To access the full paper, download the PDF on the left-hand sidebar. An executive summary of the paper is also available here.

I. Introduction

Russia’s intensifying challenges to physical and energy security in Europe demand bold response options. In this paper, we seek to quantify the potential energy security consequences of a significant disruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe, and objectively assess the strengths, weaknesses, and consequences of potential response strategies.

Moscow pressures Europe on multiple fronts. Russia continues augmenting what is likely already the world’s third-largest buildup of ground, air, and naval forces of the past 50 years to the north, east, and south of Ukraine. Simultaneously, Gazprom’s deliveries of Europe-bound gas in January 2022 are the lowest since at least 2017, despite record low European gas inventories and a clear demand call. Gazprom’s refusal to sell additional gas on the spot market could be characterized as a “commercial” decision. But completely discounting the motivations of the prime occupant of the Kremlin with regard to Gazprom’s decisions would be a mistake. Geopolitical motives are equally plausible, such as actively dissuading European support for Ukraine by highlighting the importance of Russian gas supplies, while also coercing key customers toward additional long-term contracts that would perpetuate dependence.

Today’s situation in Europe, and how it may play out on the energy front, recalls the Berlin Airlift in 1948-1949 where intrepid action by the United States and its allies dynamically reshaped the situation and turned tactical entrapment into a galvanizing strategic triumph. In June 1948, Gen. Lucius Clay, the administrator of US-occupied Germany messaged to Washington that “there is no practicability in maintaining our position in Berlin, and it must not be evaluated on that basis. ... We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent.”

Within two weeks, a US-led effort established an airbridge that ultimately saw a cargo plane landing every 45 seconds at Berlin’s Tempelhof Airport, and less than a year later, Moscow lifted the blockade. Present circumstances demand a similar show of American intent (call it a “Berlin Gaslift”) and a readiness to support allies boldly and clearly. There is no guarantee of success, but inaction and disengagement carry more certain, global consequences, including the empowerment of malign actors for whom no leverage point—even life critical commodity flows—is off limits. No matter how the event is sliced, an unabated large-scale curtailment of Russian gas supplies to Europe would be regionally devastating and globally impactful. Second- and third-order impacts could even include slower global phaseouts of coal.

Action to uphold energy security is inherently multilateral, involving US allies and strategic competitors alike. But leadership by the world’s financial, military, and energy superpower would form an irreplaceable foundation. The current United States national interest in preventing adversaries from using energy flows to coerce allies echoes the motivations behind the Carter Doctrine promulgated more than 40 years ago. While the specific factual circumstances of gas security in Europe are very different now, the stakes are equally high.

Today the situation in Europe is quite different from past periods when, due to payment disputes, Russia cut its supply of natural gas transiting Ukraine, ultimately impacting downstream consumers in Europe. Concerns about Europe’s dependence on Russian gas are not new and have been evaluated on many occasions. Indeed, much attention was given to the role of Russian gas in Europe in the wake of pricing disputes that led to short-term supply disruptions, specifically with Ukraine in the winters of 2005-06 and 2008-09. These events pushed European consumers to reevaluate Russia’s role in European gas markets by seeking alternative supplies through LNG and pipelines from the Caspian region. In 2009, Hartley and Medlock addressed the role of Russian gas in Europe using the Rice World Gas Trade Model. They concluded that although the short-term impacts of reductions in Russian gas supplies are deleterious for Europe, there are multiple short- and long-term margins of response available to counter such actions. Additionally, they noted that the long-term ramifications for Russia could be quite severe, as such actions would drive subsequent investments that could compromise Russian market presence.

They also went on to note that their analysis “highlights the common interest that the countries of Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and North America have in promoting the development of an efficient worldwide market for natural gas.” Of course, the global market for natural gas is evolving, largely as a result of increased LNG trade, but it has not transitioned to a fully transparent, efficient market for LNG that is deep enough to seamlessly absorb a significant supply disruption. Hence, short-term responses are critical and will remain so even with an efficient market. At the same time, long-term thinking remains as important as ever. As was written more than seven years ago in the wake of the Russian occupation of Crimea, the US has a valuable counterpunch to Russian actions that impact Europe’s gas supplies: LNG.

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.