Refugee Relocation Can Be a Positive Experience

In recent years, much attention has been focused on the reluctance of host governments to support local integration of refugees. Fearful of attracting more refugees and over-burdening economic and social systems — and possible negative political consequences — some countries’ governments have barred the option of long-term refugee integration.

Although positive approaches to refugee issues have often been overlooked in media coverage and academic publications, there are some notable success stories: This issue brief centers on the initiatives undertaken by Mexico and Brazil — two refugee-hosting countries — to absorb and welcome refugees through relocation programs. It also highlights the important, and mostly unheralded, efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support new and creative solutions.

Mexico’s Refugee Relocation Program

Seeking Asylum in Mexico

In recent years, Mexico has become a transit country for migrants seeking to enter the U.S. Even more recently, it has become a destination for migrants and asylum-seekers.[1] The number of people asking for asylum in Mexico has skyrocketed — from less than 9,000 in 2016 to 141,000 in 2023.[2] Meanwhile, the countries of origin of asylum-seekers have become more diverse, with lower numbers of Central Americans arriving and larger numbers of Haitians, Cubans, Venezuelans — as well as Russians, Bangladeshis, and Afghans — many of whom have made their way to Mexico through the treacherous Darien Gap.[3] For example, the number of Haitian asylum-seekers increased from 5,917 in 2020 to 44,239 in 2023 — almost one-third of the total number of asylum-seekers.[4]

Under Mexican law, the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR) processes and approves asylum requests while the Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) issues residency permits to those who have been granted asylum. Mexican law requires asylum requests be processed in the states where the initial application is made; if asylum-seekers leave the state, their applications are considered abandoned and they are subject to detention and deportation.

Most asylum-seekers arrive from Guatemala and cross into the Mexican state of Chiapas. One of the country’s poorest states, it has high levels of unemployment and low indicators of literacy, standard of living, and social well-being. Three-fourths of Chiapas’ population is below the poverty line, compared with the national average of 42.9%.[5] While the law requires asylum requests to be processed within 45 days, the rise in numbers — coupled with COMAR’s inadequate capacity — has meant that the process can be delayed for up to a year. This means that asylum-seekers must stay in Chiapas before they can move elsewhere in the country — or more often, continue their journey to the U.S.

Mexico has a relatively generous policy toward asylum-seekers, granting an average of 72% of requests (77%, when complementary protection is included). Complementary protection is granted when an individual does not meet the criteria for refugee status but would be at risk if returned to their home country.[6] With proof of their asylum application, asylum-seekers have the right to work in the country and to access social services, housing, health care, and education. After two years as residents, they can apply for naturalization — although the process can be cumbersome and expensive. At the end of 2022, about 600 refugees were in the process of naturalizing. [7]

Relocation and Integration

In 2016, UNHCR began a program of local integration in which refugees could be relocated to cities in central and northern Mexico, where jobs are plentiful and there are more services to support them. As of March 2023, 30,000 (mostly Central American), refugees had been relocated to 10 different cities.[8] The relocation process is relatively rapid: UNHCR provides a workshop on the program for interested refugees, interviews individuals to see if they are good candidates for relocation, and within a week relocates them to the new city. Upon arrival, UNHCR provides hotel stays for a few days and an intensive orientation program, including employer introductions, housing assistance, and overviews of social services and public transportation.

After disbursing an initial cash grant, UNHCR provides a suite of supportive services to assist the relocated individual or family — regular home visits over the course of three months, support for enrolling children in schools, and trouble-shooting any problems that may arise with accessing social services or employment. A study in 2019 found that after one month, 90% of participants in the program had found jobs (compared with just 10% in southern Mexico) and all the children were enrolled in school (compared with just 13% of those who remained in Chiapas).[9]

Employment is key to the success of the program: Some 500 employers are involved, working closely with UNHCR to match refugees with mostly entry-level jobs. In fact, employers compete with one another to attract refugee workers, offering benefits such as savings schemes and transportation. The opportunity to participate in the formal labor sector offers refugees stability and hope. In addition to its strong relationships with the private sector, UNHCR works with a rich array of local and state government authorities and civil society organizations who provide a range of services — from vocational education programs to community engagement opportunities to psychosocial counseling. Employers routinely describe the program as a win-win situation, meeting their needs for a steady labor force and refugees’ needs to exercise their agency and become self-reliant.[10]

Refugees also contribute to Mexico’s economy through their taxes and contributions to social security. A study carried out by UNHCR and the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) found that the contributions they make exceeded the Mexican government’s budget for refugee protection.[11] The cost of UNHCR’s relocation program is about $800 per refugee, including transportation, UNHCR staff support, cash assistance, and other services.

Challenges Faced

Although the program is successful, challenges remain. Perhaps the biggest challenge is that about one-third of participants in the relocation program leave the program. Some leave to join family members elsewhere in Mexico, or to study, but most probably leave to journey toward the United States. The lure of the American dream remains strong. U.S. border policies, which have been volatile in recent years, have a direct impact on migrants and refugees in Mexico. When there is a loosening of border restrictions — or the perception that it will be easier to enter the U.S. — more people set out for the border.

Financial inclusion is another challenge facing relocated refugees. In most cases, they need bank accounts to be paid and the identity documents they possess — which should entitle them to open these accounts — are often not accepted by local banking authorities. Only about 23% had bank accounts after a month, although close to half had such accounts after six months.[12] This is an ongoing struggle for UNHCR, which seeks to explain to banks that refugees do possess the right to open such accounts. Another challenge, particularly for single-parent households, is the need for child care. This seems to be a universal problem, but it is particularly difficult for refugees who no longer have the family support that was more readily available in their home countries.

While Spanish-speaking refugees tend to have an easier time adapting to life and work in Mexico, other refugees, particularly Haitians, have had a more difficult time. It seems that they are more likely to leave the program than others, possibly due to the language barrier — this despite employers translating training packages into Haitian Creole. Mexican government policy — particularly the requirement that asylum-seekers remain in the state where they entered until their asylum claim has been decided — is also an obstacle. As COMAR has offices throughout the country, it would be much easier if asylum-seekers could be relocated and complete the asylum processes in their new location, while they work and earn an income. However, COMAR’s capacity is limited; its budget has not been able to keep up with the surge in asylum requests. Although its budget doubled between 2017 and 2023 — from 21 million Mexican pesos ($1.25 million) to MX$48 million — the number of asylum-seekers increased more than eight-fold in the same time period. While UNHCR has provided funding and staff to COMAR, additional resources would certainly facilitate the processing of claims and decrease the financial hardship for refugees struggling to survive with ad hoc daily labor in Chiapas.

Brazil’s Interiorization Program

Beginning in 2014, Brazil experienced a large-scale inflow of migrants fleeing deteriorating economic conditions and political oppression in Venezuela. Most migrants entered the states of Roraima and Amazonas — which, like Chiapas and Tabasco in Mexico, are among the poorest states in the country — where they overwhelmed local capacity to absorb new arrivals. The Brazilian government, again with the support of UNHCR and other international and local organizations, began a process of relocating new arrivals to cities in other regions of Brazil where unmet demands for labor were more available and conditions were more conducive to integration.

Historically, not many Venezuelans migrate to Brazil, with numbers averaging about 1,000 per year through the mid-2010s. However, since 2014, the number of Venezuelans leaving their country has soared. As of August 2023, 7.7 million Venezuelans have sought protection in other countries, 6.5 million in Latin American countries. While most went to Colombia (2.9 million) almost 500,000 have sought protection in Brazil, mostly through Brazil’s northern states of Roraima and Amazonas.[13] Like Chiapas and Tabasco in Mexico, these two northern states are among Brazil’s poorest, with higher poverty levels than the national average.

A 2020 study by Caritas found that 34% of Venezuelans in Boa Vista, Roraima’s capital, were homeless, and in Porto Velho in the state of Rondônia, the figure was one in five.[14] Unemployment among Venezuelans was much higher (59%) than for locals in the host communities (15%).[15] Moreover, a World Bank-cited study on employment in Manaus, the capital of Amazonas, found that wages for Venezuelans were much lower — 723 reais ($145) and 449 reais for Venezuelan men and women respectively — than the average wages for Brazilians, respectively 2419 reais and 2187 reais.[16]

In 2017, the state governor of Roraima declared a state of emergency due to the large number of Venezuelan arrivals.[17] Also in 2017, Brazil adopted a new, rights-based migration law — the result of a long participatory process. By 2018, Roraima (population 520,000) had received 50,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants. The governor protested, claiming that the Venezuelans were increasing the threat of disease and social disorder, and asked the federal government for support. [18] The federal government responded by taking charge of the humanitarian response, setting up a new Federal Emergency Committee and instituting a new assistance and border management program called Operação Acolhida (Operation Welcome), followed later that year by Parliament’s approval of the related legislation, Law 13.684/2018.[19]

Residence Permits for Venezuelans

Historically Venezuelans were able to enter Brazil without passports, as long as they had some form of national identity documents, and from the start of the influx, Venezuelans were able to apply for asylum in Brazil. However, the surge of Venezuelans presented a challenge to Brazilian institutions. Although protocols allowed citizens of Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) member states to receive temporary residence and work permits, Venezuela was not a signatory to the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement (MRA).[20] Thus in 2017, the Brazilian government made regulations creating a new temporary residence permit for nationals of countries bordering Brazil that were not part of the MRA, including Venezuela. Initially this provided a two-year residency permit; additional regulations later enabled extension to permanent residency — authorizing Venezuelans to work and access social services, including health care and education, on a par with Brazilian citizens.[21] It is notable that this generous policy has continued through the present administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

In 2019, the National Committee for Refugees (CONARE), Brazil’s refugee agency, recognized the gross human rights violations in Venezuela as grounds for granting prima facie refugee status to Venezuelan asylum-seekers. Consequently, asylum was granted to more than 100,000 Venezuelans — a number far higher than other Venezuelan-hosting countries in the region (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile). Another 100,000 asylum applications are still pending.[22]

Operação Acolhida

Operação Acolhida has three components:

• Border management and access to documentation.
• The establishment of shelters.
• A policy of interiorization.

Unlike the relocation initiative in Mexico, Brazil’s interiorization policy — the voluntary relocation of Venezuelans to other cities across Brazil — is overseen by the federal government and implemented by the Brazilian armed forces. This has generated some concern among civil society actors, even though the interiorization mechanism has also been supported by dozens of other organizations.[23] For refugees and migrants the interiorization policy involves four types of relocation:

1. Shelter-to-shelter — moving from shelters in Roraima to shelters in another state.[24]
2. Family reunification — moving to join family members in other parts of the country.
3. Social reunification — moving to areas where other Venezuelans have relocated.
4. Employment-based — moving based on job vacancies in new locations.[25]

Before they are relocated to other cities, Venezuelans who choose to participate in the program receive proper documentation, including a work permit and the Cadastro de Pessoa Física (CPF), which is Portuguese for Individual Taxpayer Registry — similar to the U.S. Social Security card. They are also vaccinated according to the national immunization schedule. The interiorization strategy and Operação Acolhida are generally supported by the InterAgency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), co-led by UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), with support from 55 other civil society organizations and UN agencies.

UNHCR Involvement

UNHCR, which manages five shelters for refugees and migrants in Roraima, supports the interiorization initiative by:

• Offering information about the program.
• Screening and registering potential participants.
• Liaising with the logistics team managing the relocation.
• Providing nonfood items to those who are going to travel.

UNHCR is particularly involved in the institutional — shelter-to-shelter — and employment components of the strategy. It has developed programs to support Venezuelans to organize self-help organizations and to increase the participation of women (presently only 29% of those relocated are female).[26]

Responsibility for management of the shelters is shared between UNHCR, the Ministry of Social Development (responsible for reception and assistance), and the armed forces (responsible for infrastructure, logistics, and health). Shelters and reception centers in receiving communities are managed primarily by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with support from UNHCR, providing registration, orientation, support for local integration, and monitoring.[27]

Some Relocation Statistics

• By 2023, more than 120,000 Venezuelan refugees had benefitted from relocation to around 1,000 cities — about one-fourth of the total number of Venezuelans in the country.[28]
• A reported 100,000 remain in Roraima — given that nearly half a million Venezuelans have sought refuge in Brazil, if these numbers are accurate, this suggests that many Venezuelans are living elsewhere in the country and have moved there outside of the formal interiorization policy.
• A 2019 study found that 77% of Venezuelans were able to find jobs within a few weeks, in Brazil’s interior, while only 7% of Venezuelans in Roraima were employed.[29]
• A 2021 survey of 2,000 relocated Venezuelans found that 80% of them had found jobs or were running their own businesses with salaries comparable to Brazilians, while those who remained in Roraima received one-third of the salaries of Roraima residents.[30]
• A 2021 World Bank study on the integration of Venezuelans in Brazil — which did not focus on those who had been relocated under the interiorization program — found that they were much less likely to be employed in the formal sector or to access education and health services than Brazilians.[31]

The Importance of Capacity Building and Coordination

The interiorization process was supported by a national capacity building program which began in 2018. Dozens of local workshops and planning meetings were held throughout the country, involving 600 institutions, and culminated in a national meeting in 2019. As many of the municipalities which agreed to take relocated refugees had little experience in providing services to refugees and migrants, capacity building remains an important precursor to successful integration.[32]

In spite of these initiatives, observers have noted that municipalities have experienced challenges in providing services to refugees and migrants and that the lack of affordable housing or shelters has remained a major limitation.[33] Coordination and lack of follow-up monitoring have become a problem as well, with some municipalities reporting that they do not receive information about refugees who will be relocated to their communities, nor when. The government has tried to provide support for vulnerable Venezuelans — including people with disabilities, children, LGBTQ+ individuals, and survivors of violence — but notes that there are still challenges in meeting the needs of large families and vulnerable refugees and migrants.[34]

Comparisons and Conclusion

Having outlined the Mexican and Brazilian refugee relocation programs, it is helpful to compare the two. There are several broad points of similarity:

• These two programs seek to address the dual challenges of relieving stress in relatively poor border states and providing opportunities for refugees to integrate into their countries.
• The governments of both countries have adopted the broader definition of refugees espoused in the Cartagena Declaration, and the two governments offer protection to those seeking it in their nations.[35]
• Participation in each program is voluntary.
• There is robust civil society participation in both countries.

The major difference between the two programs seems to be driven by the fact that Mexico has a powerful northern neighbor which continues to attract migrants. Other ways in which the programs differ:

• The impetus for relocation initiatives is not the same. UNHCR plays the leading role in Mexico, while the Brazilian federal government takes the lead in its interiorization program.
• The role of the private sector seems much stronger in Mexico, although the percentage of Venezuelans relocating under the employment-based modality in Brazil is increasing.
• The central role played by Brazilian armed forces sets the country’s program apart from its Mexican counterpart.
• Brazil has relocated far more refugees than Mexico, over 120,000.

The relocation experiences of refugees in these two countries offer insights into the importance of self-reliance and integration, as well.

In the case of Mexico, it is clear that refugees are becoming self-reliant — which is an important step toward local integration. However, we know that integration is a long-term process that includes not only tangible indicators such as employment, language acquisition, and educational access but also important —though less measurable — indicators such as a feeling of belonging. The scale of Brazil’s interiorization program suggests that it would be useful to have a more comprehensive assessment of the program’s successes and weaknesses in this regard.

The fact that these innovative, and largely successful, relocation programs are being implemented by two refugee-hosting countries in the Global South is noteworthy and shows that local integration for refugees remains a viable and durable solution for refugees. While the programs in Mexico and Brazil are not perfect, they are creative and innovative approaches that seek to address the needs of both refugees and host countries. By finding solutions that not only enhance refugee protection and well-being but also cater to domestic labor needs, these initiatives promote a mutually beneficial scenario.

At a time when so much of the public discourse on refugees is negative, it is important to signal when things are going right — there is much to admire in these two programs.

Acknowledgement

The author wishes to extend appreciation to her UNHCR Mexico, UNHCR Brazil, and Georgetown University colleagues for their support.

Notes

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[1] This section of the brief is drawn from research conducted on Mexico’s relocation policy by Georgetown University with the support of USA for UNHCR — a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, DC. The full report can be accessed online (Elizabeth Ferris and Katharine M. Donato, Refugee Relocation in Mexico: Findings from the UNHCR Local Integration Program [Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of International Migration Georgetown University, 2023], https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-relocation-in-mexico-findings-from-the-unhcr-local-integration-program/).

[2] Secretaría de Gobernación, Boletín Estadístico de Solicitantes de Refugio en México 2016 (Ciudad de Mexico, MX: Unidad de Política Migratoria / Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados Subsecretaría de Población, Migración y Asuntos Religiosos / Segob, 2018), https://portales.segob.gob.mx/work/models/PoliticaMigratoria/CEM/Estadisticas/BoletinesCOMAR/2016/COMAR_2016.pdf; “México Registró Durante 2023 La Cifra Récord De 140 Mil 982 Solicitudes De Asilo, Un Aumento Interanual De 18.2%: Comar,” Latinus, January 11, 2024, https://latinus.us/2024/01/11/mexico-registro-durante-2023-la-cifra-record-de-140-mil-982-solicitudes-de-asilo-un-aumento-interanual-de-18-2-comar/.

[3] Caitlyn Yates and Juan Pappier, “How the Treacherous Darien Gap Became a Migration Crossroads of the Americas,” Migration Policy Institute, September 20, 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/darien-gap-migration-crossroads.

[4] Figures from the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR), as reported in Ferris and Donato, Refugee Relocation in Mexico.

[5] “Anexo Estadístico De Pobreza En México 2016–2020,” National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL), accessed March 13, 2024, https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Paginas/AE_pobreza_2020.aspx. Also see interactive map: https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/Paginas/Resultados_Pobreza_Interactivo.aspx.

[6] Stephanie Brewer and Maureen Meyer, “Struggling to Survive: Plight of Asylum Seekers at Mexico’s Southern Border Highlights Need for Regional Action,” Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), June 2, 2022, https://www.wola.org/analysis/struggling-to-survive-plight-of-asylum-seekers-at-mexicos-southern-border-highlights-need-for-regional-action/.

[7] UNHCR-Mexico, communication with author, March 2023.

[8] This figure is particularly important given that the program was suspended for almost a year due to COVID-19 restrictions.

[9] Statistics are from an internal document that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mexico made available to researchers.

[10] UNHCR-Mexico, communication with author, March 2023.

[11] Cited in PowerPoint presentation, “Soluciones Duraderas: Inclusión e Integración,” 2021, shared with author by UNHCR-Mexico.

[12] UNHCR-Mexico, communication with author, March 2023.

[13] “Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela,” R4V, last updated November 30, 2023, https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants.

[14] Cited in Diego Chaves-González, Jordi Amaral, and María Jesús Mora, Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees: The Cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, Migration Policy Institute and International Organization for Migration (IOM), July 2021, https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/press_release/file/mpi-iom_socioeconomic-integration-venezuelans_2021_final.pdf.

[15] Chaves-González, Amaral, and Jesús Mora, Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees.

[16] Chaves-González, Amaral, and Jesús Mora, Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees.

[17] Gisele P. Zapata and Vicente Tapia Wenderoth, “Progressive Legislation but Lukewarm Policies: The Brazilian Response to Venezuelan Displacement,” International Migration 60, no. 1 (February 2022): 142, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/imig.12902.

[18] “Brazil State Seeks to Shut Venezuelan Border to Stop Refugee Flow,” Reuters, April 13, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-venezuela-border/brazil-state-seeks-to-shut-venezuelan-border-to-stop-refugee-flow-idUSKBN1HK2W9/.

[19] The 2018 migration law “provides for emergency assistance measures to receive people in vulnerable situations resulting from the migration flow caused by the humanitarian crisis; and makes other provisions”: https://legislacao.presidencia.gov.br/atos/?tipo=LEI&numero=13684&ano=2018&ato=6f4oXW61UeZpWTdf2.

[20] The Southern Common Market, known as “MERCOSUR” for its Spanish initials (and “MERCOSUL” in Portuguese), is a trading bloc between four South American countries — Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay — with additional countries having associate status: https://www.mercosur.int/en/about-mercosur/mercosur-in-brief/. On the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement, see: https://www.gfmd.org/pfp/ppd/10502.

[21] Venezuelans have the choice between applying for migratory status under the MERCOSUR Residency Agreement or making a claim for asylum. The main difference between these legal categories in Brazil is that not only can migrants travel back to Venezuela more easily, but they can also be deported — while refugees cannot be returned to Venezuela against their will. Liliana Lyra Jubilut and João Carlos Jarochinski Silva, “Group Recognition of Venezuelans in Brazil: An Adequate New Model?” Forced Migration Review 65 (November 2020), https://www.fmreview.org/recognising-refugees/jubilut-jarochinskisilva; Leiza Brumat, “Migrants or Refugees? ‘Let’s Do Both’. Brazil’s Response to Venezuelan Displacement Challenges Legal Definitions,” Migration Policy Centre Blog, January 11, 2022, https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/migrants-or-refugees-lets-do-both-brazils-response-to-venezuelan-displacement-challenges-legal-definitions/. Note that this policy was based on Brazil’s experience in 2012 with similar humanitarian visas followed by residency for Haitian migration.

[22] Chaves-González, Amaral, and Jesús Mora, Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees. See also Jubilut and Silva, “Group Recognition of Venezuelans.”

[23] Geoff Ramsay and Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, Responding to an Exodus: Venezuela’s Migration and Refugee Crisis as Seen from the Colombian and Brazilian Borders, July 2018, https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Final-VZ-Migration-Report-Final.pdf.

[24] “After 5 Years, Brazil Relocation Strategy Benefits Over 100,000 Venezuelans,” IOM, April 4, 2023, https://www.iom.int/news/after-5-years-brazil-relocation-strategy-benefits-over-100000-venezuelans.

[25] This program, known in Portugese as “vaga de emprego sinalizada,” is based on job vacancies being flagged in the new location. As in Mexico, the program is voluntary and since it began, more than 70% of Venezuelans living in Roraima have expressed their willingness to be relocated for work. See Conselho Nacional de Imigracão, Perfil Sociodemográfico e Laboral de Imigracão Venezuelana: Resumen Executivo, 2017, https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/portugues/Publicacoes/2017/Perfil_imigracao_ven_Roraima_resumo.pdf.

[26] “Interiorização,” Agência da ONU para Refugiados (ACNUR) Brasil, last accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.acnur.org/portugues/construir-futuros-melhores/solucoes-duradouras/integracao-local/interiorizacao/.

[27] Zapata and Wenderoth, “Progressive Legislation but Lukewarm Policies.” UNHCR directly manages 50 reception centers which have welcomed more than 6,500 people (“Interiorizacão”).

[28] Internal Relocation Report, ACNUR, July–September 2023, https://www.acnur.org/portugues/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/EN-Internal-Relocation-Report-Jul-Sep-2023-VF.pdf.

[29] Chaves-González, Amaral, and Jesús Mora, Socioeconomic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees.

[30] “After 5 Years.” See also UNHCR and UN Women and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), Limites e Desafios à Integração Local de Refugiadas, Refugiados e Pessoas Migrantes da Venezuela Interiorizadas durante a Pandemia de COVID-19, December 2021, https://www.onumulheres.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Sumario-Executivo-Limites-e-desafios-a-integracao-local-de-refugiadas-refugiados-e-pessoas-migrantes-da-Venezuela-interiorizadas-durante-a-pandemia-de-Covid-19-dez.2021.pdf

[31] Felipe Irnaldo, “Displacement in Brazil: Helping Policy Makers to Improve Economic and Social Inclusion for Venezuelans,” The World Bank, May 19, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/05/19/deslocamento-no-brasil-ajudando-os-formuladores-de-politicas-a-melhorar-a-inclusao-economica-e-social-dos-venezuelanos.

[32] Matriz de Monitoramento de Deslocamento (DTM) Nacional Sobre a População Indígena do Fluxo Venezuelano no Brasil, IOM and the Brazilian Government, August 2023, https://brazil.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1496/files/documents/2023-08/resumo-executivo_matriz-de-monitoramento-de-deslocamento-dtm-nacional-sobre-a-populacao-indigena-do-fluxo-venezuelano-no-brasil-2a-rodada.pdf.

[33] Jordi Amaral, “The Quiet Growth of Brazil’s Venezuelan Population,” Americas Migration Brief, October 5, 2023, https://www.migrationbrief.com/p/the-quiet-growth-of-brazils-venezuelan.

[34] Interiorização: Uma Estratégia De Apoio À Integração Socioeconômica, R4V, June 27, 2023, https://www.r4v.info/pt/document/interiorizacao-uma-estrategia-de-apoio-integracao-socioeconomica.

[35] “Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 22 November 1984,” UNHRC, https://www.unhcr.org/us/media/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection-refugees-central.

 

 

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