Takeaways From the First Phase of the Israel-Hamas War

Introduction

The latest Israel-Hamas war will loom large in the history of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict — alongside the wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973, the intifadas of the 1980s and 2000s, and the 1993 Oslo Accords. All were transformational moments that continue to shape the conflict, but events at the close of 2023 — Hamas’ acts of terrorism, Israel’s response in Gaza, regional reactions and flashpoints, and decisions by major stakeholders — will surely be the central hinge-point for the next decade or more. Indeed, the year ahead will be a critical juncture in the history of the conflict and perhaps the entire Middle East.

This policy brief takes stock of the drivers underpinning the dynamic first three months of the war; the assumptions and strategic questions that have surrounded it; and what these may mean for the direction of the war and its aftermath. The second policy brief in this series will evaluate the paradigms that characterized the conflict before and after the war, and what the crisis may mean for efforts to reach a permanent settlement to the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

What Does Hamas Want?

Since Hamas took full control of Gaza in 2007, Israel and the militant group have fought four major wars (in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, and 2021) and seen many other flare-ups of violence. These usually followed a similar pattern: a precipitating event, an exchange of missiles from Gaza and retaliatory strikes from Israel, a cease-fire once the sides perceived returns on the fighting to be diminishing, and then a return to the previous state of affairs, with a degree of subsequent coordination on rebuilding in Gaza.

In between wars, the Israeli security apparatus and Hamas usually operated with informal arrangements in which Israel allowed funds to reach Hamas in Gaza to maintain stability in the territory. This policy — occasional violent clashes with Hamas followed by accommodation with the group (a practice Israelis came to call “mowing the grass”) — enjoyed wide consensus in Israeli political and security spheres. Beyond the tactical desire to maintain calm, it was also viewed by some as a strategic interest for Israel: As an example, at a Likud Party meeting in early 2019, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly said that this policy prevented a two-state outcome by maintaining Palestinian division between the Palestinian Authority-run West Bank and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, preserving Israeli control over the future of the West Bank and Gaza.[1]

An Unclear Endgame

But Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack was different than any previous round of Hamas-Israel violence. Large groups of Hamas militants had never before broken through the Israeli lines surrounding Gaza and enabled an attack of such a scale inside Israeli territory.

Symbolism was undeniably part of Hamas’ calculus. The attack came nearly 50 years to the day after the Yom Kippur War between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, in which Egypt surprised Israel with an attack on its positions in Sinai. From that attack, Israel emerged considerably bruised and incentivized to reach a peace with Egypt, returning some of the territories it occupied in 1967. As was the case in 1973, the Oct. 7 attack came as Jewish Israelis celebrated a High Holy Day, Simchat Torah, which impacted the Israeli response.

But the comparison to 1973 mostly ends there. In contrast with Egypt’s attack a half-century earlier, which was designed not only to showcase Israel’s vulnerability but to affect its decision-making, Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack does not seem to have come with a defined diplomatic endgame in mind. Analysts have offered a variety of explanations of what Hamas was seeking to achieve; some of them are simultaneously possible, and some of which would be mutually exclusive.

Several Possible Goals

1. Seize on a Moment of Unprecedented Division in Israel

We should not forget that the months that preceded the Oct. 7 attack were some of the most politically fraught in Israel’s history. Between January and October last year, hundreds of thousands of Israelis — a massive amount considering the country’s population is 9 million — took to the streets to protest an effort by the Netanyahu-led coalition in the Knesset, Israel’s Parliament, to weaken judicial checks on legislative and executive authority. Labor unions, military reservists, and huge swaths of Israeli civil society played a central role in the protests. In response, supporters of the government organized counterprotests. Given the social and political unrest over such a prolonged period, Hamas might have been convinced it could catch its opponent in a moment of weakness.

2. Stall the Saudi-Israel Normalization Process

Hamas undeniably saw value in derailing Israeli normalization in the region — sending a clear message that such integration could not proceed unchecked while the Palestinian issue remained ignored. Given the magnitude of the Oct. 7 attack, however, it seems certain that Hamas conceived its plans far before Saudi Arabia and Israel’s diplomatic progress earlier in 2023. Clearly, the attack was about much more than Israel’s regional relationships.

Hamas likely sensed, though, that a normalization agreement would be a major blow for the Palestinian aspiration to self-determination. This was likely a major factor, especially considered Hamas’ Iranian sponsorship. The bottom line: Hamas sought to dispel the notion that the Palestinian issue was not an obstacle on the road to peace between Israel and its other Arab neighbors.

3. Collect Bargaining Chips

By taking hostages, Hamas almost certainly intended to collect bargaining chips that could be exchanged for Palestinian prisoners. Indeed, some Hamas leaders have cited Netanyahu’s foot-dragging in previous negotiations over prisoner release as one of the reasons behind the attack. It is a strategy Hamas has used before, most prominently in the case of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Shalit was kidnapped in Israel and held captive by Hamas from 2006–11 before eventually being exchanged for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails (including Yahya Sinwar, who now heads Hamas in Gaza).

It is debatable, however, whether Hamas intended to capture as many hostages as it did on Oct. 7 (over 200 were ultimately kidnapped). Observers have made the case that the attack was a “catastrophic success” for Hamas — that the group anticipated results on a far smaller scale, around which Israel would offer an intense but limited military response and negotiate prisoner swaps, allowing Hamas to bolster its claim to the mantle of Palestinian resistance. Under this theory, Hamas itself was surprised by the havoc it was able to reap, and the 1,200-plus people killed and 200-plus kidnapped led to a response Hamas did not anticipate. What was meant to be a battle like those of the past became a total war.

4. Draw Israel Into a Stalemate

Alternatively, it has been suggested that Hamas intended to provoke a massive “final war” and create a new status quo in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Under this theory, the scope of the Oct. 7 attack was meant to draw Israel into a mass military response and reoccupation of Gaza that would:

1. Bring the violence and injustice of the decades-long conflict to new heights.
2. Provoke wide-scale anti-Israel demonstrations across the Middle East.
3. Draw international attention and prompt condemnation.
4. Bring in the regional “Resistance Bloc” (Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis) against Israel to spark an even wider conflagration.
5. Ultimately raise the cost of occupation to an intolerable point for Israel.

Hamas officials have said that creating a “permanent” state of war on all of Israel’s borders is among the goals of its operation. How Hamas’ leadership may have expected this massive confrontation to play out and ultimately lead to is unknown, as the group’s maximalist stated diplomatic goals do not represent a feasible basis for negotiations.

5. Gain Leadership of the Palestinian National Movement

Lastly, it is possible that the Oct. 7 attack was meant to foster Palestinian political support for Hamas. Hamas has asserted that it is the face of Palestinian resistance, building on its goals during the last round of large-scale violence in May 2021. The name Hamas gave the Oct. 7 operation, which can be translated to “Operation Al Aqsa Flood inside Israel,” is a less-than-subtle signal of its desire to be seen by Palestinians and the overall Middle East as the protector of Palestinian and Muslim rights in Jerusalem.

Further, the attack can be read as an attempt to discredit the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)’s nonviolent approach to dealing with the Israelis, which has proven insufficient to prevent Israeli injustice against Palestinians or achieve Palestinian self-determination. After Oct. 7, early polls of Palestinians showed a spike in approval for Hamas, possibly because of the perception that it alone is standing up to Israel.[2] Still, Hamas is often described by analysts as ambivalent about governing, preferring popularity and political and military symbolism to actual day-to-day governance. How it could seek to leverage the current war to replace Palestinian institutions remains unclear. Still, the stagnation and unpopularity of the PA indicate its distance from most of the Palestinian public.

In any case, an important takeaway from the war’s first three months is the degree to which Hamas is a black box in terms of its ideology, goals, operations, and structure. It seems clear that there are multiple power centers within the group, each with different understandings of aims. For this reason, the theories described above remain debated and will be for years to come. Hamas has never articulated a clear diplomatic endgame. While many suggested in recent years that Hamas’ political wing was becoming more pragmatic and open to creative diplomatic solutions, the Israeli assessment now is that any such signs were a long-game manipulation to lure Israel into complacency. For Hamas, the Oct. 7 attack achieved the goal of putting the Palestinian issue back on the table, and itself on top of the resistance mantle. But a path from the current moment to a constructive, longer-term measure to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unclear. And if much of the world has its way, Hamas will not be in a position to decide how that path unwinds.

How Israel Has Responded

In Israel, the weeks that followed Oct. 7 were among the worst in the history of a country that has known many tragedies. The attack plunged Israel into a state of existential anxiety and insecurity. The Israeli intelligence and security failures that surrounded the attack will be studied and debated for years to come. Amid the national trauma, a broad consensus around the need to respond overwhelmingly quickly developed. Shock and public rage led to a massive retaliation on Gaza that brought enormous damage, killed thousands of civilians, and displaced nearly the entire population. Through the first three months of the war, however, Israel’s longer-term policy aims have remained opaque.

Israel’s War Aims are Simple — But Less Viable

In the days that followed the attack, Israel’s defined war aims were clear: 1) destroy Hamas, 2) achieve the return of the hostages, and 3) prevent such an attack from ever happening again. These goals had broad public support and international sympathy, but as the war has gone on, it has become evident that they present major dilemmas that do not lend themselves to clear metrics of success or a coherent long-term strategy.

1. Destroy Hamas

In the first days and weeks of the war, the Israeli leadership set the bar for success high: “We will wipe this thing called Hamas — ‘ISIS-Gaza’ — off the face of the earth. It will cease to exist,” said Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.[3] As the early weeks of war dragged on, first with a bombing campaign and then a ground invasion, whether Israel could cause Hamas to “cease to exist,” or even completely defeat the group militarily, had come into question. Since taking control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas has developed significant institutional and military apparatuses. At the beginning of the war, analysts estimated that Hamas had around 30,000–40,000 fighters as well as extensive underground tunnels and bunkers in which to wage urban warfare.

Israeli leaders have since clarified that their goal is to end the security threat Hamas poses to Israel, as well as its ability to govern the Gaza Strip. This is widely viewed as a more manageable goal, but it fails to address Hamas’ ability to wage an insurgency in Gaza or the West Bank. More importantly, it fails to address Hamas’ political support among the Palestinian public — the view by a major percentage of Palestinians that Hamas is the only Palestinian political actor standing up to Israel and fighting for the Palestinian people. Hamas as an idea and a movement will be difficult, if not impossible, to defeat militarily.

2. Return the Hostages

Israel’s second stated goal, and perhaps the highest priority for most of the Israeli public, is the return of the hostages held by Hamas in Gaza. Beyond killing 1,200 people on Oct. 7, Hamas took more than 230 Israelis and other foreign nationals into Gaza as hostages. Between Nov. 21 and Dec. 1, 108 hostages were released by Hamas in exchange for expanded humanitarian aid into Gaza and the release of 240 Palestinians held by Israel. The release of the remaining Israeli hostages would likely come at a major cost to the Netanyahu government: an Israeli withdrawal and Hamas’ continued control in the Gaza Strip. In 2024, Egypt and Qatar have both sought to negotiate an end to the war, but the parties seem very far apart.

3. Prevent Future Terrorist Attacks

The third — and perhaps most paradoxical — of the goals is to end future terrorist attacks from Gaza. Israel has effectively destroyed much of Gaza’s infrastructure, and Hamas has undeniably become a shell of itself since Oct. 7. But terrorism is political by definition: “the use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.”[4] Israel’s siege of Gaza, without an effort to undermine Hamas’ political goals and ideology by presenting alternatives for the Palestinian people, does not advance the long-term goal of preventing future terrorism.

Scenarios for Future Governance in Gaza

For the first three months of war, Israel did not lay out an affirmative vision for Gaza’s future governance. This can not only be attributed to its focus on the war aims outlined above, but also to the makeup of the Netanyahu coalition. Nuanced public discussions around “the day after” would almost certainly fracture an already teetering coalition. Israel’s current government — the most right-wing in the country’s history — will not endorse the PA as the future governing body of Gaza, nor will it endorse a process that could lead to a Palestinian state, which the coalition rejects for a variety of reasons (security, ideological, and otherwise).

In most Israelis’ eyes, the PA has been poisoned by corruption, ineffectiveness, and the incitement of violence against Israel. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has been clear in his desire to collapse the PA; since last October, he has frozen funds to the PA and suggested he would rather resign than transfer its tax revenues to be used in Gaza. Meanwhile, the PA is weak and unpopular among Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Its leadership refuses to return to governing Gaza without a sense from Israel, the U.S., and international community that it would be a step toward realizing a Palestinian state — an assurance the Israeli government will not offer.

Israel has spent months seizing control of Gaza and destroying Hamas’ capacity to govern and make war. This process will continue — though likely at a lower intensity — through the early months of 2024, and it seems wholly unlikely that Israel will negotiate a truce with Hamas and leave the group to govern Gaza as it did before the war. So, the question becomes: If/when Israeli leadership feels Hamas has effectively fallen, what happens then? If Israel refuses to view the PA as an option and potential partner, three scenarios seem possible:

1. Long-Term Israeli Containment and ‘Freedom of Operation’

One very realistic option may be long-term Israeli control over Gaza’s borders, security, and economy, while reconstruction, governance, and security issues remain addressed ad hoc. Israel’s leadership has stated that it does not intend to “reoccupy” Gaza but suggested a desire for Israel to have “freedom of operation” in the territory for years to come. This would likely include military buffer zones along Gaza’s land and sea borders and potentially the Philadelphi Corridor, the Egypt-Gaza border area that has long-been overseen by Egypt. It could even include zones inside Gaza.

However, open-ended de facto Israeli control over Gaza — even without day-to-day “boots on the ground” in population centers — seems likely to lead to increased humanitarian stressors. These might include:

1. Growing resentment and radicalization.
2. A long-term insurgency and state of terror against Israelis by remnants of Hamas or successor insurgents.
3. Regional and/or international friction and isolation.
4. Extended risk of regional conflagration.

Despite these and a host of other challenges, the Israelis’ sense that Gaza is a threat and that they lack alternatives may make this scenario the most likely.

2. Withdrawal

Israel could also declare “mission accomplished” and withdraw from Gaza. This would likely be in response to domestic and international pressure, with the benefit of offloading the burden of overseeing the territory. But this approach would almost certainly leave a vacuum for Hamas or other enemies of Israel to fill, ultimately undermining Israel’s goal of crushing Hamas and advancing Israeli security.

Seeking to avoid the mistakes of 2005, when Israel withdrew from Gaza and Hamas ultimately gained control of Gaza after a civil war with rival political party Fatah, some have proposed that Israel pursue a “local option.” In this scenario, a chosen individual or group of local leaders would manage Gaza in coordination with Israel and probably Egypt. It is unclear who this would be and how this would work; it is also unclear how long such actors would last, as they would undoubtedly be targets of assassination by Hamas and others. As such, this scenario would be extremely fragile, and likely impossible.

3. Governance by a Regional or International Coalition

Early in the war, some policymakers and analysts expressed the possibility of Israel handing Gaza off to an international or regional coalition to govern and manage security. Among the proposed candidates were Egypt, Jordan, the Arab Gulf states, NATO, the Arab League, or some combination of the U.S., United Kingdom, France, and/or any combination of the above.

These proposals did not, however, address why these actors would take on the cost and risks of controlling Gaza; how such a regime would work and toward what end; or a laundry list of other challenges. For Middle Eastern states, Europe, and the U.S., occupying a highly populated — and now-destroyed — territory without an exit ramp is not a viable option. Even Arab states that despise Hamas and have relationships with Israel would not be inclined to clean up after it, given current public opinion and Israel’s conduct during the war. Without a political horizon or road map toward an endgame, regional and international actors should not be expected to go far beyond the bare minimum: humanitarian relief.

None of the options described above seems especially desirable, possible, or sustainable. A long-term Israeli occupation of Gaza seems certain to result in tragedy for Israelis and Gazans. The creation of a vacuum in Gaza — the likely result of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal or effort to put a (perceived) puppet government in place — is a recipe for future disaster. And no Arab or international force is likely to agree to take on the Gaza without a political endgame.

Thus, all signs point to the need to address the political foundations of the conflict and Palestinian support for Hamas: the lack of Palestinian self-determination. In addition to a security strategy, Israel will need to wrestle with a political/diplomatic strategy to match – indeed, to see a mutually-agreed political “endgame” to the conflict as a path toward its own security. Refusing to do so will only repeat the cycle of violence.

Policy Considerations Moving Forward

The first months of the conflict brought both a painful torrent of violence and a similarly chaotic policy environment. Neither Israel, the U.S., nor any other actor had a credible plan for how to react to an attack like Oct. 7 — particularly in the context of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which at the time was assumed to be intractable and slowing eroding, rather than ripe for a massive conflagration.

For the first two months of the war, the Biden administration maintained publicly that Israel had a right and obligation to respond in Gaza as it saw fit. As the war continued, however, the administration determined a need to push Israel to limit civilian casualties and define a plan and “day after” for Gaza. In Washington, many questions came to be broadly discussed over this time about the realm of possible paths forward and assumptions on which the Biden administration could build a strategy.

1. What to Do About Hamas

Israel will likely succeed in ending Hamas’ governance of Gaza. But it will be impossible to eliminate all combatants and/or the political potency of the movement’s resistance narrative. Indeed, a prolonged Israeli war in Gaza would likely further increase Hamas’ popularity and recruiting power; as such, any governing structure that emerges in Gaza immediately after the war will likely require at least tacit acceptance by remnants of Hamas. Otherwise, insurgency is inevitable. How to achieve this acceptance and prevent insurgency, though, is unknown, and it depends on how the next few months play out.

2. What to Do About the Gaza-West Bank Divide

Solutions for Gaza will likely prove inextricable from solutions for the West Bank. For Palestinians, a separate Gazan government — particularly one put in place by Israel — is a nonstarter. Going forward, the West Bank and Gaza should be seen as a unit. No one is served by continued division and stagnation, and Palestinian political leaders and factions need to be pushed to work to build unity, legitimacy, and capacity to meet the moment. Elections are one tool for addressing the divide between the two territories, but in the current moment it is difficult to identify the mechanics that would be required.

3. What to Do About the Palestinian Authority

In its current form, the PA is too weak and unpopular to fill the inevitable governance and security vacuum in Gaza. As such, capacity will need to be built, and legitimacy granted, by Palestinians in Gaza, the people of the West Bank, and regional and international actors.

As Gaza transitions out of Israeli control, Palestinians (and potentially Israelis) would likely reject attempts by external actors to act as trustees. Instead, it would be most acceptable for external actors to support Palestinian institution-building toward self-governance. In January 2024, the U.S. began a dialogue with the PA on necessary reform steps with the goal of creating international momentum toward a “new” PA.

4. What to Do About the Israeli Government

The coalition currently leading the Israeli government is virtually certain to pose a barrier to a sustainable Israeli-Palestinian peace. The current government lacks wide support within Israel, regionally, and internationally, and it continues to pursue destabilizing actions (blocking aid, targeting civilian infrastructure, permitting settler violence, using troubling rhetoric, expanding settlements, etc.). Advancing constructive post-war scenarios will require a sea change in the Israeli government’s approach.

5. What to Do About a Political Horizon

The current Israeli government will reject any steps that explicitly advance a two-state end-goal. However, the current Israeli government will not last forever, and polls show a future government may be more centrist in its approach. If this happens, the United States – particularly President Biden through the trust and leverage he has built – has an important role to play in putting the two-state solution back on the respective publics’ agendas as the only viable long-term option for peace and security. Still, it is an open question whether this will resonate with or be rejected by the unprecedentedly traumatized Israeli and Palestinian publics, and whether other important stars will align.

6. What to Do About the Arab Governments

Early in the war, some officials and pundits suggested that Arab states could step in after the war to rebuild, and potentially govern, Gaza. This is highly unlikely. Without a fundamental change in Israel’s current government and its policies, and a clear U.S. embrace of a policy centering a diplomatic endgame, Arab states will not move in to fill the governance and security vacuum in Gaza that would following Israel’s invasion.

7. What to Do About the UN

Palestinians and the Arab states might insist that in the transition, the United Nations (UN) play a role beyond the provision of humanitarian assistance. Israel would likely oppose a formal UN role, and political dynamics with the Security Council’s permanent (Russia, China) and rotating members would complicate matters. An alternative might be to form a “contact group” made up of the UN, the Arab Quartet (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), and the PA with Israel, the U.S., and the European Union. Again, this step would likely require a sense that a larger political process toward a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could bear fruit.

Conclusion

In wrestling with the questions above, it seems clear that a piecemeal approach moving forward would likely be ineffective and inefficient. Linkages between each of these components will be critical. A successful approach should be comprehensive and set explicit targets from the outset. It should establish clear sequencing and timelines and take domestic politics and spoilers into account. As of the time of writing, it is too soon to tell if this will be the case.

The latest Israel-Hamas war has shattered many assumptions that have come to characterize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the past decade, including that:

• Actors can “manage” the conflict without addressing its roots.
• Palestinians will forego their self-determination goals for economic advancement and stability.
• Israel’s military is invincible.
• Hamas’ political and ideological stance was becoming more moderate.
• Regional normalization can proceed without addressing the Palestinian issue.
• The U.S. can withdraw from the Middle East.

All these assumptions are now under heavy reassessment. The strategic calculations of all parties will inevitably be impacted by this moment. Meanwhile, they deal with the terror, trauma, fear, and destruction that have characterized the first phase of the war.

In the wake of Oct. 7, the long-intoned warning that the status quo was unsustainable and peace would be elusive in the absence of a negotiated resolution to the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become even more stark. If there is a hope, it is that this new reality can spur a long-term process toward a just, sustainable peace for two people long beset by violence and injustice. 

Notes

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[1] Tal Schneider, “For Years, Netanyahu Propped Up Hamas. Now It’s Blown Up in Our Faces,” Times of Israel, October 8, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/for-years-netanyahu-propped-up-hamas-now-its-blown-up-in-our-faces/.

[2] Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No (90), December 13, 2023, https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2090%20English%20Full%20text%20Dec%202023.pdf.

[3] Maayan Lubell, “Israel’s New War Cabinet Vows To Wipe Hamas off the Earth,” Reuters, October 11, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-gantz-agree-form-emergency-israel-government-statement-2023-10-11/.

[4] Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “terrorism (n.),” accessed January 2023, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/terrorism_n?tab=factsheet#18691289.

 

 

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