What Comes After the Israel-Hamas War?

Introduction

In early July, speculation abounded that an agreement between Hamas and Israel for a ceasefire in Gaza was close to completion. Over the past two weeks, President Donald Trump has held a series of discussions with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani about final details. Additionally, special envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and special envoy for hostage response Adam Boehler have expressed optimism that a deal is in reach. 

The current negotiations are expected to achieve a two-month ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, during which 10 living and 15 deceased Israeli hostages will be released in exchange for Palestinian detainees held by Israel. In this period, significant amounts of aid would enter Gaza, though the mechanisms for doing so remain contested, and talks would continue toward a final end-of-war agreement. 

A key sticking point for the talks has been the repositioning of Israeli forces inside of Gaza, and Hamas’ insistence that Israel commit to a permanent end to the war. On the former issue, talks are ongoing. On the latter issue, President Trump has reportedly offered personal guarantees to Hamas that Israel will adhere to an agreement — an attempt to signal that Israel will not resume military operations unless Trump agrees that Hamas has broken the terms or acted counter to his aim to end the war.

The current ceasefire negotiations come at a complex moment. Stability remains tenuous along a number of hotspots, following two years of regional upheaval, most recently the Israel-Iran war, including U.S. intervention. Additionally, in mid-July, the Israeli military struck targets in Syria, which could destabilize the country’s new government and to which the Trump administration has expressed their lack of support.

Within Israel, Netanyahu faces a tenuous balancing act. In mid-July, two allied ultraorthodox parties departed the coalition, leaving the prime minister with only 50 of 120 seats in the Knesset. With this recent turn, Netanyahu — more reliant than ever on the far-right parties in his bloc — faces calls from the opposition to set new elections. Netanyahu seems unlikely to make any major decisions on Gaza, which could upset his coalition until the Knesset goes to recess between July 27 and Oct. 19. 

In that time, the Israel-Hamas war — among the most destructive and traumatic episodes in the long history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — will reach the two-year mark. The war has resulted in the deaths of more than 50,000 Palestinians and most of the Gaza Strip’s infrastructure destroyed by the Israeli military, as well as the deaths of more than 1,200 Israelis from Hamas’ attack and subsequent IDF losses across all fronts. The war’s ripple effects have significantly changed the Middle East’s regional order, but history is still being written as to whether the negotiations to end the war can chart a path toward a larger, long-term stability, peace, and prosperity. Without a resolution, prolonged, expanded violence is an increasingly concerning prospect. What is known, however, is that the conflict will not dissipate on its own. 

In the face of the drama of the negotiations and domestic politics, the lack of clarity and planning for relief, recovery, and future governance for Gaza is going under-acknowledged. Ending the war and preventing further conflict are incredibly difficult tasks that will necessitate significant trade-offs and require action from stakeholders beyond the core actors in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Washington. As momentum toward an agreement builds, it is critical that postwar aims, responsibilities, and processes are defined and agreed. 

Building on two previous briefs — one outlining takeaways and dilemmas from the early months of the Israel-Hamas war and the other describing the high-level challenges and assumptions that have impacted diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — this brief focuses on the issues and concepts on the table during ceasefire negotiations and Gaza’s “day after,” as termed by Middle East policy experts.

In the words of Secretary James A. Baker, III: “Prior preparation prevents poor performance.” Preparation and clarity around questions of Gaza’s “day after” should shape the current negotiation process and provide a horizon to work toward going forward. An absence of a strategic plan will likely only result in familiar spirals of conflict and devastation.

January 2025 Ceasefire and Its Aftermath

Ceasefire’s Stipulations

After months of mediation led by Qatar, Egypt, and the United States, Qatar’s prime minister announced that Israel and Hamas had reached an agreement for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza on Jan. 15, 2025. When the specifics were announced, the agreement closely resembled a proposal by former President Joe Biden eight months earlier, in May 2024. In that statement, Biden outlined three phases: 1) a six-week ceasefire, which would entail the release of women and children held hostage or in custody, Israeli withdrawal from heavily populated areas in Gaza, and a flow of humanitarian aid to the enclave; 2) an immediate commencement of negotiations for a permanent end to the war, full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and release of all remaining hostages; and 3) a multiyear period for reconstruction of Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian government without Hamas as a ruling presence.

For months after the Biden administration’s May proposal, ceasefire negotiations in Doha and Cairo were impeded by several issues: the number of and status of hostages, detainees, and prisoners to be released over which periods; Israeli control over Gaza’s borders and entry points; and longer-term questions of full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, end of combat operations, and the future of Hamas.

Ultimately, in January 2025, Israel and Hamas settled on a ceasefire framework, which closely followed the Biden administration’s proposal in May 2024, but left phases two and three intentionally ambiguous. As noted in my piece for the United States Institute of Peace, the ceasefire framework included the following tenets: 

1. In the first phase (42 days), military operations will cease; Israel will withdraw from heavily populated areas and the Netzarim Corridor bisecting Gaza; Hamas will release 33 Israeli hostages; and Israel will release a defined number of Palestinian detainees. In this time, displaced Palestinians in Gaza will be allowed to return to their homes; the flow of humanitarian aid will be greatly expanded; and comprehensive efforts will be made toward provision of shelter and reconstruction steps. During this first phase, Israel will maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor, the border between Gaza and Egypt, and the details of phase two will be negotiated.
    
2. In the second phase (42 days), any remaining Israeli hostages will be exchanged for a determined number of Palestinians detained by Israel. In exchange, Israel would be expected to fully withdraw from the Gaza Strip.
    
3. In the third phase (42 days), both parties will facilitate final exchanges of human remains. They will also define and implement of a 3–5-year reconstruction plan for Gaza to rebuild homes, civilian buildings, and civil infrastructure, to be overseen by several organizations and countries, including Egypt, Qatar, and the United Nations.

In the weeks that followed the ceasefire’s announcement, the first phase was implemented, with 33 hostages, both living and deceased, released by Hamas in exchange for hundreds of Palestinians detained by Israel. Israel repositioned its forces to Gaza’s borders, and displaced civilians in the south were allowed to return to the north. Humanitarian aid into Gaza also expanded.

As the first phase proceeded, however, very little progress was made in defining phases two and three, which were meant to define a permanent end to the war and plans for Gaza’s reconstruction. After two weeks of the first phase’s extension, pressure and posturing failed to overcome the core challenges of mutual agreement around final hostage releases, Israeli withdrawal, and a mutually agreeable solution for Gaza’s postwar governance. Thus, the ceasefire collapsed in mid-March.

After the Ceasefire’s Dissolution

In the months that followed, fighting in Gaza resumed, civilian casualty numbers increased, and the humanitarian crises deepened. In that time, negotiations began and fell apart intermittently. Hamas is believed to hold 23 living hostages, which it seeks to use as leverage to push Israel out of Gaza. Netanyahu and his coalition, however, have made Hamas’ complete dismantling its highest priority, and, thus far, have demonstrated an unwillingness to accept withdrawal from Gaza as a price for the Israeli hostages’ return. Hamas, meanwhile, has continued to demand a comprehensive end to the war, including Israeli withdrawal, in exchange for the release of all remaining hostages. 

Analysts did begin to notice a trend in the Trump administration’s tone and approach. In May, Witkoff, Trump campaign donor Bishara Bahbah, and Boehler established an effective channel directly with Hamas and resulted in the release of Edan Alexander. This channel raised concerns in Israel that Trump could seek to negotiate with Hamas directly. Later, on the final leg of his trip to Saudi Arabia in May, Trump said, “We’re looking at Gaza, and we got to get that taken care of. A lot of people are starving. A lot of people. There’s a lot of bad things going on.” His statement echoed the widespread global distress over the growing famine in the Gaza Strip since Israel imposed a blockade on food, water, and medicine in March, and amid a media narrative that U.S. and Israeli leadership was becoming increasingly contentious.

The president’s statements, refrain from visiting Israel while in the region, and approval of a direct U.S.-Hamas channel to release Israeli-American hostage Edan Alexander suggested that the Trump administration was “frustrated” by the Israeli government’s posture in ceasefire negotiations, months-long blockade of Gaza, and steps since May 5 to “capture” and occupy the Gaza Strip. The latter, known as “Operation Gideon’s Chariots,” was described by an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spokesman as a “broad attack that includes the displacement of most of the population of the Gaza Strip.” According to some reports, President Trump was increasingly eager for Prime Minister Netanyahu to “wrap it up,” and move toward an end to the war, which would allow the administration to move forward on some of its larger regional political and economic objectives. 

Then, in mid-June, the intense 12-day war between Israel and Iran began, in which the United States joined Israel in attacking Iranian security targets. The Trump administration’s perceptions of the war’s success have subsequently shaped its approach to the Israel-Hamas ceasefire negotiations: Days after the Israel-Iran ceasefire, Trump took to social media to publicly pressure Prime Minister Netanyahu to come to a deal and bring Israeli hostages home.

Summer 2025’s rapid developments suggest a fork in the road is approaching: Will Netanyahu commit to the vision of “Operation Gideon’s Chariots” and set the stage for long-term Israeli occupation of Gaza, or would he make concessions in the diplomatic path, which could return the hostages and end the war, but destabilize his parliamentary majority?

Importantly, the key reasons for the January ceasefire’s collapse — lack of clarity around phases two and three — are not central to the discussions, as brokers have been working relentlessly to return to phase one. Given the trendline toward a return to Gaza’s devastating situation a year ago — an intense Israeli military operation and occupation; Palestinians in Gaza confined to a condensed civilian zone in the south of the Gaza Strip; a humanitarian crisis; and an open-ended quagmire — efforts should be made to address what comes after the war, so that the tools and roadmaps are ready when the opportunity presents itself.

Central Questions Around the War’s Aftermath

Almost immediately after the war began in October 2023, the Middle East policy research community began debating and developing options for what came to be known as the “day after,” publishing proposals around humanitarian access, reconstruction, Palestinian and Israeli security, transitional governing mechanisms, Palestinian Authority (PA) reform, regional and bilateral diplomatic processes, and beyond.

The following questions are among those that are repeatedly debated and have yet to be answered by official diplomatic measures:

• Who will govern Gaza after the war, given Hamas’ disqualifications and incapacity, and the public rejection and security risks around open-ended Israeli occupation?
• Can Hamas be fully eliminated, or will it remain a part of postwar Palestinian political life?
• How can Israeli security concerns be meaningfully addressed in a post-conflict plan, without obstructing steps toward Palestinian recovery and self-determination?
• Is the PA too vulnerable and delegitimized to govern, or can it be revitalized to effectively reunite the West Bank and Gaza? If so, what would it take for Israel to accept such a path?
• Will Gaza’s civil society prove resilient enough to rebuild, or will the devastation, political fragmentation, brain drain, and trauma prevent recovery?
• What role will Israel play or refuse to play in Gaza’s immediate and long-term future?
• What role will the Arab governments play in Palestinian recovery in Gaza?
• What role will the United States and Europe play in Palestinian recovery in Gaza?
• What role will the U.N. and U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) play in relief and stabilization?
• What would a transitionary mechanism or process look like, especially one that flows from the roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders noted above?
• Perhaps, most importantly, what is the ultimate target of “day after” efforts — reunification of the West Bank and Gaza toward Palestinian self-determination through a two-state solution, or a return to a structure akin to the antebellum status quo without Hamas? In other words, what is the political horizon that stakeholders will be working toward for Gaza?

While the January 2025 agreement’s ambiguity was necessary to allow phase one to proceed, a major reason for the ceasefire’s collapse was the lack of clarity around many of the questions listed above. The agreement did not include language around filling Gaza’s governance vacuum, nor did it define plans for security, law and order issues, borders and crossings, movement or access of goods and people, or a solid sense of a long-term political horizon.

The brokers of the January agreement have yet to release their accounts of that difficult process, but their approach seemed to be that any ceasefire that included the release of hostages and the flow of humanitarian relief into Gaza — no matter the ambiguity — was a useful effort and that the momentum of such an agreement and a new U.S. administration could generate progress around phases two and three.

If another ceasefire agreement is ever reached, questions of Gaza’s future governance, security, recovery, and development will again prove critical.

Challenges of Security, Governance, and Humanitarian Aid in Gaza

To date, thousands of pages of analysis have been written about proposals concerning Gaza’s “day after.” For reasons of brevity, this brief focuses on the challenges around three main pillars:

1. Security.
2. Governance.
3. Humanitarian relief, recovery, and development.

It also describes where the Biden administration’s diplomatic work stood in January 2025, before the new U.S. administration was established.

Security

In any “day after” scenario, security — both for Israelis and Palestinians — will be a central question. Preventing another Oct. 7 attack will be a long-term objective of Israeli politics. The loss of Palestinians’ human security, which has been tenuous over decades of occupation and conflict and has intensified since Oct. 7, will be felt for generations.

Israeli demands that Hamas and other factions not pose a threat to Israel in postwar Gaza are understandable. Yet, this demand is mostly achieved at this point, as Hamas has been severely weakened. For its part, Hamas’ demands that Israel withdraw from the Gaza Strip have been refused by Israel until Hamas’ disarmament and potentially exile. Thus, the challenge has been threading the needle of addressing Israel’s security needs around Gaza, while facilitating a move toward a security governance mechanism for Gaza that is not lead by Israel or Hamas.

Since the war began, analysts and policymakers have debated alternatives to Israeli and Hamas security governance over the Gaza Strip, but no consensus answer has emerged. Israel has rejected proposals that involve the PA or multinational forces it does not control. While they have proposed a reconstruction plan for Gaza, Arab governments are wary of putting their own militaries’ boots on the ground without commitments from the U.S. and Israel as well as an invitation from the Palestinians. Long-term IDF control of Gaza does not seem sustainable, though this may be the most likely outcome. Some have proposed private security contractors as an option, which is almost certainly an ineffective as well as unfeasible approach. Ultimately, a power vacuum in Gaza serves no one’s interests, nor does the lack of definition around Gaza’s security transition in terms of process and the “day after.” However, uncertainty is where this matter currently stands.

When the baton was passed to the Trump administration, the Biden administration had been developing plans around a large-scale effort to expand the PA’s Palestinian Security Forces (PSF) to operate in Gaza. To compliment the PSF forces who would manage Gaza’s security, multilateral forces would be necessary in support roles but would not be expected to combat Hamas insurgents. The U.S. could offer coordination and leadership but would be unlikely to assist militarily.

The challenges to this pillar became:

1. Would Hamas resist this approach, and, if not, would a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program be feasible?
2. Would Israel cede control to an expanded PSF, or would Israeli leadership expect permanent freedom of operation in Gaza?
3. Could the PSF gain the capacity and legitimacy to grow into the role of a permanent security force?
4. Who would the multilateral forces be, and what would their political and timeline requirements look like?

Governance

Governing Gaza after the war presents a host of complex and unresolved challenges. No credible, widely approved authority has yet surfaced that can ensure public security, deliver services, and command broad legitimacy among Palestinians and the international community. Several ideas have emerged over the first year of the war — local clans, a local municipality, an international trust, and so on — but none proved especially viable. Currently, the Israeli cabinet has seemed to be preparing for long-term occupation and management of Gaza, which presents significant obstacles and risk.

Among analysts, the PA became the least-common-denominator candidate to lead of Gaza, as the institution is generally recognized by the international community as the Palestinian government in waiting. Due to years of erosion in capacity and public legitimacy, the PA is not yet prepared to take on this role immediately. Rather, support coalesced around an interim body supported by the international community, which could stabilize Gaza in the immediate aftermath of the war, and hand control over to a renewed PA over time as a part of a process toward West Bank-Gaza reunification and eventual statehood. The legitimacy of this interim body and transfer process — especially as it serves at the request of the Palestinian people and is not a supervisor for Israel — is an important consideration.

The Israeli leadership and majority of the Israeli public strongly oppose PA control of Gaza for a host of reasons. Beyond an understanding of the PA’s ineffective institutions and capacity, Israelis have long accused the PA of inciting violence toward Israel and targeting Israel in international fora. Among the Palestinian public, the PA is not widely popular, having not held presidential elections since 2005 and parliamentary elections since 2006. Further, Hamas, despite its battlefield losses, may retain enough popular or militant support to undermine any alternative governance structure. In other words, Hamas would almost certainly need to accept such a plan or would likely undermine these efforts.

Proposals for transitional governance by technocrats or Arab-led oversight face logistical and political obstacles, including who would secure such arrangements on the ground and how international actors would coordinate support without instigating Israeli opposition.

In sum, a solution is needed that is acceptable to Israel, Hamas, the Palestinian people, the region, and the donor countries, which is a tall order.

At the time of the transition to the Trump administration, the Biden administration was exploring what was internally called a Temporary Governing Authority (TGA) to handle the basics of governance in Gaza as a path to West Bank-Gaza reunification. In his final major address before leaving office, Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined the administration’s vision for an interim governing authority for Gaza to be created with the support of the PA along with intensive backing from regional and international partners. Per the plan, the TGA would govern Gaza until it could be merged with a revitalized PA, which would include a “swift, far-reaching reform to build more transparent and accountable governance.”

Blinken acknowledged that this kind of plan requires “a time-bound, conditions-based” pathway to Palestinian statehood. Further, he noted that this long-sought “political horizon” will help secure necessary resource commitments from key partners from Palestine, Arab nations, and beyond.

The challenges to this pillar became:

1. How would the TGA’s governmental relationship to the PA be structured?
2. How would governing leaders or members be selected and gain legitimacy in Gaza?
3. What position would Hamas take on the TGA?
4. What would Israel’s relationship to the TGA be, and how would this dynamic affect the TGA’s and PA’s success or failure?
5. What would be the political requirements of the TGA’s benefactors?

Humanitarian Relief, Recovery, and Development

The past 20 months of war have created crisis-level conditions in Gaza. Basic infrastructure — homes, hospitals, utility systems, and schools — has been destroyed, leaving over two million Palestinians in critical need of food, shelter, and medical care. Aid deliveries remain severely restricted, exacerbating shortages of clean water, medicine, and fuel. Displacement is widespread, with hundreds of thousands living in makeshift shelters or overcrowded conditions.

Israeli restrictions on aid to Gaza, the lack of functioning governance and distribution mechanisms, the insecure environment for aid operations, and lack of guarantees around accountability and transparency have contributed greatly to the crisis. All of these immediate-term issues around humanitarian relief can be addressed quickly through a ceasefire agreement, and indeed between January and March, Gaza’s crisis receded, only to return at greater scale with the ceasefire’s collapse.

Questions around longer-term recovery and reconstruction in Gaza are significantly constrained by the expansive political, security, logistical, and financial challenges highlighted above. The ongoing instability and lack of a clear, widely accepted governance plan greatly hinder the implementation of any large-scale rebuilding efforts. The lack of agreement on who can or should lead Gaza’s reconstruction have made planning and progress difficult.

Even if a governing authority is agreed upon, the scale of destruction requires tens of billions of dollars in international funding, which remains uncertain amid donor fatigue and political disagreement. Without a political horizon and a credible framework for governance, any reconstruction effort risks being partial, temporary, or quickly undone by renewed conflict.

A topic of frequent debate was the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), a regime established after the 2014 war between Israel and Hamas. The GRM was intended to facilitate the rebuilding of Gaza while addressing Israel’s security concerns. Yet, its record was mixed at best, as recovery from the 2014 war — which was much less significant than destruction across the Israel-Hamas war — took many years and was highly constrained, politicized, and ultimately unsuccessful in preventing future conflict.

Among the challenges that emerged from the GRM experience were:

• Role of Israel in controlling construction materials and equipment, which allowed it to delay or block shipments deemed to have potential “dual-use” (civilian and military) applications and, thus, led to chronic shortages and delays.
• Lack of trust between key actors in how relief and construction materials were managed and distributed.
• Exclusion of Palestinian institutions in Gaza from the process, which placed administrative responsibility largely in the hands of the U.N. and the PA in the West Bank, and, thus, sidelined Gaza-based actors and undermined local ownership of the process.
• Omission of Hamas from the GRM, which did nothing to change its de facto control over Gaza, but which created inefficiencies, tensions, and obstacles in coordination on the ground.
• Inattention to root causes behind the cycles of violence in Gaza, including blockade, occupation, Palestinian internal division, and the lack of political process.

By the end of the Biden administration, the scale of the Gaza relief, recovery, and reconstruction was enormous. No clear answer was established on how best to manage the tens of billions of dollars in recovery investment needed, in coordination with the various stakeholders, and how best to meet the urgency of the humanitarian crisis along with each parties’ political and security requirements.

While many believed that humanitarian and recovery aid would be best managed through multilateral institutions such as the U.N., the donor base — G7 countries, European Union, and/or Arab states — would need strong coordination. Advocates for this approach stated that the scope, goals, and mechanics of the humanitarian mission would be best put through a U.N. resolution. However, before this step, the resolution should be negotiated with Israel and key parties in advance to avoid the implementation being potentially blocked. When consensus was reached, the mutually agreed plan could be taken to the U.N. Security Council.

As Blinken and others acknowledged, without a sense of political horizon and a credible path to realize a two-state outcome, gathering sufficient regional and international support would be exceedingly difficult.

Trump Administration and the Arab-Backed Plan for Gaza

Since President Trump took office in January 2025, three new ideas have entered the zeitgeist around the “day after”:

• Trump’s proposal that Palestinians in Gaza be resettled outside of Gaza.
• Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid’s proposal for a mandate for Egyptian control of Gaza.
• Arab-backed plan put forward by Egypt and endorsed by the Arab League.

Of these three, only the latter seems feasible.

The Arab plan is, in part, a response to Trump’s controversial statement in February 2025, in which he suggested the permanent removal of Palestinians from Gaza, resettling them in Egypt, Jordan, and potentially other, more distant countries. His proposal also included the U.S. assuming control and rebuilding the territory into a tourist-friendly hub. The proposal — which came to be called the “Riviera” plan — drew widespread opposition and was flatly rejected by Palestinians and U.S. allies in the region, though many in Israel have embraced the concept. Trump’s statement did have the effect of pushing the Arab states into developing and releasing their own counter proposal.

Three weeks after Trump’s statement, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid proposed what he termed, “The Egyptian Solution,” in a speech at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, D.C. Under his proposal, Egypt would govern Gaza’s civilian and security affairs for up to 15 years with support from Gulf states and the international community. The proposal also outlined the following: Gaza would be demilitarized; its infrastructure would be rebuilt; and the groundwork would be laid for eventual Palestinian self-governance. While Lapid’s plan did not call for forced displacement, it includes significant financial incentives for Egypt. For practical and political reasons, however, Egypt has rejected Lapid’s proposal.

Finally, in early March, Egypt put forward its own proposal for a five-year transitional reconstruction of Gaza, which was later endorsed by the Arab League and is being called the Arab plan. The proposal presents a structured alternative to the previous plans, emphasizing the preservation of Palestinian residency and sovereignty within Gaza, and a path toward self-governance and statehood in the Palestinian territories. The plan includes international peacekeeping forces and training for a Palestinian police force. It involves a $53 billion reconstruction effort over five years, the establishment of a technocratic interim government in Gaza, and a path to instating a reformed PA as the governing body for Gaza and the West Bank.

The details of the Arab plan include:

1. Phased recovery and reconstruction: The proposal outlines a three-phase approach over five years. In the first two years, phase one would focus on humanitarian relief and early recovery, including the removal of debris and unexploded ordnance and the establishment of temporary housing for displaced residents. Phase two would center on building new housing units and initiating major infrastructure and economic projects. In phase three, steps would be taken toward the establishment of a Palestinian state, ending the conflict between Israel and Palestine.
    
2. Transitional governance: The plan proposes the establishment of a nonpartisan, technocratic government to govern the daily affairs in Gaza for an interim period, after which it would merge with the PA. The proposal calls for a path toward direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis to address final issues such as borders, the status of Jerusalem, and mutual recognition.
    
3. Security: The proposal supports an International Stabilization Force, composed of forces from Arab states, to replace Hamas in providing security, monitored by a board including Arab countries, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the U.S., the U.K., EU, and others.

To date, the Arab plan seems to be the most viable option for large-scale international participation in Gaza’s “day after,” which also meets many of the needs of Israelis and Palestinians. While not backed by the U.S. and Israel, the plan has garnered support from key Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Qatar — all of whom will be critical to any future for Gaza — as well as European partners. The plan emphasizes the non-displacement of Palestinians and immediate humanitarian relief, achieving the political and aid requirements of the Palestinians and key partners. It includes ideas for large-scale economic projects to advance long-term stability and growth in Gaza. The plan also calls for a technocratic governing mechanism for Gaza that will eventually be merged with a reformed PA as a path to statehood.

Still, the plan includes several underdeveloped tenets. The proposal lacks a clear strategy for disarmament of Hamas, which could pose security challenges. The PA’s readiness and willingness to begin such a process and Hamas’ willingness to allow this process to proceed are important questions. The $53 billion price tag is significant. Given the scale of destruction and the need for sustained international support, donors will need to feel that their investments would not be destroyed in any potential subsequent round of conflict.

Relatedly, success of the plan depends on effective coordination among various stakeholders, including Arab states, international organizations, Israel, and Palestinian factions — a role in which the U.S. has the most potential weight, but which President Trump is likely disinclined to play.

Renewed Peace Talks and Potential Paths Forward

A few weeks after the president’s visit to the Middle East in May, Saudi Arabia and France were slated to cohost a summit pushing for a renewed two-state political horizon for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conference was postponed due to the Israel-Iran war in June, but will aim to recenter the two-state solution as the cornerstone of any long-term regional peace plan. Thus, it would be countering proposals that marginalize Palestinian statehood by seeking to forge a unified front in pushing for a credible pathway toward two secure states. The initiative also reflects Saudi Arabia’s continued insistence that Palestinian statehood will remain a nonnegotiable precondition for broader Arab-Israeli peace. 

The summer of 2025 should be viewed as an opportunity to change the trajectory of the conflict and the region. The Trump administration, to some degree, seems to see the current moment as an opportunity for change through its efforts in forging relationships with the Gulf states, its decisions concerning Syria, and its rhetoric about a path toward economic prosperity the Middle East. Despite President Trump’s objectives to reduce U.S. commitments and footprint in the region, he continues to underscore American commitment to regional partners, and is likely one of the most influential world leaders toward Netanyahu and the Israeli public. In other words, President Trump could be in one of the most advantageous positions of any actor to shape the region’s trajectory, if he decides to use his leverage.

The Arab plan — endorsed by the U.S. partners across the Middle East and Europe — offers a framework for an off-ramp to end the war, return the hostages, and place the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on a path toward conflict resolution, security for Israel, and self-determination for Palestinians. Thus far, progress on this track appears as the most sustainable way to realize the vision for a new regional and global coalition to counter Iran and extremism, and to spur prosperity and integration.

In proposing the Arab plan, the U.S.’ Middle East allies are offering a doorway toward progress, which could encourage a new, more stable and prosperous regional order — one in which America’s closest regional ally, Israel, is integrated into the region rather than participating in two decades of “forever wars.” 

Importantly, establishing sustainable peace in the region is not dependent on the U.S. alone. To do this work, the political leadership of the Middle East will be compelled to make serious decisions and change course in a number of ways; thus, short-term bargains and megaprojects will not be sufficient to achieve major, sustainable renewal in the region’s long-term peace and security architecture.

Reconstruction of Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond likely hinges on the evolution of the Middle East’s political order, toward a system in which disputes and grievances are resolved, and cooperation takes root over zero-sum competition for strategic advantage. Setting and staying on paths toward negotiation, transitional justice, stability, and inclusive and accountable governance will be necessary. The Trump administration has the influence to encourage the region toward such goals, if it decides to do so.

This publication was produced on behalf of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. Wherever feasible, the material was reviewed by external experts prior to its release. Any errors are the responsibility of the author(s) alone.

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