UK-US States Trade Memorandums of Understanding: Law, Economics, and Politics

I. Introduction

On March 14, 2024, the United Kingdom and the state of Texas signed a “Statement of Mutual Cooperation (SMC) on Economic Development.”[1] This nonbinding memorandum of understanding (MOU) — a term the Texas government prefers not to use — was under negotiation for over two years.[2] The U.K.-Texas SMU was the eighth MOU concluded by the U.K. and an American state with others being Indiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, and Florida.[3] Negotiations are reported to be continuing with several other states, including California, Colorado, and Illinois.[4] Although with a parliamentary election expected in July 2024, some doubt exists that the current Conservative government is maintaining interest in the MOU program, and the views of a prospective Labour government are unknown.[5] This report solely focuses on two typical such agreements in detail, the U.K.-Texas SMC and U.K.-Washington MOU.[6]

As Gov. Greg Abbott of Texas observed at the time of signing,

“As our ninth largest trade partner, the United Kingdom plays a critical role in the Texas economic juggernaut, … Strengthening the bond between Texas and the United Kingdom is crucial for our shared economies to prosper. By signing this Statement of Mutual Cooperation today, we will further promote economic growth on both sides of the Atlantic. Texas is the economic engine of America, where entrepreneurs from around the globe can cast a vision and know they can achieve it. Working with our British partners, we will chart a greater path towards success and opportunity and create an even more robust economic partnership.”[7]

Texas ranked first among the U.S. states for exports to the U.K. in 2023, with total trade amounting to $18.2 billion in that same year and with more than 300 U.K. firms’ investments in Texas worth $8.6 billion.[8] In relative terms, Texas also has an advantage given that its economy is the eighth-largest globally among independent nations, making the state equal to that of intended free trade agreement (FTA) partner Canada and larger that such FTA partners as Australia and Mexico.[9] Texas reportedly produces 9% of U.S. GDP and 22% of all U.S. exports.[10] Other advantages are Texas’ 2,000-mile border with Mexico and Houston’s status as the sixth largest U.S. container port by number of containers.[11]

That being said, Washington state — the second MOU analyzed in this report, and albeit a smaller economy — has significant economic benefits for the U.K. as well, given that the state is the United States’ ninth largest economy by state.[12] Washington also offers a highly diverse group of production and service enterprises similar to the U.K., likely leading the United States in the number and variety of high-tech companies, including information and communication services and many others.[13] The Northwest Seaport Alliance, which entails Seattle and Tacoma, ranks as the United States’ fifth largest container port.[14] The closest U.S. seaports to Asia by sea miles are also in Seattle and Tacoma.[15]

According to the U.K. government, the eight states with MOUs account for a quarter of the U.S. economy.[16] The conclusion of U.K. MOUs with U.S. states — a policy which was undertaken by the U.K. after the Biden administration declined to conclude a FTA with the U.K. — is not without controversy. The states are restricted from signing trade agreements with foreign countries under the U.S. Constitution, raising questions regarding the potential benefits of more restricted, nonbinding MOUs.[17] The current U.K. government, for its part, left the European Union (EU) on Jan. 31, 2020, with near-disastrous economic results.[18] It did so in part to permit the conclusion of FTAs with the United States, Canada, India, and others; however, none of the three specified have been successful.[19] Nevertheless, the Conservative government appears to have seen possible political and economic benefits in these MOUs, as it continues to encourage closer trade relations with the United States under the Biden administration, even if they fail to reach expectations:

“On 8 June [2023] the Prime Minister and President Biden announced the Atlantic Declaration — a first-of-its-kind action plan covering our economic, technological, commercial and trade relations. As part of that we agreed to explore ways to grow trade between the UK and the US, already worth £315 billion, and to launch talks on a Critical Minerals Agreement, supporting a strategically important sector of the UK economy.”[20]

The balance of this report addresses four key issues raised by this admittedly unusual and legally complex group of agreements: 

• Part II summarizes the U.S. constitutional constraints on U.S. states’ entry into agreements with foreign countries, particularly those affecting federal powers over trade and commerce, and briefly addresses similar matters in the context of the U.K.[21]
• Part III discusses the reluctance of the U.S. federal government to conclude trade agreements with any country, including the U.K., that might result in increased foreign market access to the United States. 
• Part IV examines the key elements of two of the most significant MOUs: the agreements with Texas — a red state — and with Washington — a blue state. 
• Part V comments on the value of these limited agreements for economic relations between key U.S. states and the U.K., one of the United States’ oldest and most important allies.

II. US and UK Constitutional Limits on Trade

The United States

In the United States, the two major constitutional impediments to states concluding international trade agreements are the commerce clause and the outright ban on states entering into treaties. The commerce clause of the Constitution — Article 1, Section 8, clause 3 — affords Congress the exclusive power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”[22] With regard to agreements with foreign nations, Article 1, Section 10, clauses 1 and 3 of the Constitution are also highly restrictive: “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,” and “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”[23]

Nevertheless, there are many instances in which U.S. states have concluded less formal arrangements with foreign powers, often termed “MOUs.” These have been generally accepted if they are explicitly or implicitly nonbinding. For example, several years ago, California among other U.S. states which were reacting to the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement of 2015 — an international agreement in response to climate change — concluded MOUs with other nations, e.g., with China in November 2018 and April 2022. In their MOU, California and China undertook to comply with the Paris Agreement’s requirements. Both 2018 and the 2022 MOUs specifically note that they are voluntary and not legally binding — similar to the Paris Agreement — and must comply with “all applicable laws.”[24]

Questions were raised in April 2022 when Texas Gov. Abbott concluded MOUs with each of the four Mexican states bordering Texas, with the alleged intention of reducing illegal immigration, drug trafficking via highways, and potential terrorism.[25] Still, if challenged, the governor’s office could have argued that these politically controversial agreements were only nonbinding MOUs and not international agreements, suggesting that the agreements’ form is as important as their substance. The criticism of these actions by the White House and those concerned with international commerce did not mention legal arguments but focused on the enormous disruption of cross-border trade that cost businesses hundreds of millions of dollars and further encouraged inflation.[26] Others noted that immigration law and policy are the exclusive province of the U.S. federal government but chose not to mention the alleged constitutional violations of such agreements.[27]

In short, there is ample precedent for U.K.-U.S. state nonbinding MOUs — whatever the terminology used — although all appear to have, for the most part, avoided the terms “trade” or “agreement” in the operative sections, which are discussed in Part III. Political or legal challenges are possible but, in my view, are unlikely.

The United Kingdom

Post-Brexit, the U.K. has had considerable controversy over the extent to which Parliament should scrutinize international agreements concluded by the government.[28] As in the U.S. Congress, some members of Parliament are concerned about the currently broad authority of the government to conclude international agreements.[29] This concern apparently applies to those that are not legally binding, which could include U.K.-U.S. state MOUs:

“International agreements broadly take two forms: legally binding agreements known as ‘treaties’, and agreements that are politically but not legally binding, known as ‘non-legally binding instruments (NLBIs)’. Under the UK’s constitutional arrangements, the power to negotiate and enter into treaties is drawn from the royal prerogative. This means that the power still rests notionally with the sovereign, but in practice is exercised exclusively by the Government, who have considerable power and flexibility in how it is used. In order for the exercise of the prerogative power by the Government to be legitimate, a Minister must assure themselves that they are acting in accordance with the will and confidence of the House of Commons.”[30]

It is evident from current U.K. government practice that the various agreements with U.S. states become effective immediately on signature, even if there are no binding obligations, arguably putting them in the “non-legally binding instruments” category. Thus, the U.K.-Texas SMC provides that it “will come into operation on the date of the Participants’ signatures below and will continue to have effect until it is terminated or renewed.”[31] However, since the U.K. is a dualist state, meaning that international agreements cannot be self-executing, it may well be that agreements, such as the various MOUs that are explicitly nonbinding and do not create any obligations, would not generate much Parliamentary interest, as is the case with these MOUs in the U.S. Congress.[32] One academic expert suggests that much of the motivation for the U.S. state MOUs on the U.K.’s side is political; hence in public U.K. discussions, they are often termed “trade agreements,” even though they do not address market access or tariff reductions.[33] While these “trade agreements” may lack economic incentives, one of the driving forces for Brexit in the Conservative Party was the ability to conclude them, and MOUs are reportedly popular with some Conservative members of Parliament.[34]

III. The Politics of UK-US State MOUs

Brexit opened a legal path for the U.K. to conclude bilateral or multilateral FTAs as of February 2020.[35] In the process of leaving the EU, the U.K. eschewed remaining in the EU Customs Union (EUCU) because that would have bound the U.K. to the EU’s common external tariff and prevented the U.K. from negotiating FTAs with their typical mutual tariff reductions — one of their main objectives of leaving the EU.[36] However, the U.K. has only had modest success with such negotiations where large economies are concerned. The British government reports that the U.K. has over 70 trade agreements either under negotiation or concluded, many of which are post-Brexit continuity agreements — meaning that these agreements apply the terms of agreements concluded when the U.K. was part of the EU to the bilateral trade relationships with the affected countries but which no longer apply to the U.K.[37] The continuity agreements include one with Japan, but it has been criticized for not being more ambitious, especially in its handling of foreign investment issues.[38]

When considering U.K.’s FTAs that are either under negotiation or recently concluded, the most successful trade initiative to date had been with the members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), where the U.K. concluded an accession agreement in July 2023.[39] FTAs have also been finalized inter alia with Australia, New Zealand, and the Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein group.[40] Other efforts with larger economies have been less successful as noted earlier. Although the U.K. and Mexico signed a trade continuity agreement that became effective in June 2021 and essentially replicated a 2000 FTA with the EU, concluding negotiations on a new U.K.-Mexico FTA that began in May 2022 has proven elusive, in part because of U.K. human rights concerns.[41] The U.K. government has indicated that “it plans to establish a formal bilateral human rights dialogue with Mexico,” but that apparently has not begun.”[42]

After two years, negotiations toward a FTA between the U.K. and Canada have stalled.[43] Canada, like Mexico and Japan, has a trade continuity agreement with the U.K. Both Canada and the U.K. were seeking a more extensive arrangement in recent negotiations. The negotiations were suspended in the first quarter of 2024 because of the U.K.’s unwillingness to accept imports of Canadian hormone-fed beef and concerns over potentially increased imports of British cheese and automobiles into Canada.[44]

Perhaps the most significant new FTA for the U.K. — much more so than those with U.S. states — would have been with India. The two governments had held 14 rounds of negotiations as of March 2024, without being able to conclude an agreement.[45] It seems the Indian government expects better terms in several key areas: additional visas for Indian citizens wishing to come to the U.K. and an accompanying social security agreement from an anticipated Labour government after the next election.[46] However, these are not the only issues, as others include: on India’s side, better U.K. access for skilled Indian professionals, and on U.K.’s side, major reductions of Indian tariffs on a variety of goods.[47] Overall, experts estimate that the economic benefits of the trade agreements concluded by the U.K. since it became independent from the EU have been marginal, in part because the U.K. — like most highly developed countries — is primarily a service economy.[48]

Despite high hopes among British government officials and members of Parliament — some of whom have described a U.K.-U.S. agreement as the “greatest prize of all” — prospects for such an agreement are “very low,” in large part for reasons discussed below.[49] As a report issued by the Congressional Research Service states, “UK officials have acknowledged that a bilateral FTA, a post-Brexit UK priority, is unlikely in the near-term.”[50] Trade-related discussions between the United States and the U.K. have continued on a regular basis since the outset of the Biden administration, and these “executive trade actions” are dialogues on such issues as the establishment of a “Twenty-First Century U.S.-UK Economic Partnership” and a critical minerals agreement (CMA), small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and technology and cross-border data flows.[51] However, these efforts fall well short of the more traditional FTA sought by the U.K. Thus, the series of U.K.-U.S. state MOUs can be viewed as a kind of consolation prize to the UK’s strong desire to strengthen trade and economic relations with the United States. It is also partially driven by the legacy of Brexit, which is somewhat responsible for a sustained economic downturn that is subsequently encouraging new commercial relationships that are desirable even if limited in scope.[52]

During the Biden administration, it has become ever more obvious that a U.K.-U.S. FTA is not in the cards for the United States or one for any other country.[53] The March 2024 U.S. trade policy agenda clarifies why the U.K. has abandoned hope of a classic FTA with the United States and pursued alternatives such as MOUs.[54] In the 2024 trade policy agenda, the Biden administration highlights four trade-related agreements: the U.S.-Taiwan 21^st Century Trade Initiative; the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership; the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF); and the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP).[55] None of these agreements include any mention of U.S. market-opening measures as found in traditional U.S. FTAs.[56] As the United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai confirmed recently with respect to the IPEF:

“We have to acknowledge and recognize where the world economy is today. You are right, tariff reduction is not a part of this negotiation. But we are bringing together critical partners in the region to improve compatibility throughout our economies. The agriculture barriers are a topline priority for our trade agenda. I will try to fix those problems in any way that I can.”[57]

In addition to the absence of any consideration of market-opening measures in these four negotiations, Ambassador Tai confirmed her view: “We have to acknowledge and recognize where the world economy is today. You are right, tariff reduction is not a part of this negotiation” (emphasis added). Instead of trade per se, the focus is on creating “a stronger, fairer, more resilient economy for families, workers, and businesses in the United States and in the Indo-Pacific region.”[58] In other contexts, Ambassador Kai has criticized past U.S. FTAs as “20^th century tools” and defended the IPEF “as a new model that is better designed to address 21^st century issues and to advance ‘worker-centered’ policies and global economic resilience.”[59]

Thus, in certain respects, these trade negotiations share characteristics with the U.K.-U.S. state MOUs, as neither address tariff reductions nor quotas. They are a type of — what could be described as — “trade agreement light.” For example, the United States in the IPEF is seeking, inter alia, “high-ambition targets that will accelerate efforts to tackle the climate crisis, including in the areas of renewable energy, carbon removal, energy efficiency standards, and new measures to combat methane emissions.”[60] As Part IV of this report indicates, many of these same elements are addressed in the U.K. agreements with Washington and Texas, which like other states, have service economies and an interest in inventive energy practices: the Texas SMC notes “innovative energy solutions,” while the Washington MOU emphasizes “clean energy and low emissions technology.”[61]

Moreover, even though the IPEF does not reduce tariffs or require changes in U.S. law, some members of Congress contend that such agreements require congressional consultation and approval despite administration consultations during the negotiations.[62] To the best of my knowledge, no objections have been raised by Congress to the U.K.-U.S. state MOUs, most likely because they are explicitly nonbinding and subject to federal law. The IPEF provisions, like those in the U.K.-U.S. MOUs, “focus on cooperation among the members as a key mechanism to advance their objectives. Unlike traditional trade agreements, the CEA and FEA do not set out detailed rules which can be enforced through binding dispute resolution.”[63] In other words, the IPEF obligations are also unenforceable. This is not to suggest that nonbinding, trade-related agreements have no value, but only to point out the similarities with the Biden administration trade agenda, particularly its procedural aspects, and the conclusion of MOUs.

IV. Comparing UK-Texas SMC and UK-Washington MOU 

This section examines in detail two of the major agreements, which are both “MOUs,” even though the Texas agreement uses the term “SMC.” Texas is the largest state to conclude a MOU or SMC to date, although it will be second if a MOU with California is concluded. Texas is a deep-red state, with Republicans controlling the governorship, most statewide offices, and the Texas House and Senate.[64] In Washington state, the governor and other major statewide offices are members of the Democratic Party, and both the Washington House and Senate are controlled by Democrats.[65] Being among the most recent MOUs, these two presumably reflect the latest in U.K. thinking as well as the somewhat diverse views of the Texas and Washington governments. Each has a set of priorities that indicate a strong economic sector, which is energy in Texas and aerospace in Washington. Still, as the following subparts indicate, the similarities between these MOUs are greater than the differences. For example, both red and blue states are interested in concluding MOUs with the U.K., and more U.S. states may join later if they see benefits in expanding contacts and prospects of economic interchange with the world’s sixth largest economy.[66] 

The other six currently completed MOUs have not been discussed in detail because like the Texas SMC and Washington MOU, the similarities far outweigh the differences. This is, for example, the case with regard to the MOU between the U.K. and Florida, with the state ranking fourth in terms of total U.S. state GDP — behind only California, Texas, and New York.[67] The November 2023 Florida MOU differs little substantively from the Texas SMC and diverges from the Washington MOU primarily in the short shrift that it gives to environmental issues generally, including clean energy and climate change.[68]

Common Ground and Shared Provisions

Structure and Objectives

While the titles of the Washington MOU and Texas SMC are different, the variations are minor. In their respective titles, the Washington MOU refers to “trade co-operation, innovation and clean energy,” and the Texas SMC refers instead to “economic development and trade relations.” However, both agreements are structured in a similar manner with sections on these topics in the following order:

1. A series of “whereas” clauses.
2. Objectives. 
3. Priority sectors. 
4. Administrative structure. 
5. Encouragement of party participation. 
6. Information sharing and confidentiality. 
7. Intellectual property protection.
8. Funding. 
9. Interpretation and application, without third-party dispute settlement. 
10. Status of document.

Perhaps each agreement’s most important aspect from a legal standpoint is the “status” provision, which makes the MOU or SMC subject to state and federal law and the laws of the U.K. — a disclaimer of the creation of legally binding rights or effect on any rights of third parties, which is discussed in greater detail below.[69] 

Although some variation exists in the language used, the statements of objectives are similar except for a few divergencies.[70] Overall, both the Washington MOU and Texas SMC stress the desirability of increasing trade to deepen economic development, cooperation, and trade relations. In particular, both seek to create a forum to achieve the following: 

• Address anticipated barriers to trade, investment, economic cooperation, and development.
• Strengthen business links.
• Foster innovation. 
• Develop research ties. 
• Improve supply chain resilience.

Priorities 

The priorities sections of the Texas SMC and Washington MOU are similar, but logically reflect the somewhat different economies of each state. The common priorities include clean energy solutions, although with different phrasing. For Texas, the priority sectors include:

• Chemicals. 
• Health and life sciences. 
• Supply chains and critical minerals. 
• Advanced technologies. 
• Aerospace.
• Water, port, rail, and aviation infrastructure. 
• Transport service with an emphasis on light and high-speed rail. 
• Financial, legal, and other professional services.[71]

Given that Texas’ largest city is Houston, with extensive resources in health care and research, aerospace, as well as petroleum, petrochemical and petroleum-related services, these priorities make obvious sense for Houston and the rest of Texas and offer potential benefits for parallel sectors in the U.K.[72] Other major metropolitan areas with diverse economies and significant international commerce in Texas include Dallas-Fort Worth, San Antonio, and Austin, each with nearly a million or many more residents.[73] Major Texas enterprises comprise Texas Instruments, Toyota, General Electric, Lockheed Martin, ExxonMobil, Charles Schwab, and many others.[74]

In comparison, the Washington MOU’s priorities have more of a high-tech, e-commerce, and services orientation, with an emphasis on Washington’s largest city, Seattle. They include:

• Clean energy and low emissions technology. 
• Aerospace.
• Workforce development with a focus on high-value industries. 
• Life sciences. 
• Digital technologies. 
• Supply chain resilience. 
• Innovation.[75]

Again, this is not surprising given that the Seattle area is home to the headquarters and major operations of key high-tech firms, such as Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, T-Mobile, Google, Oracle, Zillow, AT&T, and Tenecent, along with many others.[76] Seattle dominates the state’s economy with a population of over 600,000; no other Washington city but Spokane has more than 200,000 residents.[77]

Additional Similarities 

Both agreements are designed to encourage third-party participation, from “private, public, academic, research, and other sectors,” along with regional, city, and county governments and trade associations.[78]

Both also provide information sharing, confidentiality, and protection of intellectual property sections.[79] Each disclaims any commitments by the participants to “financially support any activity carried out under its provisions.”[80] The agreements’ interpretation and application component is to be based on principles of good faith, with differences to be resolved through informal discussions or consultations; disagreements shall not be “referred to any third party, court or tribunal.”[81] Each was destined to become effective upon signature of both participants and to remain in force until terminated or renewed — with the Texas SMC lasting indefinitely and the Washington MOU lasting for a five-year period. Both also state the proviso that it could be terminated with 45 days’ notice.[82]

Lastly, for both, the U.K. is authorized to raise issues related to international relations, which are under their jurisdiction, namely in Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Man, and the British Overseas Territories.[83]

A Few Significant Differences 

The Economy and Environment 

The variations across economic interests in the Washington MOU and the Texas SMC exhibit each state’s differing commitments and varying commercial interests. Only the Washington MOU pledges to “support educational and skills opportunities necessary in critical industries” and “uphold the values of inclusive trade and inclusive growth.”[84] While the Washington MOU addresses investment, only the Texas SMC explicitly mentions the aim of promoting investment for businesses.[85] Additionally, the Texas SMC commits the participants to “encourage regulators and professional bodies interested in pursuing recognition arrangements of professional qualifications,” an important issue with Texas and the U.K. being heavily service economies.[86]

The agreements’ language stressing the importance of the economic relationships between participants also diverges in significant ways. The Texas SMC cites the long-standing cooperative ties dating back to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded in 1842, when Texas was still an independent country.[87] The Texas SMC also seeks to “promote and foster sustainable economic growth, support innovation, and encourage job creation” and “recognise that research, technology, entrepreneurship, and innovation are fundamental to economic growth and prosperity.”[88] However, there is no direct reference to climate change in the Texas SMC. Yet, such issues are a major focus of the Washington MOU, including in the preambular language:

“WHEREAS, the Participants aspire to accelerate and secure the significant social and economic benefits that innovation, clean growth, protecting the environment against air, water, chemical, and waste pollution, and addressing biodiversity loss deliver in building a greener and more resilient planet;

WHEREAS, the Participants support the goals of the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, recognise the urgency of addressing global climate change and aim to strengthen bilateral co-operation to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by mid-century, if not sooner, by decarbonising their economies, promoting sustainable growth, facilitating trade and investment in environmental goods and services, and building skilled and modern workforces.”[89]

More than any other provisions of these agreements, the Washington MOU’s language illustrates the significant divergence with respect to climate change between the U.K. on the one hand and Texas on the other, despite the necessary flexibility the U.K. demonstrated in these negotiations. 

Certain diversity issues are also reflected in the Washington MOU but not in the Texas SMC; the former makes specific reference to “small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and women-owned businesses,” as well as to “inclusive trade and inclusive growth” as noted above.[90] 

Energy

Not surprisingly, the two agreements also diverge very significantly in energy, again reflecting different treatments of environment and related climate change issues. The Texas SMC pledges support for “the development of new and emerging energy solutions to ensure greater energy resilience” but offers no further details.[91] The Washington MOU goes much further, pledging that participants will:

“Support global decarbonisation and the pathway to net zero, including through meeting domestic commitments to the phase out of unabated coal power by no later than 2030 as participants in the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), as well as ensuring a just transition for workers and communities traditionally reliant on fossil fuel economies.”[92]

Finally, one of the most significant drafting differences is found in a distinct section in the Washington MOU, where a list of “activities and initiatives” is incorporated. In summary, these include:

• Best practice exchanges. 
• A commitment to government and trade missions.
• Private-sector partnership development. 
• Cooperation between the respective academic and research communities. 
• Joint projects including seminars and exhibitions. 
• Facilitation of institution and corporate investment.[93]

Implementation 

While both address implementation issues, the approaches are somewhat different, although it is unclear whether in practice the distinctions will matter. For the Washington MOU, implementation provisions specifically include regular implementation and consultation, as noted earlier with the specific obligation of upholding “values of inclusive trade and inclusive growth,” which are terms not found in the Texas SMC.[94] The section also contemplates regular implementation meetings, which could include such topics as attention to trade and investment barriers; the interaction between innovation and trade; best practice exchanges in the areas set out in section 2; the facilitation of private sector stakeholders’ participation; an annual MOU review; and other forms of cooperation.[95] Perhaps most significantly, specific coordinating authorities are designated in the Washington MOU, including the Washington State Department of Commerce, the U.K.’s Department of Business and Trade in the British Consulate in San Francisco, as well as the U.K. Government Office in Seattle.[96] Realistically, if there is to be the close cooperation between the U.K. and Washington state on implementation issues, the U.K.’s Seattle office will have to be up to the task.

The approach to implementation issues in the Texas SMC is a slightly different despite considerable overlap, as its focus is on forming a “Working Group.”[97] Within six months of signing, participants commit to create a working group to coordinate implementation. The section also includes a list of best practices to inform and consult regularly on matters of common interest under the SMC and, by implication, revise and update it as needed.[98] For the U.K., the overseeing authorities are the Department of Business and Trade and the British Consulate General in Houston. For Texas, the “Texas Economic Development and Tourism Office [is designated] as the coordinating authority for all state agency interactions related to this SMC.”[99] Since the Economic Development and Tourism Office is within the office of the governor in Austin, participants may find it useful to have a representative of that office resident in Houston, near the office of the British Consulate General, at least periodically.

For the U.K., one minor advantage of negotiating with individual U.S. states is that with certain states, especially Washington and probably California, climate change issues can be recognized, unlike in treaties with the U.S. federal government where the language is still politically sensitive — although the environmental language in some, such as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), is arguably more extensive than that of the Texas SMC.[100]

The Legal Status of Agreements

One of the most important sections, especially in light of the discussion in Part II, are the provisions in “Status of this MOU” and “Status of this SMC” segments. While the language differs in minor respects, the substance is similar. The Washington MOU provides: 

• It is not legally binding under domestic or international law. 
• All actions taken under the MOU are “subject as appropriate to national, state, and international law, and any other applicable rules and obligations.”
• It “does not affect the rights and obligations of third parties or the rights of the Participants to conclude arrangements or agreements with respect to any matter described” in the MOU.[101]

The Texas SMC similarly states:

• It is subject to the “prevailing” laws of Texas, the United States, and the U.K. 
• It is “solely an expression of the Participants’ intention to establish a mutually beneficial relationship and is not an international agreement or treaty and as such does not create legally binding rights or obligations under domestic or international law.” 
• It does not affect the rights of third parties or participants in other arrangements.[102]

This language confirms that all participants are aware of the U.S. legal and constitutional constraints. Moreover, when considering these explicit disclaimers, there appears to be little basis for arguing that neither the U.K. nor the states of Washington and Texas have usurped any of the U.S. national government’s constitutional rights and obligations.

V. Recommendations and Conclusions

Participants appear to recognize that the benefits, if any, that accrue from these and other MOUs depend largely on engaging with the private sector, individual businesses, local and regional business organizations, and academic institutions. Governments can provide the framework for cooperation and nurture exchanges through government committees, but these MOUs are emphatically a series of blueprints to encourage the private sector’s involvement.

That being said, a MOU will have only limited benefits for the participants’ economies without support from the U.K. and from U.S. state governments, especially without effective and ongoing presentations by governments and businesses to educate stakeholders on the potential benefits for affected business and academic communities. Implementation will also be enhanced if the consultation provisions in both agreements are put to frequent use. Many enterprises in both the EU and U.S. states, particularly SMEs, will not recognize the potential benefits of MOUs, unless the U.K., Texas, Washington, and major private business groups provide easily accessible public information on ways to reap the benefits of these agreements. Gathering and disseminating this information will be somewhat easier if the U.K. has a consulate or a consulate general in one of the cities where many businesses are located, as is currently the case of Houston but not Seattle. It seems obvious that if the U.K. eventually concludes and implements up to 20 U.S. state MOUs, they will require more human resources than a single FTA with the central government, administered in Washington, D.C., where extensive embassy resources already exist.

The practical value of these early MOUs will have a useful demonstration effect if potential benefits can be turned into reality. It is in the U.K.’s interest, and that of other U.S. states that are engaged extensively in international commerce, such as California, to conclude MOUs — similar to the ones with Washington, Texas, and the other six states — despite the U.K.’s upcoming election and other priorities. Hopefully, if the Labour Party wins the election, the U.K. government’s interest in U.S. state MOUs will continue.

Also, multiple U.K.-U.S. state agreements would not economically replace the benefits of a U.K. FTA with the United States as a whole. However, the potential benefits even of a far-reaching FTA between the U.K. and United States may well have been exaggerated by early proponents. Both the United States and the U.K. already have most favored nation (MFN) tariffs that are low on average: 4.4% in the case of the U.K. and 3.6% in the case of the United States.[103] Thus, tariff reduction is not particularly important, except for tariff peaks, such as the U.K.’s 10% tariff on automobiles and the United States’ 25% tariffs on small trucks — the latter imposed in 1964 on the EU because of a high tariff on imports of U.S. chicken.[104] Thus, tariffs would likely not have been a major negotiating issue except for, perhaps, agricultural products. At present low levels, the United States is the U.K.’s top trading partner, with total trade in 2018 amounting to £201 billion, where U.K. enjoyed a £45 billion surplus.[105]

However, agreement on agricultural trade could have been and remains a serious barrier to an FTA. It would have been almost impossible politically for the U.S. government to conclude an FTA with the U.K. without achieving substantially improved access for U.S. farm interests to the U.K. agricultural market. The United States is the world’s largest and one of the most diverse agricultural exporters, with important agricultural producers in almost every state.[106] More particularly, the United States is a major producer and exporter of hormone-fed beef, the product that torpedoed U.K. FTA negotiations with Canada, as discussed earlier. The U.K.’s politically sensitive ban on imports of chlorine-washed chicken would also have been a major stumbling block.[107] Importation of genetically modified (GM) crops into the U.K. remains highly regulated. GM crops — important to American agricultural exports — remain largely banned in the U.K., although recent regulatory changes permit the entry of gene-edited products.[108] More broadly, U.K. agricultural sectors share little enthusiasm for an FTA with the United States similar to one concluded in 2021 with Australia, where some believe that the U.K. government was far too generous in providing Australian market access by stipulating that most limits on agricultural exports would be eliminated after 15 years.[109]

While U.K. agricultural exports to the United States would probably have been a less significant issue, the World Trade Organization (WTO) reports that U.S. import duties on some agricultural products are effectively as high as 42%, with the U.K. duties as high as 33.2%, although some duty rates are much lower.[110] Also, the United States frequently imposes tariff rate quotas, as with cheese from certain exporters, whereby a lower rate applies up to a certain level of imports, after which time the tariff rate substantially increases.[111] When the U.K. withdrew from the EU, the United States split its existing quotas on dairy products, including cheese and tobacco.[112] This could have been a sensitive issue for U.K.-U.S. FTA negotiations, since it was a major sticking point for U.K. cheese exports to Canada, and the U.S. consumer market is many times that of Canada’s.

Finally, as some minimize the importance of GDP comparisons and macroeconomic factors, it is worth keeping in mind the importance of MOUs’ benefits that may encourage international trade and investment by individual companies, including SMEs as well as those in the Fortune 500.[113] Enterprises, both in the U.K. and Texas and in the U.K. and Washington state that currently could not establish operations or offices in the other’s jurisdiction on their own, might well be able to trade and invest under the umbrella of MOUs, which would benefit each’s economy. Such trade and investment facilitation may be difficult to measure, but if this occurs widely, it will make the U.K. and U.S. state efforts to conclude MOUs worthwhile. Similarly, if MOUs become a catalyst for business and academic exchanges, all those who participate should benefit, even if the economic impact is difficult to assess.

Notes

[1] Department of Business and Trade (DBT), “UK Signs Trade Pact with Second Biggest State — Texas,” March 13, 2024, accessed April 16, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-signs-trade-pact-with-second-biggest-us-state-texas. To view the U.K.-Texas SMC, see “Statement of Mutual Cooperation (SMC) on Economic Development and Trade Relations between the United Kingdom and the State of Texas,” DBT, policy paper, March 14, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-and-texas-statement-of-mutual-cooperation-on-economic-development-and-trade/statement-of-mutual-cooperation-smc-on-economic-development-and-trade-relations-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-state-of-texas. Subsequent references to the U.K.-Texas SMC will appear as Texas SMC in notes.

[2] See “Details” of “UK and Texas Statement of Mutual Cooperation on Economic Development and Trade,” DBT, policy paper, March 14, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-and-texas-statement-of-mutual-cooperation-on-economic-development-and-trade. For more on the ongoing negotiations and related issues between the U.K. and Texas, see David A. Gantz, “UK, Texas Should Proceed Carefully with, but Not Abandon, Bilateral Trade Deal” (Houston: Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, May 18, 2022, https://doi.org/10.25613/WN0N-4758.

[3] DBT and Minister of State Nusrat Ghani, “UK Signs Sixth US State Deal with Washington State,” press release, September 25, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-signs-sixth-us-state-deal-with-washington-state.

[4] For a list of the other states with which memorandums of understanding (MOUs) are currently under negotiation as of the end of April 2024, see DBT, “UK Signs Trade Pact.”

[5] Cambridge University professor who closely follows U.K. trade negotiations, email message to author, April 21, 2014. Elections must be held by January 28, 2025, but may be called sooner. For more details on the timing of parliamentary elections, see Jennifer Clarke, “General Election: When Is the Next One and Who Decides?,” BBC News, last modified May 3, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-62064552.

[6] See DBT and Minister of State Nusrat Ghani. To view the U.K.-Washington MOU, “Memorandum of Understanding on Trade Co-Operation, Innovation and Clean Energy between the Washington State and the United Kingdom,” DBT, policy paper, September 25, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-and-washington-state-trade-cooperation-innovation-and-clean-energy-memorandum-of-understanding/memorandum-of-understanding-on-trade-co-operation-innovation-and-clean-energy-between-the-washington-state-and-the-united-kingdom. Subsequent references to the U.K.-Washington MOU will appear as Washington MOU in notes. 

[7] Office of the Texas Governor, “Governor Abbott Signs Statement of Mutual Cooperation with the United Kingdom,” press release, March 13, 2024, accessed April 15, 2024, https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-signs-statement-of-mutual-cooperation-with-the-united-kingdom.

[8] Office of the Texas Governor, “Governor Abbott Signs.”

[9] Texas Office of the Governor, “Top Texas Touts: Economy,” March 31, 2024, accessed April 18, 2024, https://gov.texas.gov/top-texas-touts-economy. As of April 2024, Canada is reported as the ninth largest world economy; Australia is reported as twelfth; and Mexico reported as fourteenth (“GDP by Country,” Worldometer, accessed April 18, 2024, https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-by-country/).

[10] Texas Office of the Governor, “Top Texas Touts: Economy.”

[11] Port Houston is recorded as having more than 2.9 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2020 (“Top 10: The Busiest Container Ports in the United States,” Container News, July 18, 2021, accessed April 20, 2024, https://container-news.com/top-10-the-busiest-container-ports-in-the-united-states/). 

[12] Using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)’s annual data from 2022, Avery Koop provides a visualization of GDP of each U.S. state (“Visualized: The U.S. $20 Trillion Economy by State,” Visual Capitalist, July19, 2023, accessed April 18, 2024, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/us-economy-by-state/).

[13] Washington Governor Jay Inslee, “Economy,” 2024,  accessed April 18, 2024, https://governor.wa.gov/issues/economy.

[14] “Top 10: The Busiest Container Ports in the United States.”

[15] The distance from Seattle to Shanghai is approximately 5,711 miles; from Long Beach to Shanghai, the distance is approximately 6,495 miles (“Distance Calculator,” Prokerala, accessed April 20, 2024, https://www.prokerala.com/travel/distance/from-seattle/to-shanghai/).

[16] DBT, “UK Signs Trade Pact.”

[17] Gantz. 

[18] Lorand Bartels noted — in an understatement — “Brexit has not done wonders for the UK economy” (“Implications of Recent United Kingdom Agreements for the United Kingdom, the US, Texas, and Mexico,” Baker Institute for Public Policy, streamed live on November 2, 2023, YouTube video, 1:06:46, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h4GJfooS6Jg).

[19] Tom Edgington, “Trade Deals: What Has the UK Done Since Brexit?,” BBC News, January 26, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-47213842. Also, for example, U.K. negotiations with Canada were suspended in January 2024 over disagreements relating to beef exports from Canada’s side and auto and cheese exports from the U.K.’ side (Paul Seddon and Kate Whannel, “UK Halts Trade Negotiations with Canada over Hormones in Beef Ban,” BBC News, January 26, 2024, accessed April 15, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-68098177).

[20] DBT, “UK Signs Trade Pact.”

[21] This section is based significantly on Gantz.

[22] U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

[23] U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 and 3.

[24] “Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of the People’s Republic of China and the State of California of the United States of America,” April 18–9, 2022, https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/4.18.22-China-CA-MOU.pdf, section VII, and see section V.

[25] Office of the Texas Governor, “Governor Abbott Signs Historic Border Security Memorandum of Understanding with Nuevo León Governor García in Laredo,” April 13, 2022, https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-signs-historic-border-security-memorandum-of-understanding-with-nuevo-leon-governor-garcia-in-laredo. To view the Texas-Nuevo León MOU, see “Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Texas and the Free and Sovereign State of Nuevo León,” April 13, 2022, https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EL_GOBIERNO_DEL.pdf.  

[26] Ted Hesson and Lizbeth Diaz, “Texas Governor Snarls Border Traffic, Buses Migrant in Effort to Pressure White House,” Reuters, April 14, 2022, accessed April 24, 2024,  https://www.reuters.com/world/us/texas-trucker-border-inspections-disrupting-supply-chain-raising-prices-white-2022-04-13/; Alicia Wallace and Vanessa Yurkevich, “Rotting Fruit, Spoiled Vegetables: How Texas Just Made the Supply Chain Even Worse,” CNN Business, April 16, 2022, accessed April 24, 2024,  https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/16/economy/texas-mexico-abbott-border-economic-impact/index.html. 

[27] These critiques were made by business stakeholders and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials, among others (Sandra Sanchez, “South Texas Border Leaders Say Bridge Closures Are ‘Self Inflicted Wounds’ Caused by Governor,” Border Report, last modified May 11, 2022, accessed, April 22, 2024, https://www.borderreport.com/regions/texas/south-texas-border-leaders-say-bridge-closures-are-self-inflicted-wounds-caused-by-governor/); and American-Statesman Editorial Board, “Editorial: As Abbott Plays Politics at the Border, Texans Pay the Price,” Austin American-Statesman, April 16, 2022, accessed April 22, 2024,  https://www.statesman.com/story/opinion/2022/04/16/gov-abbotts-reckless-border-stunts-doing-more-harm-than-good/7314870001/. As was suggested in the earlier Baker Institute report on this subject, less controversial arrangements have been concluded as MOUs between adjacent border states in the past. The states of Arizona and Sonora — which have cooperated on a variety of issues of mutual interest since the Arizona-Mexico Commission was founded in the 1950s — have concluded a series of nonbinding MOUs. For example, the Arizona Department of Commerce and the Secretariat of the Economy of the State of Sonora formed a partnership in 2018, and this agreement is also termed a MOU. It seems likely that all the parties to the current group of MOUs are aware of past practice among U.S. states (see Gantz).

[28] U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st Century, January 29, 2024, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmpubadm/204/report.html. For a summary of this report, see U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st Century — Report Summary, January 29, 2024, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmpubadm/204/summary.html.

[29] Steven Overly notes, “Democrats and Republicans alike complain the Biden administration has been pursuing economic initiatives overseas without properly consulting lawmakers” (“Bipartisan Resentment Grows as Biden Pursues New Trade Talks,” Politico, June 13, 2022, accessed April 17, 2024,  https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/13/congress-biden-trade-agenda-00038951). 

[30] Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st Century — Report Summary.

[31] Texas SMC, sec. 9.1.

[32] Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st Century, para. 29.

[33] Bartels.

[34] Bartels.

[35] See Nigel Walker, “Brexit Timeline: Events Leading to the UK’s Exit from the European Union,” research briefing, House of Commons Library, January 6, 2020, accessed April 16, 2024, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7960/.

[36] A BBC News report observed, “Now that it’s no longer in the EU, the UK is free to set its own trade policy and can negotiate deals with other countries” (“Brexit: What You Need to Know about the UK Leaving the EU,” BBC News, December 30, 2020, accessed April 17, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887).

[37] DBT and Department for International Trade (DIT), “The UK’s Trade Agreements,” last modified November 21, 2023, accessed April 17, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-uks-trade-agreements.

[38] This observation was made by Minako Morita-Jaeger, an international policy consultant and fellow of the U.K. Trade Policy Observatory at the University of Sussex (“Britain and Japan Sign Post-Brexit Trade Deal,” BBC News, October 23, 2020, accessed April 19, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54654814).

[39] DBT, “The UK’s Accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),” last modified January 11, 2024, accessed April 17, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-uks-accession-to-the-comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-cptpp. For documents regarding the original CPTPP agreement, see “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Texts,” New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, February 4, 2016, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text-and-resources/. The United States signed the original CPTPP in 2015 but withdrew in 2017 (U.S. Department of State [DOS], “Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement,” DipNote [blog], January 23, 2017, accessed April 17, 2024, https://2017-2021.state.gov/us-TPP-withdrawal/). 

[40] DBT and DIT, “The UK’s Trade Agreements.”

[41] John Curtis and Walker, “UK’s Relationship with Mexico,” research briefing, House of Commons Library, September 4, 2023, accessed April 17, 2024, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2023-0175/.   

[42] Curtis and Walker.

[43] Seddon and Whannel.

[44] Seddon and Whannel.

[45] Melissa Cyrill, “India, UK FTA Negotiations: Key Updates,” India Briefing, March 9, 2024, accessed April 17, 2024, https://www.india-briefing.com/news/india-uk-fta-25699.html/.

[46] Cyrill.

[47] Cyrill.

[48] See Aslak Berg, “Weighed Down by Gravity; UK Trade Policy After Brexit,” Centre for European Reform (CER) Insight, March 11, 2024, accessed April 17, 2024, https://www.cer.eu/insights/weighed-down-gravity-uk-trade-policy-after-brexit.

[49] Richard Wheeler, “Prospects of UK-US Free Trade Agreement ‘Very Low’, Says Business Secretary,” Independent, July 16, 2023, accessed April 17, 2024,  https://www.independent.co.uk/business/prospects-of-ukus-free-trade-agreement-very-low-says-business-secretary-b2376131.html. Additionally, not all the roadblocks are political. For example, U.K.-U.S. negotiations could have foundered over agricultural trade, particularly regarding the U.K.’s adamant unwillingness to accept U.S. hormone-fed beef, as occurred with the U.K.-Canada negotiations noted earlier.

[50] Shayerah I. Akhtar, U.S.-UK Trade Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11123. 

[51] Akhtar. 

[52] Hanna Ziady, “The UK Economy Still Can’t Cope with the Consequences of Brexit,” CNN Business, August 29, 2023, accessed April 14, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/29/economy/uk-food-imports-safety-brexit/index.html.

[53] For example, FTA discussions with Kenya — a country with which the Trump administration had announced its intent to negotiate a trade agreement — have stalled under the Biden administration. The only discussions have been over a “strategic partnership,” which “aimed at stoking growth and investment in Kenya’s economy while also addressing climate change, corruption and regulatory practices”; no mention is made of a broader trade agreement (Julia Mueller, “US, Kenya Begin Trade and Investment Partnership Talks,” The Hill, July 14, 2022 accessed April 19, 2024,  https://thehill.com/policy/international/3560248-us-kenya-begin-trade-and-investment-partnership-talks/).

[54] Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program, March 1, 2024, https://bit.ly/3V7sx8j.

[55] USTR, “USTR Releases President Biden’s 2024 Trade Policy Agenda and 2023 Annual Report,” press release, March 1, 2024, accessed April 15, 2024, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2024/march/ustr-releases-president-bidens-2024-trade-policy-agenda-and-2023-annual-report. 

[56] The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) offers an example of this language (Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, July 1, 2020, esp. ch. 2, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between).

[57] Kenneth Rapoza, “Katherine Tai Holds Ground on Free Trade, Market Access, In Senate Finance Hearing,” Coalition for a Prosperous America, March 24, 2023, accessed April 15, 2024, https://prosperousamerica.org/katherine-tai-holds-ground-on-free-trade-market-access-in-senate-finance-hearing/.

[58] The White House, “FACT SHEET: In Asia, President Biden and a Dozen Indo-Pacific Partners Launch the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity,” May 23, 2022, accessed April 16, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-in-asia-president-biden-and-a-dozen-indo-pacific-partners-launch-the-indo-pacific-economic-framework-for-prosperity/. The original “trade” pillar of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) was effectively abandoned by the Biden administration because of U.S. domestic politics (Erin L. Murphy, “IPEF: Three Pillars Succeed, One Falters,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 21, 2023, accessed June 1, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ipef-three-pillars-succeed-one-falters).

[59] Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Kyla H. Kitamura, and Mark E. Manyin, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12373.

[60] The White House. 

[61] Texas SMC, sec. 2.1.a; Washington MOU, sec. 2.1.a.

[62] Cimino-Isaacs, Kitamura, and Manyin. 

[63] Jane Mellsop, “IPEF — Two Steps Forward, But One Important Step Still Missing,” Asia Society Policy Institute, March 15, 2024, accessed April 16, 2024, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/ipef-two-steps-forward-one-important-step-still-missing.

[64] “Party Control of Texas State Government,” Ballotpedia, accessed April 16, 2024, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Texas_state_government.

[65] “Party Control of Washington State Government,” Ballotpedia, accessed April 16, 2024, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Washington_state_government. 

[66] “The Top 10 Largest Economies in 2024,” Forbes India, last modified April 30, 2024, https://www.forbesindia.com/article/explainers/top-10-largest-economies-in-the-world/86159/1.

[67] “Memorandum of Understanding on Trade and Economic Co-Operation Between the State of Florida and the United Kingdom,” DBT, policy paper, November 15, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-and-florida-trade-and-economic-co-operation-memorandum-of-understanding/memorandum-of-understanding-on-trade-and-economic-co-operation-between-the-state-of-florida-and-the-united-kingdom. Subsequent references to the U.K.-Texas SMC will appear as Florida MOU in notes. “Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United States in 2022, by State,” Statista, accessed April 19, 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/248053/us-real-gross-domestic-product-gdp-by-state/.  

[68] See Florida MOU, fifth whereas clause; and Washington MOU, fourth whereas clause and sec.1.6.

[69] Texas SMC, sec. 10; Washington MOU, sec. 11.

[70] Texas SMC, sec. 1; Washington MOU, sec. 1.

[71] Texas SMC, sec 2. 

[72] “Houston Industries,” Greater Houston Partnership, accessed April 17, 2024, https://www.houston.org/why-houston/industries/all-industries.

[73] “10 Largest Cities in Texas,” WorldAtlas, accessed April 21, 2024, https://www.worldatlas.com/cities/10-largest-cities-in-texas.html.

[74] “Largest Employers in Texas,” Texas Economic Development Corporation, accessed April 17, 2024, https://businessintexas.com/business-sectors/major-employers/.

[75] Washington MOU, sec. 2. 

[76] Kaitlyn Farley, “Seattle’s Top Employers,” MediaFeed, August 17, 2021, accessed April 17, 2024, https://mediafeed.org/the-top-25-employers-in-seattle/.

[77] “The 10 Biggest Cities in Washington,” WorldAtlas, accessed April 21, 2024, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-10-biggest-cities-in-washington.html.

[78] Washington MOU, sec. 5; Texas SMC, sec. 4.

[79] Washington MOU, secs. 6 and 7; Texas SMC, secs. 5 and 6.

[80] Washington MOU, sec. 8; Texas SMC, sec. 7.

[81] Washington MOU, sec. 9; Texas SMC, sec. 8.

[82] Washington MOU, sec. 10; Texas SMC, sec. 9.

[83] Washington MOU, sec. 4.4; Texas SMC, sec. 3.2.

[84] Washington MOU, sec. 1.3.

[85] Washington MOU, sec. 3; Texas SMC, sec. 1.3.

[86] Texas SMC, sec. 1.9.

[87] “Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between Her Majesty and the Republick of Texas. London: T.R. Harrison,1842,” Tarlton Law Library, last modified April 15, 2019, accessed April 14, 2024, https://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/treaty. 

[88] Texas SMC, third and fourth whereas clauses.

[89] Washington MOU, third and fourth whereas clauses.

[90] Washington MOU, sec. 3.3.

[91] Texas SMC, sec. 1.10. 

[92] Washington MOU, sec. 1.6.

[93] Washington MOU, sec. 3.

[94] Washington MOU, sec. 4.

[95] Washington MOU, sec. 4.3.

[96] Washington MOU, sec. 4.5.

[97] Texas SMC, sec. 3.

[98] Texas SMC, sec. 3.3.

[99] Texas SMC, sec. 3.4.b.

[100] The USMCA’s preamble notes the priorities of “health, safety, environmental protection, [and] conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources,” and Chapter 24, titled “Environment,” states the promotion of “high levels of environmental protection” and “sustainable development” (Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada). Climate change and the Paris Agreement are not mentioned, presumably because the USMCA was negotiated by the Trump administration.

[101] Washington MOU, sec. 11.

[102] Texas SMC, sec. 10.

[103] For global data trends on most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates from 1981–2021, see “Tariff Rate, Most Favored Nation, Simple Mean, All Products (%),” The World Bank, accessed April 18, 2024, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.SM.FN.ZS.

[104] Smith Caron, “How to Import a Car to the UK from Abroad Successfully?,” Caranalytics, February 2024, accessed April 24, 2024, https://www.caranalytics.co.uk/guides/how-to-import-a-car-to-the-uk-from-abroad-successfully/; Julia Kagan, “Chicken Tax: What It Is, How It Got the Name,” Investopedia, last modified January 15, 2024, accessed, April 24, 2024, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chicken-tax.asp.

[105] “Trade Talks between UK and US Set to Get under Way,” BBC News, May 4, 2020, accessed April 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-52528821. 

[106] “United States is the top producer and exporter of corn, soybeans, sorghum, wheat, cotton, beef, poultry, dairy products, nuts, fruits, and vegetables. The country has a highly diversified and mechanized agricultural sector that benefits from large-scale farms, high yields, innovation, and subsidies” (“7 Countries That Dominate the World’s Agricultural Exports,” Rexcer Blog, accessed April 20, 2024, https://blog.rexcer.com/worlds-largest-agricultural-exporters/ ).

[107] “UK Would Be ‘Insane’ to Let in Chlorinated Chicken, Farmers Say,” BBC News, February 25, 2020, accessed April 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51626525.

[108] Baylen Linnekin, “Britain Finally Relaxes GMO Rules, but Advocates Want More Deregulation,” Reason, May 21, 2022, accessed April 20, 2024, https://reason.com/2022/05/21/britain-finally-relaxes-gmo-rules-but-advocates-want-more-deregulation/.

[109] Chris Morris notes, “[S]ome British farmers fear a deal with Australia could threaten their livelihood” and that foreign agricultural imports could mean, quoting National Farmers Union President Minette Batters, the “slow, withering death of family farms” (“UK-Australia Trade Deal: What Are the Arguments for and Against?,” BBC News, June 17, 2021, accessed April 17, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/57173498). Even if these complaints are taken with a grain of salt, they could have an impact on future UK FTAs.

[110] World Trade Organization, the International Trade Centre, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Tariff Profiles 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_tariff_profiles22_e.pdf.

[111] Jayson Beckman, “Do Tariff-Rate Quotas Function as Intended by the World Trade Organization?,” USDA Economic Research Service, March 1, 2021, accessed April 22, 2024, https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2021/march/do-tariff-rate-quotas-function-as-intended-by-the-world-trade-organization/. 

[112] Peter Ungphakorn, “With Little Fanfare, the US Splits Its Tariff Quotas for UK and EU Exports,” Trade Beta Blog, July 5, 2021, accessed April 22, 2024, https://tradebetablog.wordpress.com/2021/07/05/us-splits-tariff-quotas/.

[113] As a BBC News report notes, a U.K. trade agreement with the United States “could boost the [British] economy by between 0.07% and 0.16% over the next 15 years” (“Trade Talks between UK and US”).

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