To access the full paper, download the PDF on the left-hand sidebar.

Executive Summary

Syria, by many measures and indicators, is headed toward state failure. Extremism is on the rise, sectarianism pervades the country, and, with 70,000 Syrians killed and over three million displaced, the humanitarian situation is seriously deteriorating. Spillover to Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel is a major concern, and external actors both within and outside the region are working to shape their own versions of a future Syrian state. Syria’s chemical and biological weapons stockpiles present a special threat.

Given the absence of a negotiated political settlement and the prolonged military stalemate on the ground, the U.S., engaging its partners in the international community, should act to preserve the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nature of the Syrian state, and help the Syrian people develop a democratic state at peace with its neighbors. While a renewed U.S. and EU engagement with Russia is needed to help reach a political solution in Syria—a solution our recommendations highlight—immediate steps should be taken to support and buttress both the moderate forces in Syria and Syria’s neighbors, who are vulnerable to the continued crisis.

This study provides an assessment of the state of Syria two years into the conflict, based on our extensive consultations in the region. In particular, it focuses on the capacity of both President Bashar Assad’s regime and of the opposition, including their sources of external and internal support and their ideological makeup. It also analyzes the risks associated with Syria’s current trajectory of state failure: the growing threat of radicalization and sectarianism, the stability of Syria’s neighbors, and the deepening humanitarian crisis.

Based on our assessment, the study makes the following recommendations:

1. The U.S., along with the international community, should work with the Syrian National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces (hereby “the Coalition”) to become a transitional government that is inclusive of all communities in Syria and is also representative of former Syrian government officials who share a common vision for a democratic, post-Assad Syria.
2. The U.S. should work with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab League, and the EU to create a unified international funding source for the Coalition. The administrators of this international fund, preferably a joint EU-GCC initiative, should work closely with the Coalition to ensure adequate allocation of these funds.
3. The U.S. should conduct high-level diplomacy to find common interests with Russia to end the violence in Syria and ease the fears of a post-Assad transition.
4. In an effort to support moderate opposition efforts to protect Syrian civilians and abate extremists, the U.S. should consider, in coordination with like-minded countries, providing military assistance to vetted leaders of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). In addition, the U.S., in conjunction with NATO, should form a joint special operations command in Turkey to monitor the delivery of military assistance and provide logistical and communications support and training to these vetted FSA soldiers.
5. The U.S. should reiterate its clear red line regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons, which is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
6. A UN-Arab League mandated peacekeeping force may be needed once the Assad regime falls to fill the security vacuum in the state.
7. The U.S. should lead the efforts of the EU, the Arab League, NATO, and the GCC to buttress neighboring states in the Levant, in particular Jordan and Lebanon, that are vulnerable to political and economic turmoil as a result of the deepening civil war in Syria.
8. The U.S. should continue to support efforts by the UN, the EU, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to address the deepening humanitarian crisis that is resulting from the outflow of refugees to Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as those individuals caught in the theater of war.
9. The U.S. should consult closely with Israel on the evolving security situation on the Israeli-Syrian border.
10. The U.S. should propose to the UN that individuals associated with the atrocities committed either on the side of the regime or the opposition should be investigated and referred to the International Criminal Court.

11. The U.S., along with the international community, should help the Coalition prepare for a post-Assad state.

As our recommendations note, importantly, military assistance to the opposition alone is not a solution. There can only be a political solution to this crisis. What is needed is to combine military assistance with a coordinated strategy of capacity building within the opposition, which can then have measurable results and, importantly, not lead the U.S. into any overextended commitment, including the deployment of ground forces. This strategy can reinforce our efforts to find a political solution to the crisis because a better-trained, organized opposition that is able to make political and military gains could change not only the situation on the ground, but also how Russia perceives the crisis in Syria—and change Assad’s perceptions, as well. Importantly, a negotiated political settlement, with a UN-Arab League peacekeeping force to supervise its implementation, is the best path initially to restore law and order, preserve Syria’s territorial integrity, and prevent sectarian conflict and ethnic cleansing as Syria builds a stable, democratic future.

As Syria faces this critical moment in its history, American leadership in a multilateral context is needed to prevent the state from collapsing in the heart of the Middle East and exacerbating the security of an already fragile region.

This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided appropriate credit is given to the author and Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. The views expressed herein are those of the individual author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy.