Author(s)
Introduction
A severe drought is currently affecting the Panama Canal and, exacerbated by the weather pattern known as El Niño, water shortages are likely to persist well into 2024.[1] For each ship transiting the canal, approximately 52 million gallons of water are needed to operate the sets of locks ascending from the Pacific Ocean toward Gatun Lake in Panama (the highest point of the canal at 85 feet above sea level) and descending again to sea level on the Atlantic Ocean side.[2] The water required comes from Gatun Lake, an artificial lake built to service the canal, and other smaller sources. Because the drought has lowered lake water levels, a depth limit of 44 feet — 4 to 5 feet lower than normal — has been imposed on ships transiting the canal, and daily crossings have been reduced from 36 to 32, contributing to a backlog of 264 ships as of mid-August.[3]
In some instances, containers have been off-loaded at Panama City on the Pacific side and shipped by rail across the Isthmus of Panama to Colón, to be reloaded on the same container ship. On one recent canal transit, the Panamax[4] Taiwan-owned vessel Ever Max (with a capacity of over 8,650 containers) had to unload 700 containers and ship them by rail to the Atlantic coast.[5] This is, however, an expensive process, and costs for shipping a container from Asia to the U.S. East Coast have risen by more than a third in recent weeks, to approximately $2,400.[6]
Most of the shipments transiting the Panama Canal (some 72.5%) carry exports from or imports to the United States, with China being second at 22%, and Japan third at approximately 15%.[7] The canal carries about 3% of world trade by volume and up to 29% of container trade crossing the Pacific,[8] including 40% of consumer goods shipped from East Asia to the United States.[9] More than 14,000 ships transited the canal in 2022.[10] With increases in shipping costs and delays when the canal is short of water, the potential impact on U.S. commerce is concerning, adding to trade costs and impeding further progress on combatting inflation, among other things. Moreover, revenue losses in 2023 to the Government of Panama as a result of reduced traffic and tonnage could reach $200 million.[11]
Against this background, this issue brief addresses these questions:
- What happens to ocean supply chains if water shortages in Panama are in fact long term and not just a temporary result of an El Niño weather pattern?
- If this is the new normal, what are the implications for the U.S., particularly for containers shipped between the U.S. East Coast and Asia?[12]
Background
The idea of a water route linking the Atlantic and Pacific oceans apparently originated with Spanish explorers some 500 years ago.[13] The Panama Canal finally became operational in 1914 after decades of construction difficulties, including unprecedented engineering and disease challenges.[14] From the outset, during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, the canal was “linked to the idea of the rise of the U.S. as a global power, with both commercial and military potential.”[15] During World War II, the canal provided the U.S. Navy with the flexibility to move ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific theater and shortened army supply lines.[16] Today, however, the economic significance of the canal for the U.S. and the world arguably dwarfs the military value.
For more than 80 years, the Panama Canal Zone was a 10-mile-wide slice of Americana. Granted in perpetuity to the United States by a newly independent Panama in 1903,[17] the Canal Zone was an unincorporated U.S. territory under American control. It included housing for the American workers who managed the canal — and even had its own U.S. federal court! It also housed extensive military facilities for defense of the canal if necessary.[18] Despite considerable political opposition in the U.S., in 1977 the Carter administration began a 20-year process of returning the canal and the zone to Panama. Part of the motivation for this reversal was that a canal with locks — particularly one under U.S. control — was vulnerable to terrorist attacks from dissident groups within Panama and beyond. Panama acquired direct civil control in 1977 and assumed full control of the canal and the Canal Zone as of December 31, 1999.[19]
Effects of the Canal Expansion
Contrary to some predictions, Panama has managed the canal effectively, including a $5 billion expansion in 2016 that enabled the canal to accommodate larger container ships.[20] The construction of new and larger locks significantly increased the capacity of the canal to cater to larger container ships, which led to substantial cost savings.[21] The expansion was essential to preserving the canal's position as a competitive sea route to and from Asia and between the west coast of South America and the East and Gulf coasts of the United States. As a result of the expansion, gross tonnage transiting the canal has grown from 326.4 million metric tons in 2014 to 516.5 million metric tons in 2021.[22]
When the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in lengthy delays unloading ships in California, the expanded canal made it possible for containers shipped from Shanghai to be delivered directly to Gulf and East coast ports, avoiding the issues at Los Angeles and Long Beach. This significantly increased the number of containers offloaded at Houston, Charleston, and Savannah, all three of which have invested in significant upgrades and logistical improvements in recent years. While these ports have seen more trade from Asia, they all also handle cargoes from Europe and South America. Traffic from the western coast of South America — Ecuador, Peru, and Chile — is largely dependent on the canal as well. Table 1 lists the busiest container ports in the United States.
Table 1 — Busiest Container Ports in the United States
Note A TEU (20-foot equivalent unit) is a measure of cargo capacity, the volume of a 20-foot-long container.
In recent years, Panama’s government has sought to shed its reputation as a tax haven and money laundering center and improve its environmental reputation by becoming carbon negative.[23] These policies suggest that if Panama pursues alternative sources of water to operate the canal, it will attempt to do so in an environmentally friendly manner. However, the options are limited. While the government has plans to build three new reservoirs,[24] maintaining these additional water supplies would of course depend on Panama receiving adequate rainfall in the future.
The 2016 canal expansion gave stakeholders — shipping companies, shippers, and other transportation companies — more options, particularly in the still vital carriage of goods from China to the United States. The larger Panamax ship option provided shippers and consignees with alternatives should natural disasters, pandemics, or longshoreman’s strikes again paralyze Los Angeles and Long Beach, which in 2021 were responsible for handling 44% of inbound and outbound U.S. container traffic.[25] Given the cost benefits of sea transport over land transport, the environmental impacts of these shifts could be significant — particularly for Panama and the United States.
Alternatives to the Panama Canal
Double-stack Rail Cars Across North America
One major long-existing option for consignees and shippers in the eastern half of the U.S. is to unload containers from ships calling at West Coast ports — Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle, and Vancouver — onto “double stack” rail cars,[26] a relatively economical multimodal option.[27] By 1984, all major east-west rail routes had raised existing bridges and tunnels to accommodate double stack container cars.[28] This option was very popular before the Panama Canal expansion, as it saved fuel and labor costs compared to long-haul trucking. It remains a common means of intermodal transportation because of the Los Angeles/Long Beach dominance in U.S. container traffic from Asia.
As mentioned above, during the coronavirus pandemic, major East Coast ports expanded their container traffic, beginning with the diversion of containers from Los Angeles/Long Beach to Houston, Savannah, Charleston, and other port cities. As of mid-2023, it is probably too soon to determine how much of the diverted traffic is permanent. However, it seems clear that if the cost of shipping containers from Asia to the U.S. East Coast increases significantly, the Panamax option will become less price competitive when compared with the multimodal route — for example, from Singapore or Shanghai to a West Coast port, and then via double-stack rail to Chicago and east.
Canals or Land Bridges
Proposed Alternatives. For some years governments and private investors have explored alternatives for shipping goods from Asia across the Americas to the Atlantic instead of going through the Panama Canal to Los Angeles/Long Beach. These possibilities include: 1) a canal across Nicaragua, 2) a rail transport system across Colombia, 3) a similar rail system across Mexico, 4) a tunnel across Colombia[29] and 5) a South American land bridge called the “Bi-oceanic Corridor.” Apart from the revised Bi-oceanic Corridor, none of these ideas have yet attracted much support. However, an existing railroad across Panama has been used by some shippers as an alternative, despite considerable costs.
Existing Panamanian Railroad. In operation since 1855, an existing Panamanian railroad parallels the canal. It has been improved several times, and major reconstruction amounting to $80 million was authorized in 1998 when the process of returning the canal (and railroad) to Panama was nearly complete.[30] The improved railroad is said to be able to handle 500,000 TEU annually, with plans to eventually increase capacity to 2 million TEUs.[31] However, like the proposed trans-isthmus railroads or “land bridges” in Colombia and Mexico, the Panamanian rail link is challenged by sizable operational costs. Indeed, the cost of off-loading every container, shipping them overland, and then on-loading again on the other side is considerable. The Colombian tunnel project would have similar loading costs, in addition to the enormous tunnel and infrastructure construction costs.
However, despite the extra cost, some shippers are still using this existing rail option as noted earlier.
Colombian Rail Link Proposal. In the mid-2010s, a rail link to connect the Colombian Caribbean port of Cartagena with Buenaventura on the Pacific coast was proposed. The parties were Suez Capital, a Malaysian developer, and a consortium of two Chinese state-owned enterprises. This proposal seems to have been blocked by political issues, though the estimated cost of $6 billion may have also been an impediment.[32]
Nicaraguan Canal Proposal. The Nicaragua route was to be financed by Chinese interests at an estimated cost of $40 billion, but it has not progressed since 2016, presumably due to a lack of funding.[33] Jean-Paul Rodrigue — the leading U.S. expert on the Panama Canal and alternative routes — notes that while “technically feasible,” the Nicaragua canal proposal would be much longer Panama’s 50 miles. Including Lake Nicaragua, it would extend approximately 75 miles.[34] Environmental concerns raised by several groups in Nicaragua could also be substantial.[35] (Another limiting factor for the United States could be the prospect of dealing with a repressive, unpredictable, and unfriendly government.[36])
Mexican Rail Line Proposals. A Chinese group proposed a Mexican trans-isthmus rail line during the Peña-Nieto administration, but widespread corruption charges terminated the discussions in 2014,[37] although separate discussions of the project were revived by the López Obrador administration. In 2018-19, further discussions took place about a container transport route with financial support from Singapore. The concept was ridiculed by the Mexican Shipping Agents Association, whose president contended that at least 200 trains a day would be needed for the railroad to compete with the Panama Canal.[38] The cost of new port construction on both coasts was also cited.[39] Still, some members of the Mexican senate have argued that the rail line could help to encourage long-desired new investment in the southern part of Mexico because of the convenience of rail service to any regional manufacturers for transport of materials and the finished products.[40]
For assorted reasons, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López-Obrador chose to move forward instead with a tourist train (the “Tren Maya”) across the isthmus, which would not carry cargo. It is not yet operational, and overruns have already significantly increased its cost. It is also beset by objections from Mexican environmentalists and Indigenous groups as construction is destroying many pre-Hispanic sites.[41]
Bi-oceanic Corridor. The Bi-oceanic Corridor is a somewhat different concept. The original formulation was a single railroad connecting Peru’s Callao port with Brazil’s Santos Port. The level of ambition was staggering: An 1,800-mile railroad through the land-locked nation of Bolivia — which at the time welcomed a rail connection to both oceans — would have to cross the Andes, one of the highest mountain ranges in the world.[42] The idea apparently arose in conversations in 2013 between then Bolivian President Evo Morales and Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping. Reports suggested that all three countries approved the project and had planned a 2025 inauguration date. However, for a variety of reasons, the railroad plan did not go forward, despite the re-endorsement of the concept by the presidents of both Bolivia and Colombia in January 2023.[43]
Since 2018, the railroad proposal has been partially replaced with road construction. The new route now excludes Bolivia and Peru (presumably because of their continuing instability[44]) but is to connect Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, and Argentina, using primarily roads rather than railroads.[45] This corridor is not specifically designed to move containers across the continent but rather to expedite transportation of exports and imports, particularly for major mining and agricultural interests, and facilitate intra-regional trade. Still, if it is completed and key port facilities are updated, particularly in Chile, there could be some diversion of Brazilian and Argentine exports to Asia from the Panama Canal to this corridor — but only if costs and shipping times are comparable.
While construction is underway and parts of the extensive road and bridge construction may be serviceable in the near future, the project’s completion date is unknown. Funding appears to have come from several sources, most likely including China, but details are unavailable. Argentina is the only one of the four countries that is part of China’s Belt and Road initiative, but China manages Brazil’s second largest port, Paranaguá, and Chinese investment in Chile amounted to $13.2 billion between 2013 and 2022.[46] There is no public record of any significant U.S. government financing for the project, which is not surprising given the lack of interest in Latin America from the past two American administrations, even as China expands its activities there.[47]
Other Shipping Options
Should the Panama Canal route become permanently less cost-effective, the option of shipping goods from Shanghai or Singapore via the Suez Canal to the eastern U.S. will likely gain popularity. There is already significant container shipping to the United States via Suez even though the route from Asia takes about a week longer and is therefore more costly. (See Figure 1 below, comparing that route with the alternative shipping options via land and sea.) The Suez Canal has one giant advantage over the Panama Canal: Suez is a sea-level canal, without locks that depend on an abundant supply of fresh water.
Figure 1 — Main Routing Alternatives between the Pacific and Atlantic[48]
Suez Canal. If climate change results in rising ocean levels over the coming decades, this could in fact be an operational benefit for the Suez Canal, which currently carries about 12% of global trade.[49] The absence of locks also makes the possibility of terrorism through enemy air strikes harder. However, safety is relative. In 1956 (when France and the UK attacked Egypt because of differences over ownership of the canal), Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser demonstrated that the canal was relatively easy to block.[50] More recently, in March 2021, the accidental grounding of a large container ship (the Ever Given) closed the Suez Canal for over a week, resulting in billions of dollars of stakeholder losses and the rerouting of many ships around the Cape of Good Hope, with greatly increased costs. [51]
Other Options. In time, the fabled North-West Passage across the Arctic areas of Canada and the United States may well become more practical for commercial ship traffic if climate change continues to raise temperatures and melt the Arctic ice. But as of 2023 this seems to be relatively far off.[52] Until the Panama Canal opened in 1914, ships had no convenient sea-borne alternatives to rounding Cape Horn, although U.S. transcontinental railroads after 1869 offered the first of the practical overland options. Today, the dangers and unpredictability of the Cape Horn route still discourage most transits, in part because it can add as much as thousands of miles to the route from the West Coast of the Americas to the East Coast.
Implications of Reduced Efficiency of Panama Canal
Is there any upside to the reduced efficiency of shipping via the Panama Canal?
Increased Pressure for Nearshoring and Reshoring
The first and most obvious consequence is increased pressure for nearshoring (sourcing materials and components in Canada and Mexico) and reshoring (manufacturing in the United States). Both of these have been embraced for other reasons by the Trump and Biden administrations and by many manufacturers both U.S. and foreign.
- Shorter supply lines may be slightly less profitable when ideal conditions exist, but they are less susceptible to the disrupting effects of events like pandemics and tidal waves — and unpredictable foreign leaders.
- In some instances, reshoring and nearshoring may further U.S. national security (e.g., through the manufacture of microchips and electric vehicles) and may, to a limited degree, increase U.S. employment.
- Given the high environmental costs of shipping a container 9,000 miles from Asia to the U.S. by diesel-fueled ship by any route, shorter supply lines have significant benefits for the environment.
- For the decreasing number of people who still believe that free and open trade and reduced trade barriers are good for the U.S., to the extent that higher shipping costs via Panama or elsewhere encourage nearshoring, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) as an institution and its members and stakeholders could benefit in the medium and longer terms.
- It is also worth noting that reshoring or nearshoring may reduce but will not eliminate long supply chains, particularly in the short and medium terms. Many of the enterprises that have diversified away from China for final manufacturing and some intermediate goods production will remain dependent on Chinese- or other Asian-origin parts and components for the foreseeable future, even as they seek local or regional sources. This seems particularly true for the automotive industry. The USMCA rules of origin that raised domestic content for passenger vehicles from 62.5% to 75%[53] mean that, for many producers, up to 25% of vehicle content will still originate in China or elsewhere outside of North America. Moreover, the volume could be higher for autos produced in Mexico, which avoid the USMCA rules for some autos and SUVs shipped to the U.S. and chooses instead to pay the modest 2.5% U.S. most-favored-nation duty.
Effect on Shipping Costs Generally
An ongoing water shortage problem in Panama will affect shipping costs for American and other Western Hemisphere businesses. Higher costs for Panama Canal transportation may provide an incentive for some sellers and buyers to use U.S. West Coast ports, particularly Los Angeles/Long Beach, but also Oakland, Seattle, and Vancouver. This could result in a modest reduction in the volume growth that Houston, Savannah, and Charleston have experienced in recent years. However, waterborne transportation — despite being slower than alternatives and more at the mercy of the weather — is still the most economical transport option where available in most situations.[54]
Conclusion
The appeal and importance of the Panama Canal has, if anything, increased since Spanish explorer Vasco Nunez de Balboa first envisioned it over half a millennium ago.[55] After its completion in 1914 and particularly since its expansion in 2016, the Panama Canal has played a crucial role in international commerce. Despite the several supply chain alternatives explored in this issue brief, the global economy will benefit if the Panamanian authorities can locate sufficient new water supplies to keep the canal operating efficiently. After all, it is one of the world’s most vital waterways.
Endnotes
[1] See Christine Murray and Oliver Telling, “Severe Drought in Panama Hits Global Shipping Industry,” August 14, 2023, Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/86839bc7-1926-4bf6-b593-1720f7fbd8b4?shareType=nongift.
[2] See Nancy S. Giges, “Panama Canal Expands to Meet Demand, August 19, 2020, ASME, https://www.asme.org/topics-resources/content/panama-canal-expands-to-meet-demand#.
[3] Murray and Telling, “Severe Drought.”
[4] “Panamax” and “Neo-Panamax” ships are as wide and long as the Panama Canal allows so can be routed through it. Panamax ships carry up to 5,000 TEUs; Neo-Panamax ships, introduced after the canal’s expansion, can carry up to 14,000 TEUs. “Post-Panamax” ships are wider and longer and must bypass the canal. They and other ultra-large container vessels (ULCV) carry the largest amounts of cargo, some well in excess of 20,000 TEUs. See https://www.dhl.com/content/dam/dhl/global/dhl-global-forwarding/documents/pdf/glo-dgf-cargo-sizes-infographic.pdf.
[5] Lisa Baertlein and Marianna Parraga, “Focus: Historic Drought, Hot Seas Slow Panama Canal Shipping,” August 21, 2023, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/historic-drought-hot-seas-slow-panama-canal-shipping-2023-08-21/
[6] Murray and Telling, “Severe Drought.”
[7] Anna Skinner, “Chart Shows Dramatic Drop in Gatun Lake Levels as Drought Hits Panama Canal,” June 15, 2003, Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/chart-shows-dramatic-drop-gatun-lake-levels-drought-hits-panama-canal-1807083.
[8] Murray and Telling, “Severe Drought.”
[9] Baertlein and Parraga, “Focus: Historic Drought.”
[10] Baertlein and Parraga, “Focus: Historic Drought.”
[11] Murray and Telling, “Severe Drought.”
[12] Considering that the canal currently provides more than 3% of Panama’s GDP and jobs for 9,500 workers, there are significant implications for the country’s service-based economy: see “Canal de Panama: Annual Report 2020,” 2021, https://pancanal.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/2020-AnnualReport.pdf.
[13] History.com Editors, “Panama Canal,” History (website), September 6, 2022, https://www.history.com/topics/landmarks/panama-canal.
[14] See “The Panama Canal,” Embassy of Panama in Washington, D.C., accessed September 23, 2023 https://www.embassyofpanama.org/panama-canal.
[15] Quoting University of San Diego Professor Richard Feinberg in “How the Panama Canal Helped Make the U.S. a World Power,” August 15, 2014, PBS News Hour, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/panama-canal-helped-make-u-s-world-power.
[16] See “Military Significance of the Panama Canal,” Beyond the History Textbooks website, October 7, 2014, https://beyondthehistorytextbooks.com/2014/10/07/military-significance-of-the-panama-canal/ (noting that the canal could not accommodate many larger Navy vessels). This problem was partially mitigated to some extent by the 2016 expansion.
[17] See History.com, “Panama Canal. ”Panama Canal,” September 6, 2022, History.com, .
[18] “Canal Zone,” Britannica, last updated August 16, 2023, https://www.britannica.com/place/Canal-Zone.
[19] Britannica, “Canal Zone.”
[20] Murray and Telling, “Severe Drought.”
[21] The largest ships, with capacities over 20,000 TEUs, still do not fit. A TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) is a measure of cargo capacity, the volume of a 20-foot-long container.
[22] Martin Placek, “Panama Canal’s Net Tonnage from 2014 to 2021,” August 6, 2023, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/710203/net-tonnage-panama-canal/.
[23] Murray and Telling, “Severe Drought.”
[24] Nancy S. Giges, “Panama Canal Expands.”
[25] See Table 1 and “11 Largest Ports in North America,” Partner Trade, accessed September 23, 2023 https://partnertrade.us/top-11-largest-ports-north-america/.
[26] In other words, these are railroad cars which can carry two layers of containers.
[27] Malcom McLean, the inventor of modern shipping containers, pioneered the concept with the Union Pacific Railroad. See “Intermodal: 6 Milestones Growth,” Association of American Railroads, accessed September 23, 2023 https://www.aar.org/article/6-milestones-intermodal-growth/#.
[28] AAR, “Intermodal: 6 Milestones.”
[29] DC Velocity Staff, “A 30-minute alternative to the Panama Canal?”
January 13, 2023, DC Velocity, www.dcvelocity.com/articles/56341-a-30-minute-alternative-to-the-panama-canal.
[30] See “Panama Railway Company; First Transcontinental Railway,” accessed September 23, 2023, http://www.panarail.com/en/index.html.
[31] Panama Railway Company: Freight Service (website), accessed September 23, 2023, http://www.panarail.com/en/cargo/index.html.
[32] See Suez Capital, “Trans Colombia Railway Line,” June 10, 2023, https://www.suezcap.org/portfolio/innovative-interfaces/.
[33] See Jean Paul-Rodrigue and Theo Notteboom, “The Nicaragua Canal Project,” Port Economics, Management and Policy, (New York: Routledge, 2022),https://porteconomicsmanagement.org/pemp/contents/part9/nicaragua-canal-project/.
[34] Quoting Professor Jean-Paul Rodrigue of Hofstra University in Chris Baraniuk, “The Rival to the Panama Canal That Was Never Built,” August 25, 2023, BBC Future, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20230825-the-rival-to-the-panama-canal-that-was-never-built .
[35] Baraniuk, “The Rival.”
[36] See “U.S. Relations with Nicaragua,” U.S. Department of State fact sheet, September 15, 2022, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-nicaragua/.
[37] See Suez Capital, “Trans Colombia Railway Line,” June 10, 2023, https://www.suezcap.org/portfolio/innovative-interfaces/.
[38] MND Staff, “Trans-Isthmus Railway Plan a ‘Pipe Dream,’ Says Shipping Agents Group,” April 22, 2019, Mexico News Daily, https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/trans-isthmus-corridor-plan-a-pipe-dream/.
[39] MND, “Trans-Isthmus Railway.”
[40] Discussions with Senator Montoya via Zoom on September 20, 2003.
[41] See Kevin Seiff and Whitney Leaming, “Destroying Maya Treasures to Build a Tourist Train,” December 9, 2022, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/mexico-tren-maya-destruction-archeology/.
[42] See Eva Grey, “The Bi-Oceanic Corridor: A New Railroad to Rival Maritime Freight? April 30, 2018, Railway Technology, https://www.railway-technology.com/features/the-bi-oceanic-corridor-a-new-railroad-to-rival-maritime-freight/.
[43] “Bioceanic Train Highlighted by Presidents of Bolivia and Colombia,” January 24, 2003, Prensa Latina, https://www.plenglish.com/news/2023/01/24/bioceanic-train-highlighted-by-presidents-of-bolivia-and-colombia/.
[44] Another factor may well be Bolivia’s continuing frustration with having lost its corridor to the sea 150 years ago. See “How Bolivia Lost its Access to the Sea,” March 23, 2023, Kawsachun News, https://kawsachunnews.com/how-bolivia-lost-its-access-to-the-sea. This is one of many narratives that discuss Bolivia’s loss of its corridor in 1879 and in this instance the asserted role of Chile and the UK in the war.
[45] See “The Bi-Oceanic Corridor to Revolutionize South America,” YouTube, September 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FPSOZCNqHdk.
[46] “China Regional Snapshot: South America,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 25, 2002, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/china-regional-snapshot-south-america/.
[47] HFAC, “China Regional Snapshot.”
[48] Theo Notteboom, Athanasios Pallis and Jean Paul Rodrigue, Port Economics, Management and Policy (New York: Routledge, 2022), https://porteconomicsmanagement.org/pemp/contents/part1/interoceanic-passages/routing-alternatives-pacific-atlantic/. For an excellent discussion of these and other related issues, see Jean-Paul Rodrigue, The Geography of Transport Systems, 5th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2017).
[49] “Egypt’s Suez Canal Blocked by Huge Container Ship,” March 24, 2001, BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56505413.
[50] See Office of the Historian, “The Suez Crisis, 1956,” U.S. Department of State, accessed September 23, 2023, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez.
[51] BBC News, “Egypt’s Suez Canal.”
[52] See Matthew Scott, ”Does the Northwest Passage Exist: 7 Mind-Blowing Facts, Myths and FAQs,” March 14, 2023, Discover: Silversea (website), https://discover.silversea.com/destinations/arctic/7-northwest-passage-facts/.
[53] USMCA, chapter 4, Appendix to Annex 4-B, Product-Specific Rules of Origin for Automotive Goods.
[54] Beatrix Potter, “The Pros and Cons of Water Transportation,” April 2, 2020, Urban Transport News, https://www.urbantransportnews.com/article/the-pros-and-cons-of-water-transportation.
[55] History.com, “Panama Canal.”
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