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In a few weeks, we will be faced with an extraordinary spectacle: the leader of an American ally will be speaking to a joint session of Congress in large part to criticize the foreign policy of the president of the United States. The leader in question is Bibi Netanyahu, prime minister of Israel. The policy at issue is President Obama’s approach to ongoing negotiations with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program.
The speech is apparently the brainchild of House Speaker John Boehner and Ron Dermer, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and a former Republican political operative. The invitation was extended without consultation with the White House. The Obama administration’s response has been sharp, with officials publicly decrying the invitation as a breach of protocol; off-the-record comments have been even more pointed. The White House has said that Obama will not meet Netanyahu during the prime minister’s visit to Washington.
It is, of course, perfectly within Boehner’s rights — and those of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who joined him in making the offer — to ask Netanyahu to address the Congress. But the invitation is just as surely a clear insult to President Obama.
For Netanyahu and congressional Republicans, the speech advances a shared opposition to what they perceive as Obama’s soft approach to the Iranian nuclear talks. On Capitol Hill, Republicans — and some Democrats — are pushing additional sanctions legislation aimed at Iran. The White House, for its part, has promised to veto any such bill, saying that it would undermine sensitive ongoing negotiations with Tehran.
The prime minister and Boehner also have political reasons. Netanyahu is facing parliamentary elections on March 17; their outcome is still in doubt. An appearance before the U.S. Congress would send a clear message to Israeli voters of Netanyahu’s influence in Israel’s most important ally. Boehner sees the speech as an opportunity to burnish the GOP’s reputation as a strong supporter of Israel. At a minimum, Netanyahu’s address will put congressional Democrats in an unenviable quandary: however peeved they might be at the speech, they are loath to risk too vocal a criticism of Netanyahu.
I’m with foreign policy analyst Aaron Miller on the impact of Netanyahu’s visit in terms of U.S.-Israeli relations: not much. The White House may grumble about Netanyahu’s affront; congressional Democrats might squirm at the clumsy position in which they find themselves; foreign policy mavens may wring their hands at Boehner’s introduction of politics into the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. But, when all is said and done, Obama and Netanyahu, should the latter win upcoming elections, will grit their teeth and deal with other. Indeed, we should expect some sort of effort — if only for public consumption — at reconciliation between the two leaders. Congressional Democrats, no matter how uncomfortable they might be with Netanyahu’s ploy, will give him enthusiastic standing ovations when he speaks. And, for the foreseeable future, U.S. domestic politics will continue to play a large part in our policy toward Israel, whoever is elected president in 2016.
The bottom line: despite some angry leaks to the press, the prospect of the Obama administration making more than token gestures of displeasure toward a possible future Netanyahu government is remote. Differences — most notably on Iran — will continue to divide the two leaders. But the Obama administration will retain the U.S. commitment to Israel. As we have for decades, we will continue to provide Israel with financial assistance, state-of-the-art weaponry, and support in international fora like the United Nations. In short, Netanyahu’s speech may prompt more than the usual diplomatic kerfuffle. But it does not mark a crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations.
Joe Barnes is the Baker Institute’s Bonner Means Baker Fellow. From 1979 to 1993, he was a career diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, serving in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.
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