From Market Guardians to Monopoly Keepers: Regulatory Capture in Mexico’s Energy Sector

Introduction

On Feb. 5, 2024, then President Andrés Manuel López Obrador introduced 20 initiatives to amend Mexico’s constitution. The date holds significance as the anniversary of the constitution’s enactment, following the Mexican revolution of 1910–17. The original text emphasized the primacy of the common good over individual interests and throughout the six years of his administration, López Obrador asserted that each policy measure undertaken by his government was meant to revive the social essence of the original constitutional text. This package of constitutional reforms, he argued, was a step toward restoring a system in which collective well-being takes precedence over individualism.^[1] A key objective of these reforms was the elimination of nearly all independent regulatory agencies because, in his view, they prioritized private over public interests.

Even before taking office, López Obrador expressed his opposition toward all regulatory agencies, saying that they had been enablers of the privatizations that solely benefited private companies, instead of providing for the public good.^[2] In his view, the Energy Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE) and the National Hydrocarbons Commission (Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos, CNH) — both key to energy sector regulation — had been responsible for the decline of Mexican oil company Pemex and the Federal Electricity Commission (Comisión Federal de Electricidad, CFE). He argued that the agencies’ actions, aimed at limiting the market dominance of these state-owned entities, hindered their ability to serve the collective good, while favoring private companies.^[3]

In his speeches and daily press conferences, López Obrador reiterated that these agencies were the instruments of those he referred to as “conservatives” who had powerful material interests in the sectors the agencies were intended to regulate — and thus they were “captured” by them.^[4] Furthermore, from the time of their creation, the mission of these agencies was to restrict Pemex and CFE and perhaps even shepherd them into oblivion. The former president believed that state companies should not pursue profitability as private companies do, but the public good and that, in line with the social principles of the 1917 Constitution, Pemex and CFE had to be rescued from an unfair competition model that was leading to their demise.

In keeping with this paradigm, the president submitted a bill that would transform the state companies into national strategic entities that were simultaneously overseers of social welfare, rather than value creation corporations.

A complementary energy reform bill, aimed at dismantling the institutional framework that supports market competition in the Mexican energy industry, has since been approved by the constitutional committee of the Lower Chamber of Congress (Cámara de Diputados) and awaits plenary review.^[5] While weakening the regulators, the bill seeks to strengthen Pemex and CFE. Eliminating the regulatory agencies aligns with this model, abandoning their current role in fostering efficient markets.

To explore the policy shift, this report is structured as follows:

• First, it examines the evolution of regulatory agencies in light of their original purpose and intended role, while also exploring how this mission conflicts with the former president’s vision of a nationalized energy industry.
• Second, the actions and measures taken during the former administration toward weakening regulatory agencies are reviewed.
• Third, the constitutional reform that absorbs the powers of these agencies into the Secretariat of Energy is analyzed, noting how it formalizes ongoing practices and completes regulatory capture by the state.
• Last, the conclusions and consequences of this policy will be surveyed in the light of their impact on consumers, the industry, and market development and North American economic integration.

Concepts of Autonomy and Independence

Years before the February 2024 constitutional amendment initiative was presented, López Obrador had already taken several steps to restrict the autonomy and independence of regulatory agencies. To discuss this, the concepts of autonomy and independence need to be conceptualized and explained. Autonomy has to do with the ability of a government agency to exercise its legal powers, without interference from other authorities, while independence is freedom from “regulatory capture” — undue influence on the regulatory agency to act in favor of or against certain parties. Thus independence is a wider concept, relating to broader forms of interference with decisions.^[6] Although regulatory agencies cannot be autonomous without independence (and vice versa), it is nonetheless necessary to distinguish one from the other.

Lopez Obrador’s Legacy and Sheinbaum’s Challenge

As mentioned above, on Feb. 5, 2024, López Obrador introduced an extensive package of constitutional reforms.^[7] One of these, aimed at restructuring of the energy industry, is still pending full discussion in congress. 

A second key reform proposes the elimination of several regulatory agencies, including two that directly regulate the energy sector. So far, this secondary reform has only been approved by the Constitutional Commission of the Lower Chamber of Congress.^[8] For it to be enacted, however, it must secure approval from two-thirds of the members present in both the House and Senate, as well as a majority of state legislatures — at least 17 of the 32 local congresses.^[9]

Claudia Sheinbaum assumed office as president of Mexico on Oct. 1, 2024, just as these reforms were advancing through the initial stages of the approval process.

Insights Into the Proposed Energy Reform

Although it is unclear from the constitutional reform bill how the energy sector will be regulated, it is notable that the acronyms “CRE” and “CNH” are not mentioned in the revised version of Article 28 of the Constitution.^[10] If approved, the amended Article 28 will provide that the “Executive Branch, by way of the department in charge of conducting national energy policy, [who] shall be vested with the legal powers to undertake the technical and economic regulation of the sector, as well as the competence to exercise discipline in energy and hydrocarbon matters, in the terms of the law.”^[11]

Two main insights can be offered regarding the amendment:

• Regulatory Agencies Are Not Named — The revised Article 28 wording explicitly omits the names of the regulatory agencies. However, it is possible that the names of these agencies may appear in the enabling legislation, as they did before the 2013 energy reforms of former President Enrique Peña Nieto. If not, they will cease to exist, and their functions will likely merge into the “department in charge of conducting national energy policy.”
• Department Responsible Not Specified — The constitutional text does not explicitly state that the department in charge of energy policy will be the Secretariat of Energy (Secretaría de Energía de México, SENER). However, given the current political context, it is highly unlikely that an agency tasked with regulating the sector will be placed in any other department. It is noteworthy that President Sheinbaum has appointed Luz Elena González, a trusted ally, to head SENER. González has been tasked with enforcing financial discipline and promoting sustainable policies within the energy sector.^[12]

Background to the Proposed Reforms

Throughout his administration, López Obrador held the congressional and state legislative majorities to dismantle the regulators. But he chose not to do it. Instead, even before taking office, his incoming administration acted against the leadership of CRE and CNH. Rocío Nahle, who became López Obrador’s secretary of energy, pressured the incumbent commissioners of both agencies to resign.^[13] López Obrador then tried to appoint commissioners sympathetic to his cause, but after twice failing to obtain Senate approval, he was legally able to appoint them.^[14] The commissioners he appointed largely followed his lead in making decisions that should have been within their purview as agency heads. He undermined their autonomy by interfering with their core functions and stripped them of independence by subjecting them to political pressure, which lead to discriminatory practices against competitors of Pemex and CFE.^[15] In other words, López Obrador captured the regulatory agencies by depriving them of autonomy and independence.

Thus, López Obrador’s proposed constitutional reform, and the enabling legislation that will follow, is essentially the formalization of what already exists in practice — regulatory agencies that have been captured by the interests of the state-owned energy companies. The process is now in the hands of the Sheinbaum administration which will be socially, economically, and internationally liable for the consequences of this reform.

Fear and Loathing of the Energy Regulators

To understand López Obrador’s opposition to independent regulatory agencies — also known in Mexico as constitutional autonomous agencies (OCAs) — it is necessary to briefly explain their history and purpose. Although there are seven OCAs in total, this report is concerned with the two operating in the energy sector: CRE and CNH.

Origins and Purpose of CRE

Initially established by presidential decree in 1993 as a consulting agency to SENER on electricity matters, CRE was formally constituted by legislation in 1995, primarily to facilitate the opening of a natural gas market by liberalizing the sales, transportation and storage of natural gas. Before that, such activities were the exclusive preserve of Pemex.^[16] CRE was specifically designed to enhance market efficiency in the energy sector, ensuring that consumers have access to reasonable cost and high-quality energy goods and services. The absence of a competitive market left industrial consumers at a disadvantage. As the sole suppliers in the sector, Pemex and CFE were able to impose costly, discriminatory, and inefficient contractual terms.^[17]

Following the Peña Nieto reforms in 2013, CRE’s competences were extended beyond natural gas and, alongside SENER, it began to exercise significant regulatory powers in the fuel, biofuel, petrochemical, and electricity markets, although Pemex and CFE still held dominant positions.

Upstream Regulation by CNH

The upstream regulator, CNH, was created during former President Felipe Calderón’s 2008 reforms. At that time, upstream activities had not been liberalized, so the aim was to oversee Pemex’s operations. CNH’s role was to ensure exploration and production (E&P) efficiency to optimize the state company’s performance. Following the 2013 reform, which opened E&P investment to third parties, CNH became a key player in managing the competitive bidding process, so that contractual areas would be awarded to third parties and/or Pemex based on their proposed value creation.

However, at the start of López Obrador administration, bidding rounds were canceled and E&P companies faced scrutiny. López Obrador and Nahle warned that their contracts would be reviewed and that, if deemed unfair, would be terminated. Although this did not occur, the government accused these companies for poor results, trying to show that Pemex’s performance was superior to its competitors. The continuous decline of oil and gas production became the justification for canceling the rounds. The president argued that it proved that competition had failed to increase production and achieve energy security in Mexico.

Competition Widened Regulators’ Role

With the opening of Mexico energy markets and the onset of competition, CRE and CNH were tasked with much more than simply overseeing Pemex and CFE. Their responsibilities became more complex and their scope significantly expanded. In particular, CRE began working toward increased efficiency in the natural gas, fuels, and biofuels markets, becoming one of the arbitrators in the competitive race to build a cleaner and more efficient power sector. CNH oversaw/managed three oil and gas bidding rounds, awarding 107 contracts to 73 companies entered the Mexican market from 20 countries.^[18] Although Pemex held the most contracts (initially 14), it was still a much more varied and complex scenario than when Pemex was the sole operator.

In this new landscape, CNH quickly became the regulator of numerous companies with diverse operations that varied by contract area. As a result, its administrative burden grew rapidly with the launch of the rounds. Pemex appeared to thrive within the competitive ecosystem, becoming involved in several joint ventures and partnering with BHP Billington (later succeeded by Woodside) for the deep water “Trion” contract in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico.

Although Pemex and CFE were adjusting to the arrival of competitors, concepts such as market efficiency, competition, and nondiscriminatory treatment — the very reasons why regulatory agencies were created — conflicted with López Obrador’s nationalistic energy policy. The then president viewed CRE’s mission (to limit Pemex and CFE’s dominance over energy consumers) and CNH’s role (to enhance the performance of the state oil company as the sole oil and gas operator) as unacceptable. This led to his constitutional amendments, which appear aimed at dismantling these regulatory agencies. The energy-related amendment, approved in August 2024g by the Constitutional Review Committee of the Lower House, is rather vague about when, how, and into what model these agencies may evolve. It is expected that they will become part of a government department (likely SENER), losing their status as autonomous and independent regulatory agencies. This will likely be devoid of technical autonomy and subject them to political influence, unable to make policy-driven decisions.

Possible Scenarios for Regulatory Agencies

Before 2013, energy regulatory agencies existed as legal entities but were not specifically referred to in the highest legal norm—the constitution. With their protection in mind, Peña Nieto’s reform coined the term “energy coordinated regulatory agencies,” explicitly mentioning them in Article 28 of the Constitution. In Mexico, constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.^[19] The proponents of the 2013 reform likely did not anticipate that by 2024, one party would hold a qualified majority in both chambers of the federal congress and in state legislatures — a situation last seen in 1994. However, as of October 2024, MORENA and its allies have achieved this majority, and have already enacted two constitutional reforms. It is expected that the reform eliminating the regulators will also pass.^[20]

Should this occur, there are three possible scenarios that will be discussed in the following paragraphs. While it is uncertain at this stage which will emerge, one will ultimately prevail, as the energy sector will require some framework to regulate the market.

1. Return to Pre-2013 Status

The first scenario — and the most unlikely — is that the regulatory bodies will return to the status they had before 2013. They will no longer be mentioned in the constitution, but they may continue to legally exist, with some technical autonomy, as part of the department governing national energy policy — as mentioned above, this is expected to be SENER.

The new regulator would probably be similar to the current one, albeit reduced in power and functions, and with a clearer ideological mandate. Due to budgetary restraints, CNH and CRE may also be fused into one single organization. The agency’s leadership could comprise a group of commissioners. The number of commissioners is irrelevant, as it seems clear that there would be no diversity of policy outlooks. Within the structure of SENER, the commissioners may have, perhaps, some technical autonomy, but no independence. their budget will depend on the resources that the department chooses to allocate to them and, given MORENA’s critical stance toward regulatory agencies, the assignment of human, material, and financial resources may be limited. If this model were to prevail, it would be to minimize investors’ concerns; however, it is unlikely to be adopted.

2. Collegiate Organization Within SENER

A second potential scenario could involve installing some form of collegiate organization within SENER, but bereft of autonomy or independence. This means that although the regulators would have some legal powers, they would be unable to take independent action. Their structure, competences, faculties, and enforcement capabilities would be entirely dependent on SENER’s ability and willingness to enforce their decisions. Furthermore, the allocation of human, material, and financial resources would depend completely on the department and its head. A regulatory body of this kind would serve no purpose other than to pretend that Pemex, CFE and other energy companies are under some form of technical and economic oversight. All decision making, however, would be highly political.

3. Regulatory Department Within SENER

The third possible option is the one most likely to materialize. It consists of a nonautonomous, highly dependent “regulatory” department within SENER, operating under the authority of the secretary of energy. Perhaps named something like the “Directorate of Regulatory Affairs,” it would report to both Deputy Secretaries — one for hydrocarbons and one for electricity — according to their respective areas of competence.

While the models outlined above are hypothetical, they are feasible. The constitutional amendment that is currently being discussed lacks detail about the structure of the new regulatory authorities, their staffing levels, or the material and financial resources they will receive to perform their duties/work. However, the preamble states that shrinking or eliminating the regulatory bodies aligns with the policy of maximum austerity in government spending, suggesting that minimal resources would be allocated to them. If budgetary considerations are the main driver, rather than having effective energy regulation, downsizing these organizations is the most likely scenario.

Consequences of Unfit Regulatory Agencies

The more drastic the changes in the regulatory model, the greater the risks that may unfold for industry players. This section explores the potential consequences of each of the three scenarios discussed above.

1. Return to Pre-2013 Status

The first structure is very similar to the one that existed before the Peña Nieto government. Should that model prevail, it would remain as a collegiate body, perhaps with fewer commissioners and staff, but still reasonable capable of regulating the markets. Its legal powers would likely be reduced in the secondary legislation and its workload will drop as private participation in the hydrocarbon and electricity sectors continues to decline.^[21] Even so, the workload may exceed the capacity of the agency. Thousands of pending permits — for diverse activities such as pipelines, service stations, power generation plants, and storage facilities — already await approval.^[22] In addition, there is a wide range of varied contracts and permits in force that require ongoing administration. It is doubtful that a significantly reduced electricity and hydrocarbon agency will be able to perform effectively. As this burden grows, the agency may become incapable of fulfilling its duties.

2. Collegiate Organization Within SENER

The second possible model is similar to the first with one important difference: It will entirely lack both autonomy and independence, as it will be subordinated to the secretary of energy and will have no competences of its own. It is likely that technical decisions will be superseded by political ones and the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment amongst industry players will no longer be enforced.^[23] Given the already announced preferential treatment for Pemex and CFE, which is set to become law in the coming months, future regulators will be obligated to prioritize these state-owned companies.^[24]

3. Regulatory Department Within SENER

The final scenario would entail the most extreme reduction of the regulatory apparatus, and will consequently result in the disappearance of energy regulation altogether. A one-person direction, with a rather reduced staff, would be unable to perform even the most elementary regulatory tasks. Complex tariff rate modelling, review and approval of intricate energy projects requires experienced teams with broad knowledge of the industry, from the economic, financial, technical and sociopolitical perspectives. With thousands of existing permits to approve and administer, a small regulatory office will not be able to attend the needs of a vast energy ecosystem. This scenario would collapse the regulatory system.

The Challenge Ahead

Energy regulators have always suffered from a considerable power and information asymmetry with the regulated companies they regulate. In the Mexican energy sector, the greatest challenge will be the oversight of Pemex and CFE. With their preferential status conferred by the constitution, they will be more difficult to govern. Ironically, the regulators originally established to promote market development are now poised to become enforcers of the state monopolies.

Implications of Regulatory Elimination for North American Commercial Relations

Although the constitutional reform process to eliminate the independent regulatory agencies is not yet complete, its consequences can nevertheless be predicted. As this initiative is complementary to the one positioning CFE and Pemex as central players of the energy sector, the new regulators are likely to prioritize the state-owned companies, potentially overlooking efficiency and better practices. This approach will affect users of all sizes and scales, making the quality and pricing of energy goods and services as unpredictable as the shifting tides of political will. This anticompetitive edge will strain U.S.-Mexico relations by hindering North American market integration and creating barriers between the two economies.^[25]

The Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad, IMCO), a think tank, has analyzed the likely impact of the extinction of the regulatory agencies. According to IMCO, the elimination of any or all of the seven agencies could contravene various chapters of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). In the energy sector, the elimination of CRE and CNH has negative implications for relationships between Mexico and its North American commercial partners, as they contravene Chapters 21 and 22 concerning competition policy and state-owned enterprises and designated monopolies.^[26] This constitutional reform will result in a much greater concentration of power and a significant reduction in accountability.^[27]

Also, the USMCA mandates that national competition authorities be maintained so that domestic laws do not give less favorable treatment to persons from other USMCA member countries. The elimination of CNH and CRE, which currently regulate the state-owned companies, contravenes the obligation of enforcing regulation in an impartial manner, as established in USMCA chapter 22 . In sum, according to IMCO, the approval and implementation of these constitutional reforms, would not only affect Mexico’s competitiveness and institutional robustness, but would also generate uncertainty and lead to a volatile climate that diminishes the trust of Mexico’s commercial partners.^[28]

For those interested in the potential of nearshoring, the ongoing shortage of gas and clean energy raises concerns about Mexico’s ability to supply incoming companies.^[29] Favoring Pemex and CFE may undermine nearshoring aspirations, as the national energy companies are currently unable to meet existing domestic and export demand, let alone handle growing needs.^[30]

Impact of the Reform on Sheinbaum’s Green Energy Aspirations

Lopez Obrador’s legacy of depriving Mexico of autonomous and independent energy regulators may not only impact market efficiency and competition but also Sheinbaum’s goals to decarbonize the industry. The current constitutional reforms will hinder the fulfilment of her manifesto, “100 Steps Towards the Transformation,” which she unveiled the day she assumed office.^[31] In that manifesto, Sheinbaum proposes a real transformation of the national energy mix and is committed to maximizing the use of renewable energy, but CFE has shown little interest in investing in renewables. She also states that her government will replace fossil fuels with alternative sources.

However, these measures could compromise her commitment to protecting the national oil company, wherein as fuel that cannot be sold in an open market must be bought by CFE. The same challenge applies to her policy goal of substituting internal combustion engines with electric vehicles, for both private and public transportation.^[32] These new policies could lead to significant revenue losses for Pemex due to reduced fossil fuel sales. At this point, it seems unlikely that regulations would be put in place to force Pemex to relinquish its production, imports, and trade of fossil fuels.

Paradoxically, this constitutional reform could end up defining Sheinbaum’s energy policy, as her predecessor has sought to tie her to what he deems is the “fourth transformation” of Mexico.^[33] In the energy sector, it essentially means reversing progress.

Conclusions and Predictions for Future Policy

Pending completion of the constitutional reform approval process, the end result is uncertain. In its current form, the constitutional initiative is not very specific, so the secondary legislation will govern the future of these agencies. If these agencies lose their autonomy and independence, it will deal a fatal blow to regulatory oversight. While political negotiation remains possible, there is little hope that a more reasonable compromise will be reached.

If López Obrador’s reforms prevail — despite his departure from office — the agencies will be smaller and less costly, but almost certainly weaker, regardless of their final form. At this point, Sheinbaum’s views about regulators are unknown, but she has repeatedly demonstrated her unconditional backing of Pemex and CFE, so it seems unlikely that she would permit firm disciplinary action by regulators against the state-owned companies.

Neither scenario is promising for Mexico’s energy industry. The ideological winds are not in favor of independent and autonomous regulatory agencies.

Notes

^[1] Carlos Elizondo Mayer-Sierra, “La Constitución de la Cuarta Transformación,” Cuestiones Constitucionales: Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional, no. 47, July–December 2022, https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/cuestiones-constitucionales/article/view/17527/18199.

^[2] This bill not only extinguishes the energy regulatory agencies but also many similar agencies such as the Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones (Federal Telecommunications Institute, IFT), the Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica (Federal Economic Competition Commission, COFECE), the Instituto Nacional de Transparencia (National Institute for Transparency, INAI), Consejo Nacional de Evaluación Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social, (National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy, CONEVAL), and La Comisión Nacional para la Mejora Continua de la Educación (The National Commission for the Continuous Improvement of Education, MEJOREDU): Cámara de Diputados, “Comisión de Puntos Constitucionales aprobó dictamen que plantea la extinción de siete organismos autónomos,” Bulletin No. 7111, August 23, 2024, https://comunicacionsocial.diputados.gob.mx/index.php/boletines/comision-de-puntos-constitucionales-aprobo-dictamen-que-plantea-la-extincion-de-siete-organismos-autonomos-.

^[3] The Energy Regulatory Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Energía, CRE) is the midstream hydrocarbon regulatory authority. It also regulates certain electricity-related activities, such as granting of permits and the rates of transmission in CFE´s power lines. The National Hydrocarbons Commission (Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos, CNH) is the oil and gas upstream regulatory authority. With no new exploration and production contracts awarded during the López Obrador administration, the CNH’s role has been limited to administering the remaining 88 contracts still in force (Miriam Grunstein, “Mexico’s Independent Energy Regulatory Agencies: Institutions at Risk,” Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, December 5, 2019, https://doi.org/10.25613/AYRA-EM24); Elizondo Mayer-Serra.

^[4]López Obrador made repeated references to the quoted words in his regular press conferences, as in this example: https://youtu.be/m-juThOCAk4?si=kT8Wkv0kAMDq4ftC.
Regulatory capture has been described as “a process by which regulatory agencies may come to be dominated by the industries or interests they are charged with regulating. The result is that an agency, charged with acting in the public interest, instead acts in ways that benefit incumbent firms in the industry it is supposed to be scrutinizing” (Will Kenton, “What is Regulatory Capture?” Investopedia, updated August 1, 2024, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulatory-capture.asp).

^[5] Cámara de Diputados, “Comisión de Puntos Constitucionales.”

^[6] José Roldán Xopa, “La Autonomía Constitucional De Los Órganos Reguladores. Hacia Una Reconstrucción Conceptual,” UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2020, https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/13/6169/4.pdf.

^[7] “Presidente presenta 20 reformas a la Constitución; devuelven humanismo y espíritu público al documento, afirma,” AMLO, February 5, 2024, https://lopezobrador.org.mx/2024/02/05/presidente-presenta-20-reformas-a-la-constitucion-devuelven-humanismo-y-espiritu-publico-al-documento-afirma/.

^[8] The initiative was approved in general terms — with 22 votes in favor, 17 against and zero abstentions — and was sent to the directive committee for plenary discussion (Cámara de Diputados, “Comisión de Puntos Constitucionales”).

^[9] Cámara de Diputados, “Prontuario de Reforma Constitucional. Artículo 135,” n.d., https://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/biblio/virtual/dip/pront/8reform.pdf.

^[10] Cámara de Diputados, “Comisión de Puntos Constitucionales.”

^[11] Cámara de Diputados, “Comisión de Puntos Constitucionales.”

^[12] Héctor Usla, “Sheinbaum da señal de disciplina financiera en Pemex y CFE con Luz Elena González en Energía,” El Financiero, June 27, 2024, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/economia/2024/06/27/sheinbaum-da-senal-de-disciplina-financiera-en-pemex-y-cfe-con-luz-elena-gonzalez-en-energia/.

^[13] It was reported that, as early as November 2018, Rocío Nahle, then serving as Secretary of Energy, allegedly requested the resignation of the chairpersons of both the CRE and CNH. Although Nahle denied making such a request, all commissioners from both agencies resigned within the first six months of the presidential term. López Obrador and Nahle described these officials as conservatives aligned with a system that, they claimed, endangered the survival of state-owned companies (Salvador Camarena, “Rocío Nahle vs. la CNH y la CRE,” El Financiero, November 14, 2018, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/opinion/salvador-camarena/rocio-nahle-vs-la-cnh-y-la-cre/).

^[14] Andrea Becerril and Víctor Ballinas, “El Senado rechaza a candidatos para la CRE; AMLO podrá elegirlos,” La Jornada, April 9, 2919, https://web.jornada.com.mx/2019/04/04/politica/013n1pol.

^[15] Diana Nava, “Pide AMLO a reguladores privilegiar a Pemex y CFE”, El Financiero, August 4, 2020, https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/economia/amlo-lee-la-cartilla-a-reguladores-energeticos-les-pide-ajustarse-al-fortalecimiento-de-cfe-y-pemex/.

^[16] José María Lujambio Irazábal, “La Comisión Reguladora De Energía En Las Reformas Energéticas De 2008 Y 2013,” Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo (CIDAC), 2013, http://www.cidac.org/esp/uploads/1/5Reg_CRE2608.pdf.

^[17] Lujambio Irazábal.

^[18] Information about the contracts that were awarded and are still in force can be found on the “Rondas México” website, https://rondasmexico.gob.mx/.

^[19] Mauro Arturo Rivera León, “Understanding Constitutional Amendments in Mexico: Perpetuum mobile Constitution,” Mexican Law Review 9, no. 2 (January-June 2012): 3–27, https://doi.org/10.22201/iij.24485306e.2017.18.10774.

^[20] The reforms are those concerned with judicial reform, enacted on September ember 15, 2024, and the National Guard, enacted on September 24, 2024 (“20 iniciativas de reforma a la Constitución,” AMLO, October 2, 2024, https://lopezobrador.org.mx/20-iniciativas-de-reforma-a-la-constitucion/).

^[21] Enrique Hernández, “Crisis energética en México por falta de inversión en producción y distribución: Coparmex,” Forbes, May 8, 2024, https://www.forbes.com.mx/crisis-energetica-en-mexico-por-falta-de-inversion-en-produccion-y-distribucion-coparmex/.

^[22] Comisión Reguladora de Energía, Registro público del órgano de gobierno, https://www.cre.gob.mx/Permisos/index.html.

^[23] Lujambio Irazábal.

^[24] “20 Reformas.”

^[25] Grunstein, “From Regulators to Political Subjects. The Energy Sector Without the Independence of CRE and CNH,” Wilson Center, September 16, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/regulators-political-subjects-energy-sector-without-independence-cre-and-cnh.

^[26] Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad (IMCO), “México y América del Norte: los riesgos de las reformas constitucionales de 2024,” September 23, 2024, https://imco.org.mx/mexico-y-america-del-norte-los-riesgos-de-las-reformas-constitucionales-de-2024/.

^[27] IMCO.

^[28] IMCO.

^[29] Grunstein, “From Regulators to Political Subjects.”

^[30] Hernández.

^[31] “100 pasos para la transformación,” October 1, 2024, Claudia Sheinbaum, https://claudiasheinbaumpardo.mx/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/CSP100.pdf.

^[32] “100 pasos para la transformación.”

[33] Roberto Salinas-León, “AMLO and the ‘Fourth Transformation’ in Mexico,” Cato Institute, Policy Report 41, no.66 (November/December 2019), https://www.cato.org/policy-report/november/december-2019/amlo-fourth-transformation-mexico.

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