Setting the Stage
Recently, there has been a major departure from how Turkish politics has functioned for more than a decade: The Turkish president and the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Özgür Özel, leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), met twice in less than two months. The first of these meetings took place in the AKP headquarters on May 2, 2024; President Erdogan, in turn, visited the CHP headquarters on June 11, 2024, his first visit in 18 years. These were not mere courtesy visits; just as important was the substance. In the days that followed, the term “normalization” emerged as the buzzword.
As one might expect from politicians at the opposite ends of a deeply polarized political system, there is no consensus on the meaning of “normalization,” even though the term has become central to ongoing political discussions. President Erdoğan highlighted the “political tension that has increased due to the three elections in the last year” and the need to take steps to reduce this tension, blaming CHP leader Özel in part for “drag[ging] politics into tension.” Erdoğan demanded that the opposition adopt “a unifying language” that prioritizes “the state and the nation” and for them to “act constructively.” The irony is not lost on those who follow Turkish politics closely.
CHP leader Özel stated that Erdogan’s use of the language of “normalization” constitutes “an important turning point,” while he rejected suggestions that a normalization process should lead to a change in their policy positions or take the party away from “protect[ing] the rights of the victim, the oppressed, the poor, the insecure.” Özel responded negatively to the rhetorical question, “Are you going to clench your fists again?”; he views the normalization process more as “ground for dialogue, meeting, talking, shaking hands.”
Background to Normalization Talks
Turkish politics and society have been in overdrive since the failed coup of July 15, 2016. The Turkish society was, uncharacteristically, unified in its opposition to the attempt to overthrow the government and in its support of the ruling AKP’s response.
Thereafter, the government undertook a political, judicial, and social campaign directed at those involved in the attempted coup, whether directly or by affiliation, and those whom the government deemed potential threats — this campaign continues, albeit with less intensity. While this campaign targeted, in part, the coup leaders, its extensive and prolonged nature created an environment of constant tension and polarization in society and politics, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) research project measures levels of polarization across countries around the world, including Turkey. Two indicators of polarization are of particular interest in this context: political polarization and polarization of society.
Figure 1 — Polarization in Turkey
The political polarization indicator is measured in response to the question, “Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?” — it aims to identify the extent of polarization across opposing political camps. The value of the measure varies between 0 (no polarization) and 4 (high polarization).
The social polarization indicator answers the question, “How would you characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues in this society?” — it focuses on whether the differences of opinion lead to “major clashes of views and polarization.” The measure varies between 0 and 4, with lower values indicating high levels of polarization while high values indicate low levels.
The data shows, indeed, that Turkey has descended into its most polarized period of the post-World War II era. Beginning with the years leading up to the Gezi Park protests (2013), the social and political polarization measures both dip close to the maximum polarization values, 0.04 and 3.98 respectively, in 2016 — the year of the attempted coup. Since then, V-Dem has recorded only negligible reductions in the levels of polarization in Turkey.
Timing of Normalization Talks
Given that social and political polarization has remained at high levels since 2016, it is not a new phenomenon. So, why are we having this discussion about normalization only now, eight years after the attempted coup? The answer lies in how President Erdoğan, and by extension the ruling AKP, view their relative political power in the country. Between the party’s ascent to power in 2002 and March 2024, President Erdoğan and the AKP did not lose an election, whether parliamentary, presidential, local elections or referenda. Such apparent invincibility bolstered the ruling party’s confidence and all but eliminated the need for political compromise over the years. Going it alone and sharpening its political rhetoric seemed to bear political fruit, which was supported by election outcomes, the metric by which political parties measure their success.
This nearly impossible track record stood until the local elections in March 2024, when CHP, the main opposition party, won the plurality of the votes (37.8%) and provinces (35). In contrast, the AKP obtained 35.5% of the votes and 24 provinces, failing to win any of the five largest provinces. It is in this context that the pivot toward “normalization” must be evaluated.
Figure 2 — 2024 Election Results
The AKP was rattled by its first electoral defeat, leading to a rare glimpse into a ruling political party being forced to reevaluate its political strategies and discourse.
While local elections help the AKP to sustain its control over the Turkish economy, society, and politics — and thus have major implications for the party’s power — they pale in comparison to the weight of parliamentary and presidential elections. The “normalization” discussions were initiated with the aim of stopping the damage and curbing any further AKP electoral slide. When polarization no longer benefits, and possibly hurts, the ruling party, political normalization seems to be their best strategy moving forward.
Prospects of Normalization
Turkey is certainly due for a normalization process, whether within the narrow framework envisioned by Erdoğan and Özel or more broadly restoring a sense of normalcy to Turkish society and politics, as in the earlier years of AKP rule. CHP leader Özel’s agreement to a limited scope normalization paves the way for political dialogue and is an important step toward opening up the country’s political landscape. However, it is President Erdoğan’s approach to normalization that will ultimately determine its odds of success and longevity. Historically, Erdoğan has relied on leveraging social, ethnic, or religious divisions to spur his political prospects. If normalization is to be a long-lasting policy, Erdoğan must remain convinced of the idea that political tension and polarization has become counterproductive to political success. With nearly four years until the next elections, Erdoğan and Özel have an opportunity to experiment with normalization and assess its political benefits for both parties.
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