minister visits in 2013-14 and went so far as to talk of a “strategic partnership” that would begin the process of rebuilding trust after the frostiness of the Ahmedinejad era.
Like the UAE, Kuwait gave a guarded welcome to the final nuclear deal and expressed hope that it would ease tension and contribute to regional and international security. Saudi Arabia also gave a cautious endorsement of the deal and reiterated a call for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons in a little dig at Israel. With King Salman set to make his first visit to the United States as Saudi monarch in September, it is probable that that his discussions with President Obama will focus on the monitoring, verification and implementation of the agreement rather than on whether it should have been reached at all.
Moving forward, Gulf policies toward Iran will be characterized by several key elements that do not always move in the same direction. Thus, the Gulf states will move toward partial normalization of economic (more than political) ties with Teheran even as they deepen the already-dense network of defense and security ties with the United States. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif will visit Qatar and Kuwait over the weekend with the reported aim of organizing a “6+1” meeting between himself and the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) foreign ministers at the United Nations General Assembly in September. Simultaneously, however, the Obama administration looks set to accelerate arms deliveries in a bid to reassure Gulf partners over the United States’ commitment to regional security and stability.
On the ground, Gulf-based businesses will be among the primary beneficiaries from any loosening of international sanctions on Iran. Dubai, in particular, long functioned as a vital link that connected Iran to the global economy through a combination of direct and re-exported trade. By 2011, Iran accounted for about a quarter of total re-exports from the UAE before the introduction of new rounds of international sanctions in 2012 and 2013 that targeted non-U.S. companies still dealing with Iran and impacted in particular the provision of trade financing services for Iranian businesses. Any easing of sanctions would likely find Emirati (and other Gulf) entities ready and willing to step back in to Iranian markets.
Finally, the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, will respond to the Iran deal by escalating their campaign against Iranian-backed proxies in regional conflicts from Syria to Yemen. This reflects the fact that, for many in the Gulf, the primary threat from Iran lies not in Teheran’s nuclear program but in Iran’s support for militant non-state actors such as Hezbollah and, more recently, the Houthi rebels in Yemen. As such, it is probably no coincidence that the nuclear agreement was followed within days by an intensification in the military campaign in Yemen that culminated in the liberation of Aden from Houthi control. In addition to the Saudi-led airstrikes and training, the Yemeni forces were assisted also by Special Forces from the UAE, one of whom was killed in action.
Paradoxically, the coming weeks and months may therefore see an escalation in the proxy conflict between Gulf- and Iran-backed groups in Syria and Yemen just as direct political and economic contacts resume at bilateral levels. While attention focuses on domestic debates within the United States and Iran, the regional dimension should not be lost sight of, as the possibility remains that a spike in the proxy campaigns could heighten tensions to the point where they threaten to unravel the gains of recent weeks.
[1] “Qatar Urges Dialogue With Iran,” Gulf States Newsletter, February 9, 2012, 10.
[2] “Dubai Eager to Capitalize on Iran Opening,” Financial Times, January 21, 2014.
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D., is the Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East. His research examines the changing position of Persian Gulf states in the global order, as well as the emergence of longer-term, nonmilitary challenges to regional security. He is a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics Middle East Centre and an associate fellow at Chatham House in the United Kingdom. Follow him on Twitter at @Dr_Ulrichsen.
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